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UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND


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Headquarters U.S. Southern Command
Chief of Staff, Major General Jon A. Norman, USAF
Date: 26 April 2018 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: ___ Deny in Full: ___ Declassify in Part: _X_
Reason: Sec. 3.3 (b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(6)
MDR: SC 16-031-MDR; 186 pages

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HISTORICAL REPORT (U)
1988



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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
APO MIAMI 34003



UNCLASSIFIED

S: 1 October 1989

SCJ3

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT STAFF, ATTN: ACTION MANAGEMENT DIVISION, WASHINGTON DC 20301-5000

SUBJECT: USSOUTHCOM CY 88 Historical Report

A. SM-414-88 dtd 23 May 1988

1. The U.S. Southern Command Historical Report for 1988 is forwarded in accordance with the reference.

2. When separated from the classified enclosure, this letter is regraded UNCLASSIFIED.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

1 Encl

D. F. CHANDLER
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief of Staff

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I

TOPICAL ITEMS

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PERSONNEL ORGANIZATION (CY 88)

KEY STAFF MEMBERS - HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

COMMANDER IN CHIEF (SCCC)

General Frederick F. Woerner, Jr., USA, Jan - Dec 88

POLITICAL ADVISOR TO USCINCSO (SCFA)

(b)(6) - Dec 88

SPECIAL ADVISOR FOR REGIONAL AFFAIRS (SCRF)

(b)(6) Jan - Dec 88

COMMAND INSPECTOR GENERAL (SCIG)

(b)(6) Jan - Jul 88
(b)(6) Aug - Dec 88

SCIENCE ADVISOR (SCSA)

(b)(6) Jan - Dec 88

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ADVISOR (SCIA)

(b)(6) Jan - Dec 88

SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR COMMAND SUPPORT (SCAS)

(b)(6) Jan - Dec 88

DEPUTY COMMANDER IN CHIEF (SCDC)

Major General Eugene H. Fischer, USAF, Jan - Dec 88

CHIEF OF STAFF (SCCS)

Rear Admiral Richard C. Ustick, USN, Jan - Dec 88

COMMAND STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE (SCSJA)

(b)(6) Jan - Dec 88

OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER (SCCM)

(b)(6) Jan - Dec 88

DIRECTOR, PUBLIC AFFAIRS (SCPA)

(b)(6) Jan - Dec 88

COMMAND SURGEON (SCSG)

(b)(6) Jan - Jun 88
(b)(6) Jun - Dec 88

COMMAND PROVOST MARSHALL (SCPM)

(b)(6) Jan - Dec 88

DIRECTOR, ENGINEER (SCEN)

(b)(6) Jan - Apr 88
(b)(6) May - Dec 88

SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS (SCRA)

(b)(6) Jan - Nov 88 (Dec vacant)
(b)(6) Jan - Nov 88
Dec 88

DIRECTOR, MANPOWER, PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION (SCJ1)

(b)(6) Jan - Dec 88

DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE (SCJ2)

Brigadier General John F. Stewart, USA, Jan - Dec 88

DIRECTOR, OPERATIONS AND PLANS (SCJ3)

Brigadier General Marc A. Cisneros, USA, Jan - Dec 88

DIRECTOR, LOGISTICS, (SCJ4)

(b)(6) Jan - Jun 88
(b)(6) Jul - Dec 88
Navy

DIRECTOR, STRATEGY, PROGRAMS AND POLICY (SCJ5)

Brigadier General James J. LeCleir, USAF, Jan - Dec 88

DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS AND AUTOMATED SYSTEMS, (SCJ6)

(b)(6) Jan - Jun 88
Jul - Dec 88

DIRECTOR, TREATY AFFAIRS CENTER (SCTA)

(b)(6) Jan - Dec 88

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (SOCSO)

(b)(6) Jan - Dec 88

COMMAND CHAPLAIN (SCCH)

(b)(6) Jan - Dec 88

U.S. COAST GUARD LIAISON OFFICER (SCCG)

(b)(6) Jan - Dec 88 | Navy

JOINT TASK FORCE BRAVO (JTF-B)

(b)(6) Jan - Jul 88
(b)(6) Jul - Dec 88

WASHINGTON LIAISON OFFICE

(b)(6) Jan - Dec 88

INDICATIONS AND ANALYSIS CENTER (IAC)

(b)(6) Jan - Dec 88

US SOUTHERN COMMAND COMPONENT COMMANDS

COMMANDER, 12th AIR FORCE, BERGSTROM AFB, TX (12AF)

(b)(6) Jan - Jun 88
Jun 88 - Dec 88

COMMANDER, US ARMY SOUTH (USARSO)

(b)(6) Jan - Dec 88

COMMANDER, US NAVY SOUTH (USNAVSO)

Rear Admiral Gerald E. Gneckow, USN, Jan - Dec 88

COMMANDER, USAF SOUTHERN AIR DIVISION

(b)(6) Jan - Dec 88

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MANPOWER

(U) The FY 88 Joint Manpower Program (JMP) for HQ USSOUTHCOM as of 1 Jan 88 was approved by JCS MSG 071225Z Apr 87, FY 88 JMP for HQ USSOUTHCOM and JCS MSG 260110Z Aug 87, FY 88 Revised JMP for HQ USSOUTHCOM:

HQ USSOUTHCOM

JMP Part II - Joint Table of Distribution (JTD):

STAFF ELEMENT	OFF	ENL	CIV	TOTAL
Commander in Chief	6	0	3	9
Deputy Commander in Chief	1	0	1	2
Chief of Staff	4	3	2	9
Treaty Affairs	4	1	2	7
J1	6	10	2	18
J2	20	14	7	41
J3	61	22	6	89
J4	12	3	4	19
J5	27	6	4	37
J6	19	54	6	79
RAD	11	3	8	22
Comptroller	0	0	4	4
Public Affairs	3	2	3	8
Staff Judge Advocate	4	1	2	7
Command Surgeon	6	2	1	9
Command Engineer	4	1	1	6
TOTAL	188	122	56	366

SERVICE	OFF	ENL	CIV	TOTAL
Army	88	70	56	214
Air Force	59	32	0	91
Navy	25	18	0	43
Marine Corps	16	2	0	18
TOTAL	188	122	56	366

JMP PART III - Joint Mobilization Augmentation (JMA) at M+1: This remained constant throughout CY 88

SERVICE	OFF	ENL	CIV	TOTAL
Army	51	57	0	108
Air Force	31	12	0	43
Navy	29	48	0	77
TOTAL	111	117	0	228

(U) The FY 89 JMP (effective 1 Oct) for HQ USSOUTHCOM was approved by JCS MSG 252152Z Apr 88:

HQ USSOUTHCOM

JMP Part II - Joint Table of Distribution (JTD):

STAFF ELEMENT	OFF	ENL	CIV	TOTAL
Commander in Chief	6	1	3	10
Deputy Commander in Chief	1	0	1	2
Chief of Staff	4	3	2	9
Treaty Affairs	7	2	4	13
J1	5	13	4	22
J2	20	29	7	56
J3	61	21	4	86
J4	12	3	3	18
J5	32	8	11	51
J6	18	36	6	60
Comptroller	0	0	4	4
Public Affairs	3	2	3	8
Staff Judge Advocate	4	1	2	7
Command Surgeon	6	1	1	8
Command Engineer	4	1	1	6
TOTAL	183	121	56	360

SERVICE	OFF	ENL	CIV	TOTAL
Army	86	71	56	213
Air Force	58	31		89
Navy	23	17	0	40
Marine Corps	16	2	0	18
TOTAL	183	121	56	360

(U) Significant manpower actions within HQ USSOUTHCOM during calendar year (CY) 1988:

(U) From 25 February to 10 March the JCS Manpower Survey and Evaluation Team conducted a survey of HQ USSOUTHCOM's, manpower vs. work load being performed. This survey resulted in a recommended net increase of 98 billets (60 military and 38 civilian).

(U) RAD was integrated into the J5 Directorate.

(U) HQ USSOUTHCOM-J1 Manpower Division completed surveys of all sixteen of the MILGP's assigned. These Surveys resulted in a net recommended increase of 23 billets.

(U) HQ USSOUTHCOM realigned eight billets to its subordinate command SOCSOUTH.

(U) In Nov 88 SECDEF directed the implementation of the VANDER SCHAAF STUDY which created a 3% decrease in HQ USSOUTHCOM manning. These reductions will occur in FY 90 and FY 91.

OTHER USSOUTHCOM ACTIVITIES

(U) The JMP for the Indications and Analysis Center (IAC) as of 1 Jan 88 was approved by JCS MSG 272351Z Jun 87, FY 88 JMP for Three USCINCSO Subordinate Activities:

INDICATIONS AND ANALYSIS CENTER (IAC)

JMP Part II - Joint Table of Distribution (JTD):

SERVICE	OFF	ENL	CIV	TOTAL
Army	11	11	4	26
Air Force	7	3	0	10
Navy	7	3	0	10
Marine Corps	1	0	0	1
TOTAL	26	17	4	47

JMP Part III - Joint Mobilization Augmentation (JMA) at M+1: This remained constant throughout CY 88

SERVICE	OFF	ENL	CIV	TOTAL
Army	3	7	0	10
Air Force	4	6	0	10
Navy	5	7	0	12
TOTAL	12	20	0	32

(U) The FY 89 JMP (effective 1 Oct) for the Indications and Analysis Center (IAC) was approved by JCS MSG 182223Z Apr 88, FY 89 JMP for three USCINCSO subordinate activities:

INDICATIONS AND ANALYSIS CENTER (IAC)

JMP Part II - Joint Table of Distribution (JTD):

SERVICE	OFF	ENL	CIV	TOTAL
Army	10	11	4	25
Air Force	7	3	0	10
Navy	7	3	0	10
Marine Corps	1	0	0	1
TOTAL	25	17	4	46

(U) The FY 88 SOCSOUTH JMP was implemented IAW JCS MSG 280015Z JUN 87, initial JMP for SOCSOUTH:

SOCSOUTH

JMP Part II - Joint Table of Distribution (JTD):

SERVICE	OFF	ENL	CIV	TOTAL
Army	5	3	0	8
Air Force	1	2	0	3
Navy	0	1	0	1
TOTAL	6	6	0	12

(U) The FY 89 SOCSOUTH JMP (effective 1 Oct) was implemented IAW JCS MSG 182223Z Apr 88:

SOCSOUTH

JMP Part II - Joint Table of Distribution (JTD):

SERVICE	OFF	ENL	CIV	TOTAL
Army	7	3	1	11
Air Force	5	2	0	7
Navy	1	1	0	2
TOTAL	13	6	1	20

(U) The FY 88 JTF-B JMP was implemented IAW JCS MSG 272351Z Jun 87, FY 88 JMPs for three USCINCSO subordinate activities:

JOINT TASK FORCE BRAVO - (JTF-B)

JMP Part II - Joint Table of Distribution (JTD):

SERVICE	OFF	ENL	CIV	TOTAL
Army	4	0	0	4
Air Force	2	0	0	2
TOTAL	6	0	0	6

(U) The FY 89 JMP (effective 1 Oct) for USSOUTHCOM JTF-B was approved by JCS MSG 182223Z Apr 88. The number and type of billets authorized remained unchanged throughout CY 88.

(U) Security Assistance Organization (SAO) manning, as authorized by various JCS messages, was as follows throughout CY 88:

SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS (SAO)

(b)(3) 10 U S C § 424

DIA

(U) The JMP for USSOUTHCOM Special Activities was approved by JCS MSG 272351Z Jul 87, FY 88 JMPs for three USCINCSO subordinate activities and remained unchanged throughout CY 88:

USSOUTHCOM SPECIAL ACTIVITIES


JMP Part II - Joint Table of Distribution (JTD):

ACTIVITY	OFF	ENL	US CIV	LWR CIV	TOTAL
USMILGP Guatemala	1	1	0	0	3
USMILGP Venezuela	2	1	0	0	2
TOTAL	3	2	0	0	5

PLANS AND EXERCISE

(U) REDUCTION OF OFF POST PERSONNEL (ROPP): Mar 1988 - Reduction of Off Post Personnel was instituted and continued throughout the entire calendar year. The goal of ROPP was to reduce the number of the DOD families residing off U.S. defense sites and military areas of coordination. Dependent travel to Panama was restricted until government quarters were available for occupancy. By Dec 88, the number of off post command sponsored personnel had been reduced by 63%.

(U) REDUCTION IN TOUR LENGTHS: Sep 1988 - As a result of the restriction on dependent travel and to encourage unaccompanied tours, the standard tour length for Panama was reduced from 36 month accompanied and 24 month unaccompanied to 30 months and 15 months respectively. This change was made retroactive to Mar 1988.



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INTELLIGENCE

~~(C)~~ PERSONNEL: Significant personnel changes occurred within the USSOUTHCOM Intelligence Directorate during CY 1988. In order to provide for an acting Director in BG Stewart's absence, the position of Vice Director was created. [redacted] (b)(5) [redacted] (b)(6) and [redacted] (b)(6) were appointed to the positions of Vice Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Deputy Director for Plans and Programs, respectively. Navy

~~(C)~~ REORGANIZATION: Major shifts took place within the Directorate's Indications and Analysis Center (IAC). Owing to the current intelligence work load, the Regional Estimates Branch was abolished in June. In response to the increasing threat, U.S. Government interest and Command Group tasking, the Panama section of the IAC's Country Analysis Branch became the Panama Analysis Cell (PAC) and took on a separate existence from the Central America Branch. With the establishment of the PAC, IAC was augmented with additional personnel to both respond to numerous taskings and provide analyses to high-level consumers. In addition, a Crisis Action Team requiring 24 hour manning by IAC personnel was created. As the situation normalized somewhat, the PAC was reincorporated into the Central America Branch.

(U) RELOCATIONS: Logistical changes occurred when the Security Division moved from Bldg. 150, Quarry Heights to Bldg. 237, Gorgas Hospital Administrative Office, Ancon. During the course of CY 1988, manpower in this division was gradually reduced from six personnel to two. The Security Division operated without a field grade officer for the months of August and September.

THE PANAMA CRISIS: LESSONS LEARNED.

~~(S/NF)~~ Actions taken by the J2 during the Panama Crisis fall roughly into five categories: organization, augmentation, planning, collection, and reporting and production. Although at various points during the crisis one or more of the aforementioned areas received additional emphasis, all received special attention. Although U.S. policy objectives -- removal of Noriega and restoration of democracy -- never changed, there were two distinct phases of implementation.

[redacted] Section 3.3 (b)(1) Joint Staff

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(S/NF) J2 PANAMA TASK FORCE: Early in the crisis J2 USSOUTHCOM established a Panama Task Force which took personnel from all J2 directorate divisions and was the focal point of J2's Panama effort. It contained three elements, outlined as follows. The analysis division provided an analytic cell, a support cell, crisis action team support and a collection management cell. The task force liaison element coordinated intelligence actions among J2, JTF-PM and the various intelligence components and units in theater. Finally, the task force's planning cell provided intelligence support for all contingency planning, developed intelligence estimates, provided targeting support and fulfilled mapping requirements.

(S/NF) JOINT TASK FORCE - PANAMA (JTF-PM): Joint Task Force - Panama was formed within U.S. Army South (USARSO) to concentrate on the Panama crisis. J2 USSOUTHCOM directed J2 JTF-PM to focus on the tactical capabilities of the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) while economic, political, and regional implications remained the responsibility of the Indications and Analysis Center (IAC). Within JTF-PM, a Joint Intelligence Task Force (JINTF) was planned, staffed, and coordinated to avoid duplication of tasking, collection, production, and reporting among the multi-service intelligence units supporting JTF-PM.

(S/NF) [redacted]

Sec 3.3(b)(1) (b)(3) 10 USC 424

DIA/Joint Staff

(U) PLANNING.

(S/NF) J2 personnel developed contingency intelligence plans to be employed in country under a series of four JCS directed operations orders. Intelligence plans dealt with all facets of theater intelligence; incorporated the JINTF organization; developed command and control relationships, and outlined a communications infrastructure to ensure connectivity.

(S/NF) [redacted]

Sec 3.3(b)(1)

DIA

(S/NF) The directorate was concerned that Noriega might not be negotiating in good faith, and did not share the optimism of many in Washington who believed that Noriega's political demise was imminent. Consequently, the J2 developed a phase plan wherein the command would be positioned to execute options, if necessary. Central to this plan was a series of thresholds and points to move from one phase to the next. This plan was briefed to high level visitors from D.C. and was central in developing contingency plans after the negotiations collapsed.

(U) COLLECTION.

(S/NF) [redacted] Section 3.3(b)(1)

(S/NF) [redacted] Section 3.3(b)(1)

(S/NF) [redacted] Section 3.3(b)(1)

(S/NF) [redacted] Section 3.3(b)(1), (b)(3), 10 USC 424

Joint Staff
DIA

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN PANAMA
Through 14 November 1988

1987	
1 June	(b)(6) retired.
6 June	voices allegations.
8-10 June	Initial disturbances.
11-29 June	State of Emergency (SOE).
20 June	Legislature voted to extend SOE.
26 June	U.S. Senate passes resolution on Panama.
30 June	OAS vote.
10 July	First great concentration - Opposition (5-10,000).
26 July	Student shot dead in El Valle; press shut down.
27 July	(b)(6) arrested.
6 August	Second great concentration - Opposition (30-40,000).
7 October	Nine U.S. service members arrested.
18 October	Noriega receives NU "Victorious October Medal".
26 November	AEROFLOT Flight 5331 arrives at Torrijos International Airport. U.S. AID requested to leave Panama.
1988	
5 January	Delvalle signs law to reopen press.
5 February	Noriega indicted in U.S. grand jury.
25 February	Delvalle announces Noriega's separation.
26 February	Delvalle and Esquivel separated from the government.
3-5 March	Banks close.
16 March	Coup attempt.
28 March	Raid on the Marriott Hotel.
12 April	Marine killed at Arraijan Tank Farm (ATF).
19 April	Engagement at AMMO Supply Point.
20 April	Engagement at Howard AFB.
May	Negotiations for Noriega's "retirement".
25 May	Negotiations for Noriega's "retirement" fail.
19 July	Two separate firefights with unknown intruders at ATF.
Early Sep.	Labor unrests begin.
18 Sep.	National Institute entered by PDF, students dislodged.
19-21 Sep.	Sea and airports occupied by PDF.
23 Sep.	"Subversive" arrests begin.
29 Sep.	U.S. Army cannon seized by PDF at Las Minas.
31 October	Several firefights with unknown intruders at ATF.
14 November	Several PDF promotions, retirements and position changes.

III. ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE ISSUES.

(U) COUNTER-NARCOTICS OPERATIONS:

~~(C)~~ Throughout CY 1988, the Directorate was deeply involved in the crisis action planning effort in response to DoD's legislated detection and monitoring role in U.S. government counter-narcotics operations. Intelligence support shall be provided to both host nation military/police forces, in order to improve their ability to monitor the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S., as well as to other U&S Commands to maximize the effectiveness of their own detection and monitoring efforts on and over Caribbean and Pacific.

~~(S)~~ In addition, a jointly manned cell composed of 33 billets will be assigned to USSOUTHCOM J2 and dispersed among three locations to include Washington, D.C., Quarry Heights, Panama, and various Latin American countries as required. Said cell is to be equipped with tempested IBM-compatible equipment for communications between HQ USSOUTHCOM and country teams where the cells are deployed.

(U) LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (LIC): The LIC model with its three sets was submitted to Department of the Army DCSINT who in turn forwarded it [redacted] (b)(3) 10 USC 424 with the recommendation that it be the basis for joint doctrine on Low Intensity Conflict. [redacted]


(b)(3) 10 U S C § 424 — DIA

(U) INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS. The following ongoing and projected intelligence plans were developed during the Theater Intelligence Architecture Program (TIAP) to implement national and theater policy strategies while improving and increasing support to the Command's missions in this region. These programs were outlined in various documents including Defense Guidance, USCINCSO's Integrated Priorities List, Defense-wide Intelligence Plan, General Defense Intelligence Program, and the Service POMs.

~~(S)~~ [redacted]

Section 3.3(b)(1) — Joint Staff

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(S)

Section 3.3 (b)(1)

Joint Staff / NGA

(S) UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE:

Section 3.3 (b)(1)

(S)

Section 3.3 (b)(1)

Joint Staff

(C)

Section 3.3 (b)(1)

(S)

Section 3.3 (b)(1)

(S) [redacted]

Section 3.3 (b)(1)

Joint Staff

(S//NF) [redacted]

Sec 3.3 (b)(1) (b)(3) 10 USC 424

DIA

(S) INTELLIGENCE UPGRADES: 470th MI Bde upgrades include 5 sub-elements, outlined as follows, to fill critical theater intelligence gaps in technology and personnel.

(S) [redacted]

Section 3.3 (b)(1)

(S) REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE TRAINING SUPPORT ELEMENT: Regional Intelligence Training Support Element (RITSE) provides intelligence sharing and training support to LATAM countries. RITSE assists and trains allied military organizations and consists of 15 personnel functioning as a cadre element. This will prove to be a key element in preparing LATAM nations to assume more active responsibility and capability for applying military power.

Joint Staff

(S) [redacted]

Section 3.3 (b)(1)

(S) PORTABLE ELECTRONIC SUPPORT MEASURES SYSTEM: Portable Electronic Support Measures System (PESMS) is a COMINT system to provide direction in finding/intercept capability. It will exploit communications used by hostile military forces, insurgents and drug traffickers.

(S) [redacted]

Section 3.3 (b)(1)

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(S) STAMP: STAMP is a joint USSOUTHCOM/Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) effort to produce mapping products in coordination with selected LATAM host nations. STAMP utilizes host nation production capabilities and enhances DMA liaison efforts with host nation mapping agencies.

(S) [redacted]

Section 3.3 (b)(1)

Joint Staff

(S/NF) EL SALVADOR ASSESSMENT: USSOUTHCOM J2 participated in an assessment of the Salvadoran Armed Forces and provided recommendations as to how to address the insurgency threat envisioned over the next five years. The final product, "Combined Assessment of the Armed Forces of El Salvador", was published 1 September 1988. The results were briefed to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and Salvadoran President Jose Napoleon Duarte.

(U) MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SHARING/SUPPORT PROGRAM. (SCJ2-OI)

(C/NF) 1988 continued the momentum started in 1987, and saw a dedicated and largely successful effort to increase military intelligence sharing and support. Based on established country priorities, SCJ2-OI continued to foster military intelligence to military intelligence relationships with individual countries. A program of military intelligence assessments of MI needs and capabilities was implemented, working in conjunction with the respective US country teams, with the purpose of developing long range plans to address those needs and shortfalls.

(S/NF) [redacted]

Section 3.3 (b)(1), Section 3.3 (b)(6), (b)(3) 10 USC 424

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(U) EXERCISE PARTICIPATION: Exercise participation by SCJ2 personnel was limited to joint exercise Largo Paso with CI and AR. Exchange visits with ES, HO, GT, EC, and PE included orientation/ familiarization visits to USSOUTHCOM by distinguished MI senior officers, and in-country visits by SCJ2. In summary, 1988 saw the fruition of dedicated efforts to design, develop, and implement the SCJ2 Intelligence Support Program, with the resultant enhancement of military intelligence professionalism of L. allies. [redacted]

(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. § 424 DIA

(S/NF) [redacted]

Section 3.3 (b)(1) Section 3.3 (b)(6) Joint Staff

(U) SECURITY: (SCJ2-PS) Certain changes concerning security operations occurred as a result of the relocation of SCJ2-PS to Gorgas Hospital. The division's previous location in Quarry Heights provided greater accessibility and visibility, while security actions were more timely in crisis situations because of proximity. However, such accessibility was frequently abused by the "casual drop in" who had ill defined queries. This often impeded pro-active planning and interfered with scheduled operations. Although this problem could have been solved more easily by enforcing more stringent management procedures, the physical distance now means that queries are given more careful consideration (while an increasing number of issues are dealt with by telephone) and casual visits have virtually ceased.

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OPERATIONS

(U) PANAMA.

(U) Panama was at the forefront of Current Operations activity throughout 1988. The crisis in Panama began in 1987 when the former Chief of Staff of the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF), Diaz Herrera, accused General Noriega of narco-trafficking and implicated him in the death of Hugo Spodafora, a Panamanian opposition leader. Panamanian-US relations plummeted when a US grand jury indicted Noriega on 5 Feb 1988. During the early months of the year, several Crisis Action Teams (CAT) were formed to handle various problems. These included Martyr's Day on 9 Jan when approximately 200 pro-Noriega Panamanians protested outside the back gate of Quarry Heights. Numerous anti-Noriega demonstrations occurred throughout Panama City, as well.

(U) Current Operations command and control responsibilities were maintained through the Joint Operations Center (JOC). One method of notifying military personnel, dependents, and U.S. citizens of unrest was through the use of Personnel Movement Limitations (PML's). The JOC notified component command centers of changes to PMLs depending upon the situation or intelligence reports. Demonstrations which were anticipated or occurring throughout the Republic of Panama (ROP) resulted in a PML status change. PML notifications were posted at the exits to installations and announced over Southern Command Network (SCN). Frequent changes were made during the first few months. The command remained at PML "A" for the remainder of the year.

~~(C)~~ On 25 February, President DelValle announced that he was relieving General Noriega as the Commander of the PDF. A CAT was formed which remained in operation until 1 July. While it was periodically reduced to a response cell, the drain on personnel demanded that Current Operations be augmented by other Divisions within the SCJ3 Directorate. To maintain continuity, the Deployable Joint Task Force (DJTF) of the J3 Directorate was incorporated into the Current Operations Division. It was separated into a distinct organization again in October.

~~(C)~~ In March, augmentation forces were deployed to protect American lives due to the decrease in stability within the host nation. The 6th Fleet Anti-Terrorist Support Team (FAST) Platoon of the Marine Corps Security Force (MCSF) Battalion arrived in Panama on 15 March. On 16 March 1988, there was an unsuccessful coup attempt against Noriega. Forces continued to flow into the theater under the following schedule:

19 Mar 88 519th MP Bn w/ 3 Cbt Spt MP Co's
4 Apr 88 Air Base Security 5 X ABGD Flts & 3 X SP Dog Sqds
5 Apr 88 Elem, 7th CAB w/ Air Recon Trp & Cbt Avn Co
5 Apr 88 503rd MP Bn w/ 3 Cbt Spt MP Co's
6 Apr 88 MARFOR Cmd Elem, Co I, 3/4 Mar & FAST
22 Jun 88 B/1/7 SFG (-) 4 X ODAs + 1 X ODB

(U) The overall control of augmentation was handled by the Current Operations Branch in the CAT. A separate CAT was also formed using DJTF personnel to handle Operation Golden Pheasant from March through April. Golden Pheasant was a deployment of the 18th Airborne Corps into Honduras following an incursion by the Nicaraguans in an attempt to destroy Contra Logistics and C2 bases. The Golden Pheasant CAT functioning simultaneously with the Panama CAT created personnel demands due to the limited manning level of the USSOUTHCOM staff. During this period, the entire directorate was used as operators to supplement the Current Operations Branch.

(U) To allow the staff to maintain a regional outlook, Joint Task Force-Panama (JTF-PM) was activated on 9 April 88. It was located at the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at Fort Clayton and commanded by [redacted] All forces dedicated to Panama were OPCON to JTF-PM and included the Army Forces (ARFOR), Air Force Forces (AFFOR), Navy Forces (NAVFOR), and Marine Corps Forces (MARFOR). JTF-PM was still in operation at the end of 1988.

(U) Augmentees from CONUS units were used as Emergency Action Officers in the JOC. This began in July and continued throughout the year and included junior officers and senior noncommissioned officers. Permanent party NCO's remained in the JOC providing continuity. The augmentees, who were TDY for 90 days, assisted in day-to-day functioning. Overall, these men and women performed magnificently. JOC augmentation continued throughout the year.

(C) While JTF-PM compiled all reports from its components, this did not relieve the Current Ops Branch from reporting all incidents to the National Military Command Center (NMCC). Intrusions by unknown persons increased through the year. The two areas where intruders most frequently tested US resolve were the Arraijan Tank Farm (ATF) and the Ammunition Supply Point (ASP). On the night of 12-13 April, an unidentified unit was located in the ATF and Marines became involved in a fire fight Prior to this, intrusions had been viewed as being a nuisance, mainly due to hunters/poachers. Subsequent to 15 April, statistics were maintained and intrusions intensified. The ATF and ASP became testing grounds for the use of night vision devices and ground sensors within the theater. Current Operations tracked intrusions and submitted OPREP-3 reports on incidents which involved use of deadly force by either intruders or US forces. In 1988, there were 15 intruder initiated exchanges of fire and 17 initiated by US forces. Intrusions after 15 April are listed by monthly totals:

MONTH	ARRAIJAN TANK FARM	AMMO SUPPLY POINT, RODMAN
APR	3	1
MAY	2	0
JUN	4	2
JUL	8	9
AUG	10	2
SEP	5	3
OCT	34	35
NOV	23	34
DEC	15	7

(U) One US service member was killed in the Arraijan Tank Farm during 1988. On the evening of 12 April, [redacted] (b)(5) [redacted] (b)(3) 10 U S C § 130b (b)(6) was killed by friendly fire. The shooting was initiated as a result of the sound of a trip flare detonated by another member of the same patrol. Navy

(U) Relations with the PDF continued to deteriorate throughout the year. Anti-US incidents had to be identified, reported, tracked, and responded to by Current Ops as they occurred. Examples of these incidents included:

(U) 22-23 Feb 88: 33 US Forces personnel were arbitrarily detained in retaliation for the detention of General Noriega's daughter and son-in-law the previous evening for erratic driving and speeding on Albrook AFS. The majority of detainees were on motorcycles. The service members were detained for wearing their uniforms to work in spite of Treaty provisions.

(U) 3 Aug 88: A female US Army Sgt was detained by two members of the PDF. She was pulled from her vehicle, searched and fondled extensively by both PDF. $6 was removed from her wallet and briefcase. Once the PDF members realized she was pregnant, she was released.

(U) 13-16 Aug 88: US Forces mail was detained at Tocumen Air Base. PDF denied access to US forces mail personnel on five separate occasions. The PDF expressed concerns over their internal security in the airport area.

(U) 29 Sep 88: The PDF seized a 120mm cannon barrel at the Port of Las Minas. It was to be used in testing at the Tropic Test Center. The Panamanian press was summoned for propaganda purposes and a PDF press conference was held in the afternoon. The barrel was returned to US control at Las Minas the following day.

(U) 1 Nov 88: A headless body wrapped in plastic and white sheets was found by the steps of the USARSO international lawyer's apartment. Located nearby was a .38 cartridge and the severed head. Investigation suggested that this incident was designed as a tool of intimidation.

(U) 11 Nov 88: A DOD civilian was detained for crimes against the security of the Panamanian state. He was incarcerated for 5 days. He was drawing pictures of the Presidential Guard Uniforms (his hobby).

(U) 13 Nov 88: A Petty Officer was detained by three DNTT PDF members at the Torrijos Airport for illegal parking. He was instructed to follow the PDF to Ancon Traffic Court, but was instead led to a secluded area. A PDF member then demanded the PO's watch and ring, which he refused. The PO was pulled from the car and beaten, a gun was held to his head and was discharged. The PO was not hit and the PDF fled from the scene. The PO fainted, awoke and returned to his command.

(C) Concern for augmentation forces was a high priority within Current Operations. The first request from USSOUTHCOM for the drawdown of forces was made on 17 July for the following units:

HHD, MP Bde (54)	1 x HHD, MP Bn (47)	Surv Plt (20)
Air Traffic Cont (3)	3 x MP Co (415)	3 x TC Det ,(40)

(C) On 28 July, JCS authorized redeployment of all units recommended, less MP forces. The proposed redeployment of MP units met strong resistance at the State Department and raised concern in the National Security Council. Redeployment was approved at the highest levels. On 31 Aug 88, SCJ3 requested the Commander JTF-PM to conduct a complete force requirement review of all augmentation forces. In Sep 88, JCS issued the order to redeploy the MP brigade and battalion headquarters and three companies. On 14 Dec 88, the following were identified to JCS for redeployment by JTF-PM.

USMC Cmd Elem (170)	2 x ABGDFs (88)	HHD, MP Bn (44)
USMC Rifle Co (242)	2 x MP Co's (266)	Spec Ops Co (57)
SIGINT Spt Elem (10)	2 x SOLCA (5)	Area Sig Co (9)
Tac Jamming Tm (11)	I&S Plt (10)	Tele Monitor (1)
Mvt Control Tm (2)	A/DACG (10)	NSA Crypto Tm (4)
Air Recon Trp/Cbt Avn Co (285)		

SECURITY AUGMENTATION REMAINING.

1 x MP Co (133)	Loud Spkr Tm (16)	2 x SOLCA (5)
3 x ABGDFs (132)	USMC FAST (53)	1 x AC-130
3 x Dog Sqds (18)	Opn Spec/Radiomen (6)	Sensor Spt (10)

(C) JCS approved the redeployment plan for augmentation forces on 19 Dec 88, however, it met resistance at OSD/ISA. The plan remained under consideration at the end of the year.

(U) Other concerns for augmentation units worked by Current Operations included a shortage of adequate billeting throughout Panama. The MARFOR arrival placed severe strains on the abilities of Naval Station, Rodman to provide adequate billeting. Due to the uncertainty of redeployment and hazy command responsibilities, Current Operations became directly involved addressing the billeting situation when it affected the operational capabilities of the MARFOR commander. The Marine Company remained in the Rodman gymnasium throughout the year. By the end of the year, the Naval Station requisitioned 40 pre-fabricated buildings to house the Marines.

(C) EL SALVADOR ASSESSMENT: In August 1987, the US Ambassador to El Salvador, the Hon. Mr. Corr, passed a request from the Chief of Staff of the Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF), General Blandon, for USSOUTHCOM to conduct an assessment which updated a study conducted previously by General Woerner in 1981. The study was to focus on ESAF organization, training, operations, and equipment. BG Cisneros, Director, J3 was appointed Chief of the Assessment Team, made up of over 50 representatives from USSOUTHCOM, its components, the ESAF, the US Military Group, and representatives from CONUS based organizations. Parameters and organization were developed during

Oct-Dec 87 by both US and ESAF representatives. In country research and coordination was conducted during Jan - Feb 88. Study results were briefed to the President Duarte of El Salvador in April and in May to the Chairman, JCS.

~~(C)~~ UPPER HALLAGA VALLEY SURVEY: Upper Hallaga Valley (UHV) Survey. In November 1988, Current Ops deployed two members for a site survey in the UHV of Peru. This deployment was in response to a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) request for assistance, processed through the Secretary of State. JCS tasked USSOUTHCOM to conduct the survey. DEA and the Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics Matters (INM) were considering expansion of their narco-trafficking interdiction and drug crop eradication efforts in the UHV. Due to the threat in the UHV from both narco-traffickers and insurgent (Sendero Luminoso and MRTA) forces, USSOUTHCOM was asked to assess and make recommendations on the security of DEA/INM and the Peruvian Guardia Civil (GC) facilities in the valley at Tingo Maria and at the Santa Lucia forward base camp. Assessment and recommendations from a facility engineering perspective, to include the proposed runway at Santa Lucia, were also requested. In addition, USSOUTHCOM was tasked to assess the possibilities for use of radar in the UHV for detection/tracking of narco-trafficking aircraft.

~~(C)~~ The survey was headed by the Deputy Provost Marshal from Current Operations and included an engineer (SCEN), a radar specialist from Current Ops, a security operations/force protection specialist (SOCSOUTH), and a representative for JCS/J3. The five man team deployed to Peru for a one week period, three days of which were spent in the UHV itself with the remaining time engaged receiving threat briefings before moving to the UHV and post survey report preparation and briefings to the Ambassador in Lima.

~~(C)~~ The team provided a comprehensive, no holds barred assessment and frank, hard hitting recommendations. This highly productive survey resulted in Ambassador Watson sending a personal message to General Woerner thanking him for the survey for making "solid, constructive contributions to our counter-narcotics program (in Peru)." The Ambassador stated, "The suggestions and recommendations they informally shared with me ... are realistic, real world and to the point -- I have already asked our people to begin implementing some of them. I appreciate your help, and commend your team for the excellent work it did while here.

(U) COSTA RICAN FLOOD RELIEF: In January 1988, Costa Rica experienced flooding in the area around Limon. On 30 January, The Office of Disaster Assistance (OFDA) requested USSOUTHCOM helicopter support for disaster relief. SCJ3 directed USARSO to support. USARSO deployed two UH-60's at 0755 on 31 January. The task force was commanded by LTC Paris and consisted of 6 pilots, 1 technical inspector, 2 crew chiefs, 1 medic, 2 fuel handlers, a logistics NCO, a communicator, and two unarmed security personnel, (17 total). The team flew 34,000 lbs of food and clothing to isolated locations and performed three medevacs using 39.6 blade hours during operations. The task force returned to Howard AFB at 1318 on 6 February 1988.

(U) SEARCH AND RESCUE (SAR): Current Operations was involved in 8 SAR missions in 1988. This included a request from the PDF to assist in locating a Casa Aviocar 212 reported missing on 30 January 1988. Assistance provided included refueling support from USARSO for PDF aircraft. Two CH-47's with four fuel bladders and four technicians were flown to Garachine. USAFSO was tasked to use the alert bird (C-130) to assist in locating the missing aircraft on 31 Jan and again on 4 Feb, and flew a total of 8.7 hours. On 5 Feb, USARSO launched two UH-60's and flew a total of 9.1 hours. The PDF finally located the crash site approximately 43 miles southwest of LaPalma Airport in the Darien. All 16 persons aboard the aircraft died.

(U) VISIT OF BG SALAZAR: Current Operations was also responsible for the 13-18 Oct 88 visit of Brigadier General Luis (Salazar) Monroe of the Peruvian Armed Forces. This was in an exchange between the Director of Operations, BG Cisneros and the Peruvian Comando Conjunta, at the suggestion of General Woerner. BG Salazar was the Chief of the 3rd Division in the Combined Defense (C3) of Peru. BG Salazar was presented briefings on the functioning of the J3 Directorate and the Joint Operations Center and was flown to Washington DC to visit the National Military Command Center on 17 October. This visit was an outstanding success and a great deal of rapport was built between BG Salazar and BG Cisneros.

(U) ANTI-DRUG SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS: On 8 Dec, the Joint Chiefs of Staff published a warning order. This directed all CINC's to prepare an assessment of how their command could best support DOD in complying with the 1989 Defense Authorization Act. This Act required that DOD serve as the lead agency in the detection and monitoring of the transit of illegal drugs into the US. The J5 Directorate was given the lead. Current Ops provided expertise in preparing the CINC's assessment (OPREP-1). It was transmitted on 23 December.

~~(C)~~ REPORTING: Current Operations, and in particular, the JOC was extremely busy providing reports to the NMCC throughout the year. Beginning with the crisis on 25 Feb, a daily Situation Report (SITREP) was required at a minimum. In addition, there were 51 incidents which required transmission of an OPREP-3, and 11 which resulted in OPREP-3 PINNACLES.

(U) C-12 SUPPORT: The Air Operations Branch of Current Ops continued to provide airlift support to HQ, USSOUTHCOM and visiting dignitaries. Numerous missions were supported for all directorates of the command which resulted in the justification and approval of a permanent deployment of C-21 aircraft at HAFB. This aircraft is to support USSOUTHCOM airlift requirements as early as Jun 89.

(U) CARIBBEAN BASIN RADAR NETWORK (CBRN): Air Operations updated the CBRN required operational capability document (ROC7-84) to ensure system requirements satisfy current political, economical, and operational realities. Air Operations also developed CBRN concept of operations document and provided guidance to quickly involve CBRN in the war against drugs.

(U) OPLANs: During CY 1988, Current Ops assisted in the preparation of OPLAN 6666-88, 6600-88 and 6601-88.

(U) PERSONNEL: By the end of 1988, Current Ops was composed of 9 officers, one NCO and two secretaries. The JOC was composed of 1 officer and 6 NCO's permanently assigned and 4 officer and 1 NCO augmentees. On a personal note, (b)(6) was selected as the USSOUTHCOM NCO of the year.

(U) ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW): Two EW officers were assigned to the Current Ops branch in 1988. Prior to this, there had been no coverage of EW on the USSOUTHCOM staff.

DEPLOYABLE JOINT TASK FORCE (DJTF)

(U) INTRODUCTION: The DJTF, which was established in 1987, continued receiving the manpower authorized by JCS. During 1988 the DJTF grew from 10 to 23 personnel. Although these personnel were resident in Panama, only 14 were available full time to the DJTF because of diversions to other Directorates (one to J-5, 2 to USSOCSO, and the rest to Current Operations).

(U) CRISIS ACTIONS: During the year two events greatly influenced the operational tempo and focus of USSOUTHCOM and the DJTF. Both events, the Panama and Honduras Crisis, occurred simultaneously causing the need for split Crisis Action Teams (CAT). Initial DJTF focus and priority was on the Honduras CAT in support of Operation Golden Pheasant. All aspects of Golden Pheasant were handled by the DJTF from Building 150 and later within the tunnel complex. As Golden Pheasant abated, emphasis shifted to the Panama Crisis and the DJTF took over the tunnel complex and was designated fully responsible for the Panama CAT until mid June.

(U) PANAMA CRISIS: From March to July 1988 the DJTF assumed responsibility for the Panama Crisis CAT and integrated numerous elements of the USSOUTHCOM staff into the operation. The CAT, working around the clock became the focal point for information processing and problem resolution during a period of increased threat to American lives and property.

(U) GOLDEN PHEASANT: The DJTF formed a Honduran CAT from March to April 1988. During this time the DJTF authored CINC assessments and monitored the sensitive situation between Honduras and Nicaragua. The DJTF was not deployed due to the commitment of personnel to both the Golden Pheasant and Panama CATs.

~~(S)~~ DJTF MISSION MODIFICATION: By October 1988 the need to augment the Operations section had abated and DJTF was again separated as a distinct entity. After a re-examination of USSOUTHCOM capabilities to support a real-world crisis, the mission of the DJTF was modified to include exercise deployment, theater contingencies (limited), theater contingency support to XVIII Abn Corps, and disaster relief/SAR operations.

~~(S)~~ A C2 initiative assigned the "C" Module mission to the XVIII Abn Corps while retaining the "A" and "B" Modules for USSOUTHCOM. AOR missions allowed the DJTF to more realistically plan, train, and execute deployments in support of exercises as a player in either the CPX or FTX mode.


(U) As a first step, the DJTF conducted a successful CPX/COMMEX during November which validated equipment availability and communications capabilities. For this exercise, the JCSE JACP/CC aircraft was employed and all equipment and associated items essential for rapid deployment and mission accomplishment were inspected. The exercise greatly increased DJTF readiness and capability to deploy.

(U) EQUIPING THE DJTF: Equipment to support DJTF operations were ordered using C2IP funds for communications items and O&M funds for CTA authorized items. An Operations Project was submitted to HQDA to establish the baseline for equipment authorizations for DJTF operations and a warehouse at Corozal assigned to store DJTF items in a "POMCUS"-like configuration. By the end of the year equipment to support ADVON and Alpha Module deployments had been identified, ordered, and tasked to providing units to allow for the CY 89 deployment of the DJTF. Equipment was no longer a critical factor hampering deployment.

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~~(S/NF)~~ [redacted] Section 3.3 (b)(1), (b)(6)

(U) PERSONNEL: Personnel shortages continue to be a problem in the JRC. Three NCO's and one Officer were sent TDY to JRC during 1988, also JRC borrowed two NCO's from another division within the J-3. JRC is authorized 5 Officers and 5 NCO's. Although JRC is receiving personnel as authorized, abnormal losses have occurred. One Officer emergency PCS for health reasons and one NCO had his clearance pu[illegible] for conduct unbecoming.

~~(S)~~ [redacted] Section 3.3 (b)(1), (b)(6)

~~(S)~~ [redacted] Section 3.3 (b)(1), (b)(6)

~~(S/NF)~~ [redacted] Section 3.3 (b)(1), (b)(6)

~~(S/NF)~~ [redacted] Section 3.3 (b)(1), (b)(6)

~~(S)~~ [redacted] Section 3.3 (b)(1), (b)(6)


~~(S)~~ [redacted] Section 3.3 (b)(1), (b)(5)

~~(S)~~ JITTERY PROP: Jittery Prop continued to provide naval surface support off the Pacific coast of Central America.

~~(S)~~ [redacted] Section 3.3 (b)(1)

Joint Staff

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~~(S/NF)~~
Section 3.3 (b)(1) (b)(6)
Joint Staff

JOINT/COMBINED EXERCISES

(U) INTRODUCTION: The FY88 USSOUTHCOM Joint Exercise Program consisted of 6 JCS-Directed, 11 JCS-Coordinated, and 1 JCS-Sponsored exercise. 3 USCINCSO initiatives (Short Duration Exercises) were conducted to broaden the scope of the USSOUTHCOM Exercise Program to countries where no JCS exercises were programmed. 4 exercises were cancelled for political or economic reasons.

a. (U) DIRECTED EXERCISES
- (1) AHUAS TARA 88
- (2) GOLDEN PHEASANT
- (3) CABANAS 88
- (4) FUERTES CAMINOS 88 (NORTH)
- (5) FUERTES CAMINOS 88 (SOUTH)
- (6) KINDLE LIBERTY 88 (cancelled: political situation in Panama)

b. (U) COORDINATED EXERCISES
- (1) KING'S GUARD 88-I
- (2) KING'S GUARD 88-II
- (3) FUERZAS UNIDAS CHILE 88
- (4) FUERZAS UNIDAS ECUADOR 88
- (5) FUERZAS UNIDAS URUGUAY 88
- (6) FUERZAS UNIDAS PERU 88-I
- (7) FUERZAS UNIDAS PERU 88-II
- (8) FUERZAS UNIDAS BOLIVIA 88 (cancelled by host country)
- (9) FUERZAS UNIDAS PARAGUAY 88
- (10) FUERZAS UNIDAS COLOMBIA 88 (cancelled by US embassy: terrorist threat)
- (11) ELLIPSE ECHO 88 (cancelled: political situation in Panama)

c. (U) JCS-SPONSORED CPX
- (1) PROUD SCOUT

d. (U) USCINCSO INITIATIVES (Short Duration Exercises)
- (1) FUERZAS CONJUNTAS 88
- (2) MAPEX ARGENTINA 88
- (3) ABSALOM GUATEMALA 88

(U) EXERCISE SUMMARIES. JCS-DIRECTED EXERCISES.

~~(S)~~ AHUAS TARA 88 (AT 88): AHUAS TARA 88 is an annual JCS-Directed, USSOUTHCOM-Sponsored and conducted Combined/Joint exercise. AT 88 was originally scheduled as a three phase exercise. Phase I was an engineer exercise to provide support for follow-on field training exercises. This exercise also supports contingency related construction for USCINCSO OPLANS. All engineer work was conducted in Honduras using three separate engineer task forces operating under the control of JTF-B, and with Honduran engineer forces. Engineer work sites were established at Puerto Lempira, San Lorenzo, Goloson, and La Mesa.

Phase II was a CPX originally scheduled for 12 Feb - 27 Feb 88. Because of concerns that the exercise would jeopardize the Central American Peace Accords (CAPA), the exercise was deferred until 26 Sep - 8 Oct 88, and was conducted using an Absalom Battle Simulation in Tegucigalpa Honduras at the request of the Honduran Estado Mayor.
The Phase III FTX was not conducted. It was originally scheduled for 30 Mar - 20 Apr 88, but was deferred for the same reasons as Phase II - (CAPA). Phase I of AHUAS TARA used much of the sealift dollars available for this exercise after MSC was forced to pass on much higher sealift costs than had originally been anticipated. Attempts to reschedule this exercise later in the year were not successful since there were no periods acceptable to both the host nation and the supporting commands.

(U) Objectives for the AHUAS TARA exercise series follow:

a. ~~(S)~~ Continue with present U.S. force presence in CENTAM, reassure friendly Caribbean nations and deter aggression in the region.

b. ~~(S)~~ Develop and use common tactical and logistical procedures to support combined/joint operations.

c. ~~(S)~~ Improve the professionalism and confidence of participating Honduran Military Units.

d. ~~(S)~~ Improve the readiness of participating U.S. units in combating Guerrilla Forces.

e. ~~(S)~~ Exercise selected elements of USCINCSO OPLANS/CONPLANS.

f. (U) Conduct JLOTS Operations.

~~(S)~~ EXERCISE ANALYSIS: Objectives A through D were met during various phases of AHUAS TARA in FY 88. Because the FTX was not conducted, objectives E and F were not met through AHUAS TARA 88. However, GOLDEN PHEASANT 88, an unscheduled FTX conducted in Honduras during March, met the USSOUTHCOM requirements for objective E. Objective F will be met during I of AHUAS TARA 90.

~~(S)~~ PHASE I PROJECT VALIDATION: The engineer work accomplished during Phase I of AHUAS TARA 88 was scheduled for validation during Phase III of the same exercise. Fortunately, although Phase III was not conducted, several other exercises made use of the projects completed during the engineer phase. During GOLDEN PHEASANT 88, The airfields of Jamastran and Aguacate were available for employment because of previous AHUAS TARA exercise related construction. The port and airfields at San Lorenzo were used during a deployment for training involving over 1000 Marines. the only projects still requiring validation are the airfields at Puerto Lempira and Mocoron. These facilities will be validated during CABANAS 89.

(U) SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENTS DURING AHUAS TARA.

(U) Phase I of AHUAS TARA employed three simultaneous engineer task forces from the Army, Navy and Air Force. All were under the operational control of JTF-B. The cross service cooperation in accomplishing all assigned tasks was notable. Units shared equipment, personnel, and expertise to assure that all projects were completed to design specifications.

~~(C)~~ There was more personal involvement by the Honduran Armed Forces for Phase II of AHUAS TARA. The Battalion Staffs that were assigned to work with the U.S. in developing OPORDS, THREAT OB, AND MSEL'S were much better prepared than in previous exercises and the combined planning was conducted on a more equal footing.

~~(S)~~ GOLDEN PHEASANT 88: GOLDEN PHEASANT 88 was an unscheduled JCS-Directed show of force conducted in Honduras in March 1988 in response to an unprecedented buildup of Nicaraguan Troops on the Honduran border, and significant cross-border incursions by the Sandinistas. Two Battalions of the 82D Airborne Division and two Battalions from the 7th Infantry Division (Light) were inserted into Honduras with only a few days advance warning. They conducted combined training with Honduran Forces.

~~(S)~~ EXERCISE OBJECTIVES.

a. ~~(S)~~ Establish a U.S. Force presence in CENTAM, reassure friendly nations and deter aggression in the region.

b. ~~(S)~~ Improve the professionalism and confidence of participating Honduran Military Units.

c. ~~(S)~~ Improve the readiness of participating U.S. Units.

d. ~~(S)~~ Exercise selected elements of USCINCSO OPLANS/CONPLANS.

~~(S)~~ EXERCISE ANALYSIS: This exercise replaced AHUAS TARA 88 Phase III in the exercise Schedule. It accomplished many of the same exercise objectives, and although not of the scope or duration as the original AT FTX, demonstrated the ability to insert a task force on short notice in response to a crisis situation.

~~(S)~~ CABANAS 88: CABANAS 88 was originally planned as a special operations exercise. It was to be located in the Mocoron- Puerto Lempira area of Honduras, to validate previous exercise related construction. When it became apparent that the Panama crisis, precluded committing the resources for a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), The USSOUTHCOM J3 directed that CABANAS be redesigned with a conventional scenario. With only eight weeks to accomplish all necessary planning, a Joint Task Force and maneuver element were identified. Using 7th Infantry Division (Light) HQ as a nucleus and augmented by USSOUTHCOM and 12th Air Force, a Joint Task Force Headquarters was formed with an ARFOR out of 7th ID and an AFFOR out of 12th Air Force. U.S. Forces deployed into Honduras

from 26 July - 15 Aug 88 and conducted combined operations with the Honduran Armed Forces. This exercise stressed use of conventional forces fighting a Guerrilla threat in a Joint/Combined environment.

(U) OBJECTIVES OF CABANAS 88.

a. (U) Exercise a Joint Headquarters Staff in the planning and execution of military operations with emphasis on command, control, communications, and intelligence procedures.

b. (U) Demonstrate U.S. resolve throughout the region.

c. (U) Enhance readiness and improve the capability of participating forces.

d. (U) Promote interoperability and standardization between Honduran and U.S. Forces.

~~(S)~~ EXERCISE ANALYSIS: This exercise accomplished it's primary objective of providing a credible force presence in Honduras during a period of heightened tension. It provided valuable experience in the development of an ad hoc JTF with very little advance notice. It offered excellent combined training opportunities with the Honduran Armed Forces particularly in the areas of control of combined air space, U.S. aviation support of Honduran Operations, and coordination of ground forces in combined OPS. This exercise did not however, test the special operations community as it was originally designed to do. Combined planning between Honduran and U.S. Forces was good, but development of combined doctrine, equipment interoperability, and standardization of procedures are areas where much additional work is required. A greater willingness on the part of the Hondurans to conduct combined planning, indicates a trend observed over the past year that the Hondurans are trying to become more proactive.

(U) FUERTES CAMINOS (NORTH): FUERTES CAMINOS (BLAZING TRAILS 88) is a combined US/Honduran exercise involving rotational units from U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard Engineer Forces, augmented by regular forces. They deployed into Honduras to build a road opening up the Aguan Valley between Yoro and Jocon. The inclusive dates for this exercise were from 14 Dec 87 to 14 May 88. Honduran Engineer Forces were employed to assist in a combined engineer construction effort.

(U) EXERCISE OBJECTIVES.

a. (U) Enhance the readiness of participating U.S. and Honduran Units.

b. (U) Provide the USARNG, and USAR the opportunity to deploy to a remote CONUS Location to fulfill annual training requirements.

c. (U) Expose USARNG, USAR, and USA Engineer Units to a bare-base tropical training environment.

d. (U) Develop a positive image in the host country toward the United States Government and its armed forces through humanitarian and civic action activities.

e. (U) Promote economic infrastructure development within the host country.

(U) EXERCISE ANALYSIS: FUERTES CAMINOS 88 accomplished all training objectives. Most deficiencies noted during recent army audit agency reports regarding previous FUERTES CAMINOS exercises were corrected by using durational personnel in key billets. They provided corporate memory and experience to ensure that the exercise proceeded smoothly. Improvements were observed by actual progress in road building. Issues such as host country reimbursement of fuel and interim maintenance still require resolution.

(U) FUERTES CAMINOS-SOUTH 88: FUERTES CAMINOS-SOUTH (BLAZING TRAILS/ABRIENDO RUTAS) was a combined U.S./Ecuadorian exercise involving rotational units from U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard Engineer Forces, with limited active component augmentation. The task force deployed into Ecuador initially in May 1987 as BLAZING TRAILS 87. This exercise extended beyond the Fiscal Year. The portion beginning 1 Oct 87 and ending on 1 Dec 87 became FUERTES CAMINOS-SOUTH 88. Ecuadorian Engineer Forces were employed to assist in a combined engineer construction effort.

(U) EXERCISE OBJECTIVES.

a. (U) Enhance readiness of participating forces.

b. (U) Provide USARNG, and USAR conduct annual training in a remote OCONUS location.

c. (U) Expose USARNG, USAR, and USA engineer units to a bare-base tropical training environment.

d. (U) Develop a positive image in the Host Country toward the United States Government and its armed forces through humanitarian and civic action activities.

e. (U) Promote economic infrastructure development within the host country.

(U) EXERCISE ANALYSIS: FUERTES CAMINOS-SOUTH 88 accomplished all training objectives. Humanitarian/Civic Action Projects developed a positive image toward the United States in the exercise areas. However, political problems were encountered throughout the exercise due to the Ecuadorian Presidential Elections, held immediately following the exercise. The extended presence of U.S. troops permitted the Ecuadorian leftist opposition to mobilize a campaign of disinformation that was effective in the area surrounding the capital. This exercise was successful in spite of the challenging physical and political conditions.

(U) EXERCISE SUMMARIES, JCS-COORDINATED EXERCISES.

~~(C)~~ Section 3.3 (b)(5)

Section 3.3 (b)(5)

Navy

(U) EXERCISE OBJECTIVES.

a. (U) Promote interoperability and standardization among regional Naval Forces.

b. (U) Exercise C3 procedures for Joint/Combined Naval Operations.

c. (U) Exercise integration of Joint/Combined surveillance systems and procedures.

d. (U) Evaluate combined Naval Patrol and interdiction doctrine.

e. ~~(C)~~ Improve cooperation and trust between the Naval Forces of Honduras and Guatemala.

~~(C)~~ EXERCISE ANALYSIS: These exercises are small in scale involving from 50 to 70 US personnel. Because of their regularity and support by the Government of Honduras, they are among the most popular exercises in Central America. The plan is to increase Third Country participation and to include U.S. Marines in future force lists. Both initiatives have been well received.

~~(C)~~ FUERZAS UNIDAS 88 - CHILE (FU 88 - CI): FUERZAS UNIDAS - CHILE is an annual JCS-Coordinated/USSOUTHCOM Sponsored exercise. FU 88 - CI consisted of a Joint/Combined CPX in the Capital City of Santiago and a combined FTX conducted in the coastal town of Pichidangui, approximately 100 kilometers northeast of Santiago. Both activities were executed simultaneously 11-14 July 1988. The CPX involved US Army and Air Force personnel, conducting a First Battle: Battalion to Corps (FB:BC) Wargame CPX, with members of the Chilean Army's Academia De Guerra (C&GSC equivalent), using notional combat forces. The FTX, an airborne medical response exercise, involved Joint/Combined medical personnel assets in a national disaster evacuation scenario. The exercise was executed despite the impending Chilean National Plebescite to determine if General Penochet would remain in power beyond 1989. Political sensitivities not withstanding, this exercise, the only one of its kind in Chile

during FY 88, received wide exposure at the Chilean Army Officers Corps level. The only significant problem originated in Chilean politics, as the FTX site was changed from the town of Santa Clara to Pichidangui to minimize US contingent visibility.

(U) EXERCISE OBJECTIVES.

(U) FOR THE CPX IN SANTIAGO, CHILE:

a. (C) Employ the First Battle (FB:BC) battle simulation in Division/Brigade level CPX.

b. (C) Plan and execute defensive/offensive operations.

c. (C) Emphasize administrative/logistics play, in addition to fire and maneuver, during wargaming.

d. (C) Exercise the functions of commanders and joint/combined staffs while accomplishing joint tactics training.

e. (C) Enhance US-Chilean military relations and interoperability.

(U) FOR THE FTX:

a. (C) Exercise planning procedures required in response to a natural disaster requiring medical support.

b. (C) Exercise procedures for the initial evaluation/assessment of a simulated natural disaster.

c. (C) Promote military relations and interoperability between Chilean and US Armed Forces medical personnel.

(C) EXERCISE ANALYSIS: All objectives were met by the end of the exercise. This was the first year that a CPX wargame was conducted in Chile and complemented with computer system support.

(U) SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENTS.

(C) The CPX was for the first time a truly joint/combined activity with participation by the Chilean Army, Air Force, and Navy. The most significant breakthrough was the involvement of the intermediate class of the Academia de Guerra, doubling the number of Chilean participants in the exercise. Chilean Officers from other units and military institutions also viewed game play as observers.

(C) The FTX improved ties among medical professionals from both countries. Medical officers in the Chilean Armed Forces asked for more frequent medical exchanges in future exercises. Airborne operations involving Host-Country and US personnel made the exercise a dynamic one.

~~(C)~~ This year's exercise included the Mississippi National Guard. All US participants--from an assortment of CONUS and Panama-based units--were under the operational control of a Joint Task Force Commander from HQS USSOUTHCOM.

(U) FUERZAS UNIDAS 88 - ECUADOR (FU 88 - EC): FUERZAS UNIDAS 88 - ECUADOR is a JCS-Coordinated/USSOUTHCOM-Sponsored exercise. This exercise, was last conducted in 1986. 1988 was a combined Air Force FTX, conducted at the Taura Air Base, 60 kilometers east of Guayaquil. This combined exercise involved US F-16's and a composite fighter squadron from the host country with F-1 (MIRAGES), KFIR'S, and JAGUARS. This was a two phase exercise. Phase I (20-24 June), designated as an interoperability training period and; Phase II (27-29 June) the FTX portion of the exercise.

(U) EXERCISE OBJECTIVES.

a. (U) Demonstrate continued support for Ecuador.

b. (U) Demonstrate US resolve throughout the region.

c. (U) Exercise command, control, and communications of a deployed Air Force Task Force.

d. (U) Enhance military relations and interoperability between the Armed Forces of Ecuador and the U.S.

~~(C)~~ EXERCISE ANALYSIS: The Panama crisis prevented the deployment of USSOUTHCOM assigned forces. Therefore, elements from the 388th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) from Hill AFB, Utah were the only US Forces participating in this year's exercise. All objectives, except D, were achieved by the end of the exercise. objective D was only partially accomplished in that Air Force to Air Force interoperability was enhanced, but an attempt to add an Army CPX to the exercise was not successful.

~~(C)~~ SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENTS.

~~(C)~~ The exercise exceeded expectations despite the one year hiatus by providing a more visible US presence in the country.

~~(C)~~ The Ecuadorian Army agreed to conduct two command post exercises in FY 89. This should improve Army-to-Army relations and make this exercise a truly joint/combined activity.

~~(C)~~ Air Force-to-Air Force professional ties were strengthened and combined interoperability was enhanced in spite of an adverse political environment.

~~(C)~~ The exercise provided recommendations to the Ecuadorian Air Force on improving their capability to defend their aircraft assets against sabotage and terrorism.

(U) FUERZAS UNIDAS 88 - URUGUAY (FU 88 - UY): FUERZAS UNIDAS - URUGUAY is an annual JCS-Coordinated/USSOUTHCOM-Sponsored exercise.

FU 88 - UY consisted of two combined command post exercise. The Army (ESLABON) CPX and the Air Force (KOMBI) CPX were conducted simultaneously 19-23 September 1988. ESLABON Exercise participants included ECEME; instructors and students, and members of the (US) 193D INF BDE (L) who functioned as a combined staff at the Army division level. KOMBI participants included ECEMA Instructors and students, and USSOUTHAF. These personnel participated in a simulated air wargame to exercise the functions of an Air General Staff in a combined theater of operations. Uruguayan politics during the initial exercise concept development phase, caused the cancellation of a proposed Army FTX consisting of a combined airborne operation. The Uruguayan Armed Forces wanted to execute a low-visibility exercise.

(U) EXERCISE OBJECTIVES.

(U) FOR THE ARMY (ESLABON) EXERCISE:

~~(C)~~ To exercise the functions of a combined staff at Army division level.

~~(C)~~ To develop mutual understanding of contingency response procedures.

~~(C)~~ To develop contingency planning capability.

~~(C)~~ To provide a basic understanding on how a US infantry brigade responds to orders.

(U) FOR THE AIR FORCE (KOMBI) EXERCISE:

~~(C)~~ Exercise a general staff in planning and execution of tactical air operations and control systems.

~~(C)~~ Promote military relationships and interoperability between the US and Uruguayan Armed Forces.

~~(C)~~ Using a simulated air wargame, exercise an air general staff in a combined theater of operations.

~~(C)~~ Employ tactical air forces in a conventional warfare scenario in a combined theater of operations.

~~(C)~~ EXERCISE ANALYSIS: All objectives were met by ENDEX. Although both exercises were conducted at separate sites, there was an exchange of officers between the Uruguayan Army and Air Force--for the first time since exercise inception--at the observer/liaison level.

(U) SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENTS.

~~(C)~~ FUERZAS UNIDAS - URUGUAY is becoming a truly joint/combined exercise.

~~(C)~~ Senior personnel from Uruguayan Military Service Schools will participate in future exercises to expand the exercise program with the Uruguayan Armed Forces.

~~(C)~~ Exchanged information on doctrinal concepts of both ground and air operations. The combined Arms Concept and Close Air Support of Ground Troops was specifically emphasized.

~~(C)~~ Uruguayan Navy acceptance of participation in future exercises opens new possibilities for exercise concept development.

(U) FUERZAS UNIDAS PERU 88-1: This JCS-Coordinated, USSOUTHCOM Sponsored exercise used an ABSALOM counter-insurgency wargame conducted between U.S. Army South and the officer advanced course of the Peruvian Infantry School. It was executed 5-16 Dec 87 in Lima, Peru. The scenario was based in the Ayacucho department of Peru, and represented a Peruvian Counter-Guerrilla Battalion in operations against rural terrorists of the Sendero Luminoso. Primary objectives of the exercise were to create an environment in which the U.S. and Peruvian players could compare and exchange counter-insurgency techniques, and to counter Soviet influence among Peruvian Junior Officers by permitting a professional and personal exchange with U.S. officers of similar grade. Both objectives were accomplished. During preliminary training, the Peruvians received instruction on the ABSALOM simulation, and U.S. players were became familiar with Peruvian organizations and equipment.

During the second week, combined wargaming provided numerous opportunities for the exchange of views. Since most of the Peruvian officers had recently returned from combat in the emergency zones, their observations were of great interest to U.S. participants. This exercise will be repeated in future years as part of USCINCSO'S strategy to reorient Peruvian Military thinking towards the internal vice the perceived external threat.

(U) FUERZAS UNIDAS PERU 88-2: Originally programmed as a simultaneous First Battle CPX and a Joint/Combined FTX, FUERZAS UNIDAS Peru 88-2 was limited to a CPX with the ESCUELA SUPERIOR DE GUERRA (Command and General Staff College-Equivalent) in Lima, Peru 8-20 Aug 88. The Peruvian Joint Staff, citing operational and economic constraints, requested that the FTX be postponed until 1989. The CPX was executed using the first battle simulation modified to reflect Peruvian organizations and equipment. The Wargame proved to be an excellent vehicle for the exchange of views between U.S. and Peruvian participants, and has been incorporated into the curriculum of the ESG. In view of the serious insurgent challenge faced by the Peruvians, USSOUTHCOM hopes to modify the scenario of this exercise towards Counter-insurgency Operations at the departmental (Brigade and Higher) level.

(U) FUERZAS UNIDAS BOLIVIA 88: Originally programmed as a simultaneous Staff Planning CPX and Joint/Combined FTX with associated civic action, was abruptly cancelled in Jan 88 by the Bolivian General Staff. The Bolivians cited "economic and operational constraints" as their reasons for cancelling. More likely, the January 100% turnover in key personnel at the General

Staff caused the new incumbents to be unprepared for a combined planning effort for execution of a Joint FTX by April 88. FUERZAS UNIDAS 89 will include an Engineering Phase dedicated to the improvement of a remote airfield, and will make a significant contribution to economic development in the Exercise area. A Search and Rescue FTX at High Altitudes will be programmed to use the airfield during a subsequent Exercise Phase.

(U) FUERZAS UNIDAS PARAGUAY 88: This was a Combined Staff Planning Exercise with the Paraguayan Command and Staff School in Asuncion, and an Airborne FTX with Associated Civic Action in Mariscal Estigarribia and surrounding villages. The U.S. Country Team stipulated minimum visibility to avoid the impression of providing security assistance to the armed forces of a military dictatorship. Therefore, The FTX portion was executed in the remote Chaco Boreal Region, while CPX activities in Asuncion were low key. The CPX Scenario involved a Paraguayan Corps with an attached U.S. light infantry brigade in conventional defensive operations against an invasion by a fictitious country. The 12 U.S. Participants acted as members of the corps staff during the planning of the defense, and later the brigade staff in planning the brigade's role in the corps counterattack. The FTX involved combined airdrops by a U.S. airborne infantry platoon and two companies of the Paraguayan "SILVIO PETTIROSSI" Airborne Regiment. Seasonal high winds in the Chaco Region and the limited ramp space at Mariscal complicated Airborne Operational Planning, especially since U.S. employment aircraft staged out of Stroessner International Airport in Asuncion. Jumps were conducted using one U.S. C-141 and three U.S. C-130 Aircraft, along with one C-47 and one Caza 212 aircraft from the Paraguayans. One Paraguayan fatality occurred through Paraguayan rigger error and the failure of the jumper to deploy his reserve after main canopy malfunction. Active U.S. efforts to assist in the investigation of the incident and appropriately memorialize the fallen jumper enhanced relations between participating units in spite of the tragedy. The associated civic action projects, were conducted along with the FTX. A combined Medical/Dental Team treated over 3000 patients, mostly children, in four remote villages of the Chaco Boreal. The U.S. Army/Air Force Engineer Team made significant contributions to the quality of life by drilling wells, improving school facilities, and laying concrete surfaces for a church/community center floor and for a school recreation area. Overall, the exercise heightened Paraguayan perceptions of U.S. concern for their country, and increased communications with the Paraguayan military.

(U) EXERCISE SUMMARIES, JCS-SPONSORED CPX.

~~(C)~~ PROUD SCOUT 88 (PS 88): PS 88 was a JCS - Sponsored World-Wide Pre-Mobilization CPX. USSOUTHCOM Used OPLAN 6602 during PS 88. A full Crisis Action Team (CAT) with component and Panama Canal Commission (PCC) Liaisons and CAT Response Cells at the service component HQS was mobilized. The exercise revealed areas where service and/or JCS assistance is needed.

(S) AIR DEFENSE ASSETS: The force list for OPLAN 6602-86 does not include either Air-to-Air or Ground-to-Air Air Defense Assets (ADA). Aircraft in Cuba, Nicaragua or any LATAM Country poses a threat to U.S. Forces and interests, particularly in Honduras and Panama.

(S) JTF-B: Most JTF-B Personnel are TDY, subject to recall in the event of mobilization. Under other global plans, aviation, military police, and intelligence assets all must redeploy leaving little more than a skeleton force of administrative, logistical, medical, and headquarters personnel.

(S) PANAMA IN PLACE FORCES: There are insufficient in-place forces to defend all of the vital facilities in Panama for more than 5 days, without PDF support. Reinforcement is necessary for unilateral defense under current plans. The timely arrival of augmenting forces is delayed since augmentees are reserves and require time for mobilization.

(U) EXERCISE SUMMARIES, USCINCSO INITIATIVES (SHORT DURATION EXERCISES).

(U) FUERZAS CONJUNTAS 88: FUERZAS CONJUNTAS 88 was a USCINCSO initiative to improve military-to-military relations between potentially antagonistic Latin American countries by providing an opportunity for professional development via a combined exercise in a neutral scenario. In March 1988, Argentina and Chile sent delegations from the Armed Forces Joint Staff and the Army War College, respectively, to participate in a ten-day joint wargame in Panama using the Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS). U.S., Argentine, and Chilean officers formed a Joint Task Force Staff, and Ground and Air Component Control Cells to execute a computerized Middle East Exercise (MEEX) scenario. The exercise provided an opportunity for the officers of all three nations to discuss joint doctrine and modern wargaming techniques. The presence of the Argentines and Chileans during a period of significant disturbances and Panama Defense Force reaction also provided them with a first hand understanding of the U.S. Government's policy in Panama. The Latin American officers were fascinated with JTLS, and were eager to repeat this type of exercise in the future.

(U) MAPEX ARGENTINA 88: 24 May through 3 Jun 1988, was the third annual Short Duration Exercise (SDE) conducted between USSOUTHCOM and the Joint Staff of the Argentine Armed Forces. This Combined Staff Planning Exercise used the Largo Paso Joint Scenario employing a U.S. Joint Task Force in support of a fictitious third-world country. A primary objective of the exercise was to evaluate and compare the two countries' systems for the planning of joint operations. The Argentine Joint Planning System was employed for the Deliberate Planning Phase, and the U.S. Crisis Action System was employed for reacting to an unforeseen contingency prior to OPORD Execution. 12 members of the USSOUTHCOM Staff, augmented by three instructors from the U.S. Army School of the Americas to participate with 27 representatives of the Argentine Armed Forces. The Argentines were members of the Joint Staff, The General Staffs of

the three services, and their respective staff colleges. The exercise contributed towards increased military to military cooperation between the U.S. and Argentina, and laid the groundwork for regular combined exercises in the future. A combined first battle CPX between U.S. Army South and the Argentine Command and Staff College was added to the concept for the MAPEX in FY 89

(C) ABSALOM CPX-GUATEMALA: This exercise was a USCINCSO initiative to foster better military-to-military relations between the United States and Guatemala using an ABSALOM Counter-Insurgency Wargame conducted between U.S. Army South and the Guatemalan Army's Center for Military Training, Conducted 9-13 November 1987. The scenario was located in an area of Guatemala threatened by guerrilla forces, and represented a Guatemalan Counter-insurgency Battalion in operations against a rural insurgent threat. Primary objectives of the exercise were to create a realistic scenario for U.S. and Guatemalan participants to exchange counter-insurgency techniques and plan and execute defensive and offensive operations at battalion level. The Guatemalans were firmly committed and highly motivated to conduct the exercise and have institutionalized the exercise at their training center. A similar exercise is planned in following years and beginning in FY-92 will become a JCS Exercise, "FUERZAS UNIDAS-GUATEMALA".

(U) DFT PROGRAM: The USSOUTHCOM Deployment for Training Program (DFT) continued to grow. 94 DFT'S were conducted in the USSOUTHCOM AOR. Of these, 46 were conducted in Honduras. DFT's are component sponsored and funded, USSOUTHCOM validated exercises. They range from two-man surgical teams, to battalion sized combat arms units. Some of the more visible deployments conducted this year were three battalion sized DFT's of 600-800 men who deployed to Honduras. Two deployments were from the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), and one deployment came from the 82ND Airborne Division. Two deployments of F111'S were made to Howard Air Force Base, Panama in August and September 1988. The purpose of these DFT's was to demonstrate the right of the US to exercise forces under the terms of the Neutrality Treaty. Finally, a surgical team deployed to Honduras to conduct surgery on Honduran children suffering from cleft palates. Over twenty surgical procedures were conducted.

(U) EXERCISE ANALYSIS: The Deployment For Training program is an excellent way to augment the JCS Exercise Program. DFT's require less lead time to plan and can be rapidly tailored to meet CINC'S objectives. Their disadvantage is that since they are component funded they are seldom, if ever, joint and usually not combined, since the primary training beneficiary must by law be the US service member. Combined training is justified however, when it enhances US training objectives and benefits the U.S. service member.

(C) SUMMARY: FY88 was a busy year for USSOUTHCOM. Exercise objectives and goals were accomplished while maintaining force presence and continuing dialogue in the politically active Central and South American Regions. Exercise Optempo exceeded that of 1987 despite significant manning shortfalls in the Exercise Division and command focus on the crisis in Panama.

LOGISTICS

ADMINISTRATION.

(U) JCS MANPOWER SURVEY: The survey generated several collateral actions that provided an overall benefit to the directorate. Preparation for the survey demanded an in-depth review of the USSOUTHCOM MTR, SC Reg 10-1, and research of all source tasking documents. This process strengthened the directorate's identity and clarified to the remainder of the staff, the logisticians role in this unified command. The 26% increase in personnel requirements recognized by the survey team attests to the success of the effort.

(U) ARRIVAL OF NEW DIRECTOR OF LOGISTICS: [redacted] replaced [redacted] as the J4 during this reporting period. Arriving from Camp Pendleton, CA, where he was the G4 of the 1st FSSG, he assumed his new duties on 23 Jul 88. After completing three years as the USSOUTHCOM J4, [redacted] was transferred to HQ USMC in Washington, DC, as Chief, Western Hemisphere Branch, Policy and Strategy Division. Navy

(U) LOGISTICS CONFERENCE: The Directorate of Logistics hosted the USSOUTHCOM Second Annual Logistics Conference 20-21 Jan 88. The conference was held at the 24th COMPWG (then USAFSO) Command Conference Room, Howard AFB. The theme of the conference was "Component Involvement in Supporting USSOUTHCOM's Strategy." It was designed to inform key logistics decision-makers and action officers about the CINC's strategy.

LOGISTICS READINESS AND RESOURCES DIVISION.

(U) OVERSEAS BASING STUDY: This division compiled logistics installation level information organized by service and base complex attachments. Specific information was submitted on the USSOUTHCOM logistics support mission. The overseas basing study was compiled during the month of Jul 88 and will be used as a tool to determine and validate base requirements throughout theater.

~~(C)~~ AHUAS TARA '88: A petroleum tanker discharge facility was constructed in the Gulf of Fonseca, near the town of San Lorenzo, Honduras. The facility is composed of a four point mooring system, a submarine pipeline and an onshore storage and distribution area. This complex gives USSOUTHCOM the ability to introduce bulk petroleum to the southern portion of Honduras. This capability is critical to USSOUTHCOM contingency plans. Prior to the introduction of this system, all fuel consumed in Honduras originated from Puerto Cortez on the Honduras Northern Coast.

(U) COLOMBIAN PETROLEUM SURVEY: A comprehensive review was conducted to determine the optimum means for improving helicopter refueling operations in the Colombian Armed Forces. The study was

requested by the USARSO Colombia Survey Team. The survey team found maintenance problems with Colombian helicopters. Poor fuel quality was believed a primary contributor to these problems.

(U) The USSOUTHCOM JPO conducted a country visit in May 88 during which he visited 12 aviation refuel points. Petroleum equipment maintenance and operational procedures were both poor. Each site had it's own, unique jury-rigged setup. Additionally, petroleum test kits were either nonexistent or incomplete.

(U) The study recommended standardizing equipment throughout the country, improving training for petroleum handlers, and establishing standard operating procedures which emphasize safety and fuel quality. The study also recommended replacing a large portion of the existing petroleum equipment.

(U) PANAMA CRISIS: A full CAT was established on 11 Mar 88.

(U) DOCK WORKERS STRIKE: On 14 Mar 88, The Ports of Balboa (Pier 18) and Cristobal closed. Dock workers went on strike because they had not been paid. On 15 Mar 88, two U.S. Flag carriers transited the canal without discharging container cargo. The carriers returned 10-15 days later and discharged the containers for Panama.

(U) ILL FATED COUP D'ETAT: On 16 Mar 88, a faction within the Panamanian Defense Force attempted to overthrow General Noriega. The attempt was ill planned and poorly executed. There were major demonstrations in Panama City, striking workers blocked roads in Balboa, and Pier 18 entrances were blocked with containers. The PDF established checkpoints throughout the city and began searching cars, checking identification, etc.

(U) MTMC SUSPENDED OPERATIONS: Due to the road blocks and the political activity going on in the MTMC/Pier 18 area, LTC Yon, USA, Commander, MTMC, temporarily suspended operations 161100Z Mar 88. There were 40 U.S. containers on hold in the customs area (18 with commissary dry goods). MTMC operations resumed on 18 Mar 88.

(U) EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION: The crisis increased the workload above what the in-country forces were able to handle for sustained operations. Each component and subordinate unit requested, through their respective services, augmentation equipment and personnel to meet mission requirements. Copies of request are on file in SCJ4. The listings are too numerous to mention here. Of note was the upgrade in secure voice telephonic communications with the purchase of 150 ea STU III units.

(U) PANAMA CRISIS SECURITY AIRFLOW #1: The Panama Security Augmentation Airflow began 182255Z MAR 88 and was completed 241200Z MAR 88. The first airflow required 15 ea C-141 and 2 ea C5A aircraft.

(U) PANAMA CRISIS SECURITY AIRFLOW #2: The second augmentation airflow began 052138Z Apr 88 and was completed on 082359Z Apr 88. The second airflow required 37 ea C-141 and 8 ea C5A aircraft. (The arrival airflow was at the rate of 1 aircraft per hour for 3 days)

(U) GENERAL STRIKE: Teachers, doctors, nurses, and 75% to 85% of Panamanian businesses went on strike in protest of salaries not being paid. Panamanian businesses went on strike to increase the economic pressure on the Noriega Regime.

(U) JOPS TRAINING CANCELLED: USSOUTHCOM conducted JOPS training every six months with TDY teams brought down to Panama. These classes were scheduled during the Mar 88 time frame. Due to the ongoing political crisis, the classes were cancelled, and would not be conducted until the next cycle.

(U) TRAVEL POLICY TO PANAMA: Military air was designated as the primary means of travel for U.S. military coming into and out of Panama. To reduce the flow of traffic into Panama, country clearances were required for official visitors. USTRANSCOM was notified to cease all space available travel to Panama until further notice. In addition, not more than 15 personnel could transit Torrijos International Airport at one time, should military air not be available.

(U) SC REG 10-3 REVISED: The Panama Crisis will be remembered as the longest operating Crisis Action Team in USSOUTHCOM's history. SC Reg 10-3 proved to be inadequate for a long term CAT. Due to the unique opportunity the crisis provided, the regulation was rewritten as the crisis continued.

(U) LESSONS LEARNED: USTRANSCOM is not capable of informing unified commands of cargo inbound on channel missions. In a period of political and civil sensitivity, CATs need to be aware of any arriving channel cargo that may present a problem. (e.g. an Abrams tank cannon being off-loaded during a GOP misinformation campaign of imminent U.S. invasion.)

~~(S)~~ GOLDEN PHEASANT: A combined U.S./Honduran air assault interoperability training exercise starting with an airborne drop over Jamastran airstrip on 20 Mar 88. Two U.S. Infantry Battalions Airborne from Fort Bragg, NC and two U.S. Infantry Battalions Light from Fort Ord, CA, were EDRE'd into Honduras in response to the Nicaraguan invasion over the Honduran border. USSOUTHCOM J4 validated all SAAM requests. Funding for the exercise remained a service responsibility. Costs associated with transport of Honduran forces were recorded and reported to JCS for Title 10 U.S. Code, section 2010 accounting.

~~(S)~~ DEPLOYMENT: Unable to be tracked by USSOUTHCOM due to the Top Secret, urgent nature of the exercise. The airflow began 171200Z MAR 88 and was completed 181330Z MAR 88. A total of 52 ea C-141 and 1 ea C5A aircraft were used for the deployment.

(S) REDEPLOYMENT: Began 281730Z MAR 88 and was completed 310845Z MAR 88. The airflow rate from Soto Cano was 1 ea C-141 per hour for 2 1/2 days. A total of 53 ea C-141 (28 ea for 7IDL and 25 ea for 82d ABN) and 3 ea C5A (1 ea for 7IDL, 2 ea for 82D ABN) were used for the redeployment.

(U) MINI-CAT ACTIVATIONS: Mini-CAT's were activated to handle incidents with the Panamanian Defense Forces at the Port of Las Minas on the Atlantic side, near Colon.

(U) ATTEMPTS TO IMPEDE/RESTRICT USE OF PORT: On 26 May 88, the PDF impeded the offload of the 536th Engineer Battalion's equipment returning from Costa Rica. On 1 Jun 88, the unloading of 2 ea MKT's and 1 ea 5 ton tractor was delayed for several hours by the PDF until a formal U.S. protest resolved the issue. On 12 Jun 88, a vessel with 65 pieces of military equipment bound for Honduras was not allowed to translated cargo to another ship until 13 Jun 88. The translation was finally allowed, but only after permitting a PDF officer to inspect each piece of equipment. The delay cost the contractor $7,000. On 12 Sep 88, the PDF refused to allow a commercial carrier to move U.S. Forces cargo through Las Minas Port without their approval. The items remained "frustrated" in the bonded area for days.

(U) FLAGRANT TREATY VIOLATIONS: On 22 Sep 88, a 120mm cannon from an Abrams tank, bound for Combustible Cartridge Case Testing at U.S. Army Tropic Test Center, and other U.S. cargo containers were seized by the PDF. Four containers were opened and the cannon was moved to Cristobal, both acts are direct violations of the Panama Canal Treaty. The GOP controlled press initiated a large scale propaganda campaign tying the cannon to alleged U.S. subversive activities. A meeting was held 23 Sep 88 in the SCTA Conference Room with MTMC, JAG, J4, and USARSO to discuss the situation. The carrier, Crawley Caribbean Transports, uses the Port of Las Minas exclusively and subcontracts containers (door to door) to consignee. The subcontractor, Terminalis, was not in default. This was the third incident in four months. The cargo was "frustrated" for 12 days. The PDF's intent was to make all U.S. military cargo go before the Combined Board for permission to move. This would give them a data base (already available from ADUANA) and give them control over U.S. movement (i.e. VETO power). The PDF used "safety" as the basis for their actions.

(U) ACTIONS AGAINST U.S. FLAG CARRIERS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF PANAMA: On 3 Oct 88, the Panamanian Port Authority passed Resolution #277-88 against CCT for alleged contrabandage (120mm cannon). USSOUTHCOM forwarded the action to JCS for resolution with the State Department. On 4 Oct 88, a Panamanian Customs Resolution curtailed all CCT activities in the ROP, (CCT operations were resumed on 5 Oct 88 after SCJ3 officials met with the PDF to resolve the issue). On 25 Oct 88 and 2-5 Nov 88, the GOP delayed the exoneration of U.S. cargo arriving at Las Minas Port.

(U) LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT: In response to a JCS J4 directive, SCJ4-L developed a comprehensive Logistics Essential Elements of Information list. The LOG EEI was staffed with USSOUTHCOM components and formatted for input into the intelligence gathering network.

(U) WORKING GROUPS: SCJ4-L provided a representative and/or support to the following USSOUTHCOM working groups: SCJ5 Joint Mission Analysis/Regional Security Strategy, SCJ5 Counter-drugs, SCJ5 Joint Doctrine Committee, and the SCJ6 Joint Tactical C^3 Interoperability Architecture.

(U) CONFERENCE OF LOGISTICS DIRECTORS 1988: The annual COLD conference was held in the Xerox International Center in Leesburg, Virginia, 26-28 Jan 88. The theme of the conference was "Joint Logistics: Today and Tomorrow". The conference was hosted by LTG Edward Honor, Joint Staff, J4.

(U) DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT: SCJ4-L contributed to the development of the following publications, coordinated by the Joint Staff in conjunction with Service Components: JCS PUB 3-07, Low Intensity Conflict, CH VII- Sustainment to LIC Operations; JCS PUB 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security; Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, Annex O; Joint Riverine Operations Review; and JCS PUB 4-01, Joint Logistics Policy and Guidance.

(U) DISASTER RELIEF PLAN UPDATES: SCJ4-L began a review to update the USCINCSO Disaster Relief Plan, to be republished in the spring of 89.

(U) LOGISTICS TEAM TRAINING: Five United States Air Force Combat Logistics Support Squadrons training deployments have occurred under the USSOUTHCOM LTT program. Two deployments went to Guatemala for Aircraft Battle Damage Repair on a C-47 aircraft and Supply Management training. One deployment to El Salvador focused on Rapid Area Distribution Support training during the establishment of a new ESAF Auxiliary Airbase at Comalapa. Another deployment went to Colombia where Supply Management training was conducted under partially automated conditions. Honduras also hosted a training deployment for ABDR on an A-37 aircraft. The USSOUTHCOM program has been a tremendous success with training small teams of both active duty and reserve personnel. The program received a favorable review from the Army Judge Advocate in July. DoD and USAF General Counsels concurred with this review. GAO's evaluation of the LTT program found no violations of the law while cautioning the command to maintain "close scrutiny" over the program. The Director of Logistics is confident that the current controls/guidance for the LTT program will ensure continued development of this important training program for logistics personnel.

(U) USCINCSO SPECIAL PROJECT: In Aug 87, General Adolfo Blandon, Chief of Staff of the Joint General Staff, El Salvador Armed Forces, requested that USSOUTHCOM provide a team to conduct an assessment of the current status of the ESAF in its prosecution of the war. BG Marc A. Cisneros was designated to head the U.S. team. Preliminary meetings were held in El Salvador in October, November and December.

The combined assessment was conducted from 4 Jan to 12 Feb 88. The assessment was briefed to General Blandon on 24 Mar 88 and to President Duarte on 5 Apr 88. Several functional areas were assessed by the team. An evaluation was conducted of all the ESAF logistics support activities and procedures used in support of military operations. The primary objective was to identify weaknesses in the Salvadorian system in order to provide better logistic services and support to military operations. Numerous recommendations were made to include the establishment of a Logistics Support Command.

(U) OFFICIAL VISITORS: LTG Edward Honor, Joint Staff, J4, made an official visit to Col Alonzo 16 Feb 88.

PLANS AND MOBILITY DIVISION.

(U) EXERCISES: Throughout 1988, mobility and logistics planners participated in conferences for the JCS directed and coordinated exercises. Activities included the identification of logistics objectives, validation of strategic air and sealift requests and the management of the JCS exercise budget.

(U) ENVIRONMENTAL MORALE LEAVE: The EML policy for Panama remained in effect, additionally, due to the crisis in Panama EML space available counter service on the Atlantic was initially approved for 90 days. This initial exception to policy was extended for 6 months.

(U) LOGISTICS PLANNING: During 1988 USSOUTHCOM participated in the deliberate planning cycle, including the base case family of plans (6600) and regional plans (6601 and 6666).

(U) CRISIS ACTION PLANNING: SCJ4 logistics and mobility planners supported USSOUTHCOM staff actions in response to the Panama crisis and other crises, such as EXERCISE GOLDEN PHEASANT in Honduras. Experience gained in the use of the Joint Deployment System and the Crisis Action System was instrumental when participating in working groups chaired by the Joint Staff or USTRANSCOM when refining procedures and reviewing systems requirements. Logistics planners attended the annual Joint Planning and Execution System Conference, providing expertise and experiences to the conference working groups.

(U) C-27 STOL AIRCRAFT: The need for this type of aircraft was originally identified in 1984 and validated repeatedly at the highest levels in DoD. There are two phases designed to meet the requirement, Phase I- interim capability using contract airlift and Phase II- acquisition by the U.S. Government for C-27. The contract airlift will consist of five aircraft (CASA 212-200) to support the USCINCSO mission requirements in theater. Acquisition is projected for completion and final fielding during the Fourth Quarter, FY 91. The C-27 aircraft will be an off-the-shelf aircraft capable of carrying 10,000 lbs of cargo in and out of an 1800 foot unprepared airfield. USCINCSO will acquire 10 ea C-27 aircraft giving access to more than 10,000 airfields (1500-3000 feet long) in Central and South America.

(U) MISCELLANEOUS: The majority of 1988 logistics planning activity focused on the preparation of responses to the changing situation in Panama. However, SCJ4 support to regional strategy activities throughout the theater (e.g. JCS and DFT exercise programs, CINC's input to PPBS, and sponsorship of theater infrastructure development) were neither hampered or fully supported with adequate funding.

CUSTOMS DIVISION - USARSO EXECUTIVE AGENT.

(U) REORGANIZATION: The duties of Chief, Customs Division and Military Customs Staff Coordinator (MCSC) were placed under USARSO MP Command and USARSO Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, respectively. The reorganization has allowed the Military Customs Staff Coordinator greater staff oversight of the USSOUTHCOM Military Customs Inspection Program as it's Executive Agent.

(U) COUNTER-DRUG EFFORTS: During 1988, it was learned that false gasoline tanks on POVs were being used to smuggle cocaine to the CONUS. A POV shipment was allowed to continue on to it's planned destination after coordination with US Army Criminal Investigation Division. One controlled delivery of cocaine was made to the New York area. To preclude further smuggling efforts through this method of operation, the command has ordered fiber optics and "bomb buster" equipment. This equipment enables operators to inspect gasoline tanks for "false" inserts and also ensure that vehicle frames, tires, etc. are not utilized for smuggling purposes.

PLANS

(U) INTRODUCTION: During 1988, the SCJ3 Plans Division continued the planning momentum generated during the previous year. A major planning effort unfolded in 1988 in response to the deteriorating political situation in Panama. The Panamanian crisis took center stage throughout most of the calendar year as members of the USSOUTHCOM staff and components developed contingency plans in response to the crisis. Members of the J3 Plans Division played significant roles by providing contingency assessments, developing and refining time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) files, and by providing briefings to the USSOUTHCOM leadership on the status of developing issues. The Systems Support Branch of the Plans Division was responsible for the creation and operation of a WWMCCS/ADP support cell in direct support of the planning effort.

(U) PLANS DIVISION RELOCATION: In early 1988, the Systems Support Branch managed the Plans Division relocation from Building 83 to Building 153, Quarry Heights, following a staff reorganization the prior year which moved the Plans Division from J5 to J3.

~~(S/NF)~~ Section 3.3(b)(1)(5)

~~(S/NF)~~ Section 3.3(b)(1)(5)

Joint Staff

~~(S/NF)~~ POLAR FRONT: In response to a JCS planning order to deal with an anticipated attack by Sandinista forces against Honduras, contingency plans were developed in support of Honduran Armed Forces efforts to repel the Sandinista incursion. Operations Order BINGO CHAMPION was developed and submitted to JCS for review. The OPORD was approved however no significant attack by the Sandinistas occurred.

~~(S/NF)~~ JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH "C" MODULE: Lessons learned from the Panamanian crisis highlighted that USSOUTHCOM and its components lacked the capability to staff a Corps level JTF HQ and simultaneously maintain an operational capability in Panama. Consequently, USCINCSO decided that for corps level contingencies, that the Army Corps force listed against the larger USSOUTHCOM OPLANS/CONPLANS would be designated as the JTF-SO upon execution. USSOUTHCOM's Deployable Joint Task Force would continue to provide the nucleus for JTF-SO for smaller scale contingencies (Army Brigade or smaller).

(S/NF) EMBASSY EMERGENCY ACTION PLANS-(EAP): On site responsibility for preparing the portions of embassy EAP's related to military support/options was transferred from the Plans Division to the Regional Survey Teams (RST) from 3/7 Special Forces Group. The RST's are required to perform security surveys at each embassy and do so on a regular basis. They will prepare USSOUTHCOM inputs to each embassy's EAP and submit it to the Plans Division for staffing and approval. This has resulted in significant savings in man-hours and TDY funds.

(C) NOBLE LEADER: The Commander's Estimate for Noble Leader, a JCS directed, close hold, SPECAT planning effort was submitted to JCS in January 1988. The planning is limited to maintenance awaiting political developments in Latin America.

(C) POTENT ARCHER 88: The CINC'S Conference and Wargame was conducted at NAS Pensacola, Florida on 22-25 AUG 88. The Wargame provided an opportunity for the Chairman, Service chiefs, and CINC'S to meet face-to-face to discuss important global warfighting issues.

(U) OPERATION OF THE SYSTEMS SUPPORT BRANCH: 1988 was the first complete year of operation of a fully staffed Systems Support Branch. Consisting of three people, the branch provided JOPS support to deliberate planners; managed the Joint Deployment System (JDS) WWMCCS data base; fulfilled the WWMCCS Inter-computer Network (WIN) Site Coordination responsibilities; provided user community perspective into DOD-wide efforts to modernize WWMCCS hardware and software; and acted as executive agent for joint planning and execution related training.

(S/NF) PLANNING CELL SUPPORT DURING PANAMA CRISIS: In March 1988 USSOUTHCOM activated a CAT and associated Planning Cell to manage the Panama crisis. The Systems Support Branch of the Plans Division established the WWMCCS support for the Planning Cell which included installation of terminals, establishment of a focal point teleconference, and extensive use of the Joint Deployment System. The teleconference was one of the earliest uses of WWMCCS for focal point communication and was heavily used. The use of JDS was the heaviest ever made of the system by USSOUTHCOM. Multiple time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) files were developed involving coordination throughout the Joint Deployment Community. In addition, the deployment of the security augmentation forces was managed by the branch through the use of JDS.

(C) PLANNING CELL SUPPORT DURING GOLDEN PHEASANT: In March-April 1988 the Systems Support Branch provided WWMCCS support to Operation Golden Pheasant, an EDRE in Honduras. Support consisted of a teleconference and use of the Joint Deployment System to track deployment of forces involved in the EDRE.

(U) OPLAN REFINEMENT CONFERENCES: During 1988, refinement conferences were held for OPLANs 6600, 6601, and 6666. The Systems Support Branch provided JOPS ADP and other WWMCCS support for the development of time-phased force and deployment data for all OPLANS, prior to, during, and subsequent to the conferences.

~~(S/NF)~~ ESTABLISHMENT OF WIN TELECONFERENCE: WIN TELECONFERENCE "SC0029" was established at the "SOUTH" host in Sept. 88 to facilitate the exchange of information between USSOUTHCOM, Service representatives, and transportation operating agencies involved in the development of USCINCSO Base Case OPLAN 6600. Established as the local subsidiary to the BASE CASE 90 TELECONFERENCE, SC0029 has served as a key facilitator for the exchange of OPLAN and CONPLAN development data between key planers down to the component level.

(U) ACTIVATION OF USSOUTHCOM's WWMCCS HOST COMPUTER: In November 1988, USSOUTHCOM's WWMCCS computer was connected to the WWMCCS Inter-computer Network (WIN). In conjunction with that, the Systems Support Branch managed activities involved in relocating teleconferences and files; establishing permissions; coordinating activation of new terminal locations; establishing the Joint Deployment System data base; developing training programs for new users; and other related efforts.

(U) JOINT PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEMS CONFERENCE (JPESC): In July 1988, the Systems Support Branch led a team of 15 representatives from USSOUTHCOM and its components to the annual JPESC at Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Va. USSOUTHCOM participation at the 1988 JPESC was greater than at prior JPESCs because of the command's extensive use of planning and execution systems during the Panama Crisis.

(U) JPOC/JOPS III/JDS COURSES: The Systems Support Branch of the Plans Division, performing as the USSOUTHCOM focal coordinator for joint planning/WWMCCS related training, coordinated the provision of the Joint Planning Orientation Course (JPOC), the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS III) Users Course, and the Joint Deployment System (JDS) Course. Instruction was conducted in Panama in October and November 1988 by instructors from the Armed Forces Staff College, the Air Training Command, and the United States Transportation Command. These courses provided members of the USSOUTHCOM staff and components with training essential to the understanding of deliberate and crisis action planning/deployment, related terminology, and the construction and development of time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) files.

(U) FLAG AND GENERAL OFFICER SEMINAR: As part of the Joint Planning Orientation Course (JPOC) training at USSOUTHCOM, instructors from the Armed Forces Staff College provided a four (4) hour joint planning seminar on 4 Nov 88 to members of the staff and components in the grade of O-6 and above. The seminar featured highlights of the JPOC, provided a forum for discussion of existing and emerging deliberate and crisis action procedures, and presented attendees with information relative to other joint planning related topics.

STRATEGY, PROGRAMS AND POLICY

(U) INTRODUCTION: In 1988 the Strategy, Programs and Policy Directorate (SCJ5) completed the reorganization that was started in 1987. With the arrival of [redacted] Brigadier General LeCleir realigned the directorate with three deputy directors. As Deputy Director for Resources, [redacted] took charge of Research and Analysis and Programming and Requirements divisions which previously reported directly to the director. Other Deputy Directors were: [redacted] Security Assistance and Colonel Holdsworth, Policy and Strategy.

(U) REORGANIZATION: The directorate was directly affected by personnel cuts within the Department of Defense. Officers assigned as Directed Military Overstrength (DMO) began to transfer without replacement. The Small Wars Operational Requirements Division (SWORD) was totally manned by DMOs, and as personnel were detached the division quickly dwindled. SWORD was formally disbanded at the end of the fiscal year, and its major functions were absorbed throughout the staff.

(U) TREATY IMPLEMENTATION: As the Command prepares to honor United States' obligations under the Panama Canal treaties, the Treaty Implementation Planning (TIP) division expanded to include communications, logistics and operations research analysts. An architect was also identified to arrive in 1989. To make room for this expansion, the TIP division moved to building 9, Corozal and occupied part of the space previously used by SWORD.

(U) CIVIL AFFAIRS: On 31 December 1989 the Civil Affairs Branch was transferred to the Operations Directorate (SCJ3). This move provided a better functional alignment by placing the civil affairs branch in the same directorate as the psychological operations branch, the exercise branch and the deployable joint task force.

(U) PERSONNEL: Other major personnel changes in the J5 staff include the transfer of [redacted] the Deputy Director for Security Assistance, who was replaced by [redacted] [redacted] stay was short as he was soon transferred to become Commander MILGP El Salvador. The Deputy Director for Security Assistance billet has been unmanned since [redacted] [redacted] transfer. [redacted], the Deputy Director for Policy and Strategy was replaced by Colonel Mills. [redacted] Chief of the Research and Analysis Division was replaced by [redacted] and the division was redesignated the Joint Wargaming Division. [redacted] [redacted] Chief of the Policy and Strategy Division retired and was replaced by [redacted] [redacted] Chief of the Politico-Military Affairs division was replaced by [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] Chief of the Requirements and Programs division was replaced by [redacted]

(U) US MILITARY GROUP PANAMA: The Panama crisis and the subsequent U.S. sanctions against the Government of Panama reduced the mission of the US Military Group, Panama to planning for possible future programs. This proved to be a short-term personnel windfall for J5 with 3 MILGP personnel being temporarily assigned to the Politico-Military Affairs division and the Coast Guard liaison office. Unfortunately, by the end of the year all were on their way to new permanent duty assignments.

U) DIVISION SUMMARIES: 1988 was an active year for the J5 directorate. Specific directorate activities are addressed in the following divisional summaries.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

(U) INTRODUCTION: The Security Assistance Division manning increased during 1988 to seven action officers, two secretaries, and an admin sergeant. Missions, roles, and functions were approved by the CINC, DCINC, Chief of Staff, and Director SCJ5.

(U) FUNDING: Security Assistance funding continued its decreasing trend in 1988 in the USSOUTHCOM AOR.

(U) MAP: The MAP program declined significantly from $188.9M in 1987 to $132.3M in 1988. The number of countries receiving MAP funds shrank from ten in 1987 to five in 1988. The following chart shows the breakdown of FY88 MAP funds in Latin America:

Belize	$ 0.25M
Colombia	$ 3.04M
El Salvador	$80.00M
Guatemala	$ 9.00M
Honduras	$40.00M

(U) IMET: IMET funding levels declined as well, but the program funding levels have remained consistent historically. Funding for FY87 was $12.8M, and $8.79M for FY88. Argentina and Brazil received IMET funding for the first time in over a decade. The following table summarizes the FY88 IMET program:

Argentina	$0.037M
Belize	$0.067
Bolivia	$0.400M
Brazil	$0.044M
Colombia	$1.250M
Costa Rica	$0.236M
Ecuador	$0.682M
El Salvador	$1.450M
Guatemala	$0.477M
Honduras	$1.170M
Mexico	$0.226M
Paraguay	$0.148M
Peru	$0.420M
Uruguay	$0.168M
Venezuela	$0.135M
PACAMS	$1.875M

(U) This table summarizes the Security Assistance programs in Latin America (CLA) contrasted with the World Wide (WW) budget:

	FMS(C)			MAP			IMET		
	CLA	WW	%	CLA	WW	%	CLA	WW	%
1985	$64M	$4939M	0.4	$236M	$805M	29	$12.2M	$56.2M	22
1986	$ 7.66M	$4947M	0.2	$198M	$798M	25	$11.9M	$52.1M	23
1987	$ 0	$4040M	0	$189M	$900M	21	$12.8M	$56M	23
1988	$ 0	$4273M	0	$132M	$702M	19	$ 8.8M	$47.4M	19

(U) PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TECHNICAL TRAINING: Professional military education and technical training is provided in Spanish for Latin Americans at three institutions maintained by the U.S. The U.S. Army School of the Americas (USARSA) is located at Ft. Benning, Georgia. The Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School (NAVSCIATTS), and the Inter-American Air Forces Academy (IAAFA) are located in Panama. The schools augmented their facilities with guest instructors from LATAM countries: USARSA 42, NAVSCIATTS 1, and IAAFA 10.

The following chart provides a summary of training for these schools:

	USARSA	IAAFA	NAVSCIATTS
Argentina	4	-	-
Belize	-	-	5
Bolivia	28	27	50
Brazil	-	-	-
Chile	-	-	-
Colombia	547	93	9
Costa Rica	38	14	17
Ecuador	9	19	4
El Salvador	583	49	32
Guatemala	13	31	8
Honduras	114	21	40
Mexico	-	-	-
Panama	-	-	-
Paraguay	6	-	9
Peru	30	-	-
Suriname	-	-	-
Uruguay	4	-	-
Venezuela	19	44	2
SUBTOTAL (USSOUTHCOM AOR)	1395	298	176

	USARSA	IAAFA	NAVSCIATTS
Dominican Rep	71	42	2
Antigua	-	-	2
Bahamas	-	-	8
Barbados	-	-	-
Dominica	-	-	2
Grenada	-	-	-
Haiti	-	-	-
Jamaica	-	-	1
St Christopher	-	-	8
St Lucia	-	-	-
St Vincente	-	-	-
Trinidad/Tobago	-	-	-
SUBTOTAL (Caribbean)	71	42	23
GRAND TOTAL	1466	340	199

(U) SECURITY ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZATION LEGISLATION: No new Security Assistance Authorization Legislation was passed in 1988. Funds for FY89 were not approved until Jan 89.

(U) CONFERENCES: The FY89-90 USSOUTHCOM Tri-Service Workshop was held at the Miami Dadeland Marriott in Miami, Florida from 25-28 Apr 88. The USSOUTHCOM SAO Commanders' Conference was held at Ft. Clayton, Panama from 26-30 Sep 88.

POLICY AND STRATEGY

(U) INTRODUCTION: During 1988 the Policy and Strategy Division continued to be the central point of the command's efforts to focus its resources on achieving national policy objectives in Latin America. Development of a US military strategy for Latin America continued; an analysis to better define USCINCSO's mission and tasks was conducted; and doctrine and force development were incorporated into the functions of Policy and Strategy.

(U) DIVISION ACCOMPLISHMENTS: The following are specific contributions that the Policy and Strategy Division made to USSOUTHCOM mission accomplishment during 1988:

(U) USSOUTHCOM STRATEGY SYSTEM: Concept and initial development were begun on the USSOUTHCOM Strategy System (SCSS). This system describes and implements the cycle which uses national strategy and policy to develop the USCINCSO Regional Security Strategy, the USSOUTHCOM Campaign Plan, USCINCSO's Priority Actions Agenda, a set of military activities, and an assessment/evaluation element.

(U) COMMAND AND STRATEGY BRIEF: The USSOUTHCOM Command and Strategy Brief was completely revised to reflect changing facts, views, and theories as the Command responded to the dynamic environment in the AOR.

(U) REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: The second edition of the Regional Security Strategy was published. This revised document reflects strategies for 17 countries in the region. Initial editorial work was begun on the third edition of the Regional Security Strategy, due for publication in the summer of 1989. This edition will be the first complete edition published consisting of a theater strategy, 20 country strategies, and 12 functional area strategies.

(U) USSOUTHCOM MISSION, TASKS, AND RESPONSIBILITIES (MTR): Editorial and staffing work was conducted on the USSOUTHCOM Mission, Tasks, and Responsibilities (MTR) document, due for publication late spring 1989.

(U) CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY: Supported USCINCSO in preparation for 1988 Congressional testimony opportunities.

(U) USSOUTHCOM JOINT DOCTRINE COMMITTEE: Established the USSOUTHCOM Joint Doctrine Committee to support the staffing effort of the many joint doctrine projects being reviewed and tracked at the unified command level.

(U) REORGANIZATION: The Policy and Strategy Division was reorganized into two separate branches: Policy and Strategy and Doctrine and Force Development. The Civil Affairs Branch of Policy and Strategy Division was dis-established on the last day of 1988. All functions of Civil Affairs were assigned to the J3 Directorate.

(U) DOCUMENT REVIEWS: Participated in the reviews of JSPD publications. Provided written input to National Document reviews such as DG, UCP, JOINT MILITARY NET ASSESSMENT ANNEX O, JSCP, and other portions of the JSCP.

(U) COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS AGREEMENT: Concluded negotiations leading to signature of a new Command Arrangements Agreement between USCINCSO and USCINCFOR

(U) LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT STUDIES: Continued participation in numerous conferences and workshops on Low Intensity Conflict studies, work groups, and projects.

(U) JOINT MISSION ANALYSIS: Participated with USSOCOM in a Joint Mission analysis of Special Operations, Civil Affairs and PSYOP.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

(U) REORGANIZATION: The Civil Affairs Branch, composed entirely of US Army Reserve Officers on active duty in the Active Guard/Reserve Program, provided in-theater support for CAPSTONE, aligned USAR Civil Affairs Units and provided a functional Civil Affairs capability on the USSOUTHCOM staff. On 31 December 1988 the Civil Affairs Branch was transferred from J-5 to J-3 to align the Civil Affairs Branch with the Exercise Division, the Deployable Joint Task Force, and PSYOP.

(U) SPECIFIC ACCOMPLISHMENTS: The Civil Affairs Branch was primarily involved with and coordinated or supported the following:

(U) The Civil Affairs Branch staff officers participated in the operational planning activities of USSOUTHCOM, as well as participating in various conference activities, development of plans, site surveys, USAR overseas deployment for training (ODT) coordination and scheduling, exercise/DFT coordination, providing in-theater support of deployed Civil Affairs Forces, as well as coordinating USSOUTHCOM's Humanitarian/Civil Assistance Program.

(U) The 361st Civil Affairs Brigade (US Army Reserve) and subordinate unit, the 448th Civil Affairs Company (US Army Reserve), continued to support USSOUTHCOM and USARSO by conducting Civil Affairs Technical Assistance Seminars, Civil Affairs Area Assessments, Exercise Support, and Civil Affairs Planning Activities. Civil Affairs Area Assessments were completed for Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. Disaster Relief/Civil Action Seminars were held in Honduras, Costa Rica, and Argentina. 361st Civil Affairs Brigade and 478th Civil Affairs Company participated in JCS/USSOUTHCOM exercises in Peru, Chile, and Paraguay and provided personnel to support ongoing USSOUTHCOM operational planning activities.

(U) The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (US Army) continued to support USSOUTHCOM by continually manning, on a TDY basis, the J-5, Joint Task Force Bravo, Honduras, and by providing staff augmentation personnel to USSOUTHCOM in support of ongoing planning activities.

(U) USSOUTHCOM's Humanitarian/Civic Assistance Program (Chapter 20, Title 10 US Code, Section 401-406), provided the means to fund Humanitarian and Civic Assistance activities in conjunction with USSOUTHCOM military operations in Latin America. This program, coordinated with Department of State, enabled USSOUTHCOM to expend approximately $1.4 million in support of basic and social humanitarian needs of the people of the countries in which USSOUTHCOM conducted military operations. Significant Humanitarian and Civic Assistance activities were conducted in Honduras ($1.2 million), Bolivia ($80 thousand), Guatemala ($70 thousand), Costa Rica ($41 thousand), and Paraguay ($43 thousand).

TREATY IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING (TIP)

(U) The treaty planning effort has expanded in scope during the past year.

~~(S/NF)~~ TIP CONSOLIDATION STUDY: The beginning of the TIP Consolidation study and its accompanying Transition Force Mission Analysis, as well as a Communications study, and development of requirements for a post 1999 force presence, were begun this year.

~~(FOUO)~~ FRAMEWORK PLAN: The Framework Plan, derived from the JCS Preliminary Plan, was published in March of 1989.

~~(FOUO)~~ TIP PLANNING: The TIP planning effort participation has been expanded, and now numbers twenty-two (22) DOD agencies.

~~(FOUO)~~ RESPONSIBILITIES: The TIP responsibilities have been approved by SECDEF and assigned to all major DOD participants.

~~(FOUO)~~ DATA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: The Data Management System (DMS) Phase One Contract is under way. This system is a Software design for the management of facilities and personnel during planning and actual treaty relocations and was funded by USSOUTHCOM.

~~(FOUO)~~ HQ RELOCATION: The preliminary base selection work for the relocation of HQ USSOUTHCOM is ongoing.

~~(FOUO)~~ JOINT REGIONAL INTERSERVICE SUPPORT STUDY GROUP: The USSOUTHCOM JRISSG, Joint Regional Interservice Support Study Group, has added TIP planning requirements to its agenda. In December 88 the JRISSG was briefed by the Logistic Evaluation Agency, on the preliminary requirements for Interservice Support Agreement management during treaty implementation.

PROGRAMS AND REQUIREMENTS

(U) INTRODUCTION: During CY 1988 the Programs and Requirements Division continued its primary responsibility of executing the Commander in Chief's role in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). The Division served as the focal point for consolidating and prioritizing command warfighting requirements and articulating these requirements in the budget process.

(U) POM ISSUES: Service POMS were released in April 1988. Due to a great deal of prior work by RP personnel, only five issues were taken to the Defense Resource Board (DRB). JCS exercises and airfield improvements (previously AM2 matting) were settled "out-of-court", leaving the following 3 issues for the DRB (all decided in favor of USSOUTHCOM):

Air Force - Short Takeoff and Landing (STOL) Aircraft
Air Force/Navy - Caribbean Basin Radar Network (CBRN)
Navy - Mine Countermeasures

(U) REORGANIZATION: In August 1988 the SWORD Division was dissolved. Management of the ongoing SWORD programs was transferred to the responsible components/USSOUTHCOM directorates. SCJ5-RP picked-up responsibility to consolidate and prioritize requirements and track the execution of approved programs. USSOUTHCOM executes approximately $10M annually in the OSD managed Counter-insurgency Special Technology (CIST) fund. These research and development dollars are targeted at developing prototype solutions to urgent warfighting requirements.

(U) PROGRAM REVIEWS: Budget execution and program oversight were accomplished by four program reviews in CY 88. Considerable progress was made by the component commands in the tracking and execution of program dollars. Increased command emphasis and the development of a standard computer data base to track funding profiles contributed greatly to this command wide improvement.

(U) PROGRAM ELECTRONIC DELIVERY SYSTEM: The Program Electronic Delivery System (PEDS) came on line during CY88 replacing the interim use of WWMCCS. This system provides direct computer link between all CINC's and the Pentagon programming offices. Already the system has proven its value by passing over one thousand pages of program decisions during the CY88 DRB.

SMALL WARS OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS (SWORD)

(U) INTRODUCTION: SWORD closed its doors for the last time on 1 September 1988. Its functions were absorbed by several staff directorates and the components. When it was created as a directorate in 1986 SWORD was seen as a single focal point for Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) where strategy, doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures and equipment would all be brought together in support of USSOUTHCOM efforts to accomplish USCINCSO's strategy, assist host nations and to advance U.S. foreign policy. Exactly how this was to be done by SWORD was always a matter of controversy which ultimately contributed to its dis-establishment.

(U) PROJECT TRANSFER: SWORD completed the transfer of its materiel projects to appropriate sponsors for active management on 26 July 1988. Twelve projects were transferred as indicated below:

	PROJECT TITLE	PROPONENT	ACTION OFFICE
1.	Counter-mine	USARSO	DCSLOG
2.	Remotely Operated Vehicle	USNAVSO	N3
3.	Automated Minehunter Computer	USNAVSO	N3
4.	Mobile Image Enhancement (SAILBOAT)	SCJ3	POL-LIC (PM)
5.	Water Purification	USARSO	DCSLOG
6.	Field Laundry	USARSO	DCSLOG
7.	Temporary Building Fabrication	SCEN	SCEN
8.	Underwater Laser Camera	USNAVSO	N3
9.	Mini-intrusion Detection System (MIDS)	USARSO	DCSOPS
10.	Heliborne DF Vehicle (UAV)	SCJ2	SCJ2
12.	Multi-Purpose Relay	SCJ2	SCJ2

(U) PROJECT TERMINATION: In addition, projects receiving SWORD direct support which were either terminated or determined not to be applicable were Deception, Fly-Away Communications, Enhanced FLIR Detection, and Tactical Collection Management System (TCMS). In support of its materiel projects SWORD managed $9.4 million from the Low Intensity Warfare Technology (LIWT) Program in FY 88.

(U) COMBINED EL SALVADOR ARMED FORCES ASSESSMENT: Research and Assessments spent 1988 supervising the production of contractor assessments on El Salvador and Peru. However, its main focus was the Combined El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF) Assessment begun in August 1987. This effort involved a combined ESAF/U.S. team led by BG Marc Cisneros for USSOUTHCOM and GEN Adolfo Blandon for the ESAF. SWORD provided the Team XO plus support from its previous assessments and administrative support. In addition, SWORD developed the methodology, arranged for Reserve Component translation from Spanish to English, edited both language versions, prepared briefing slides and generally took charge of the production of the final report.

(U) CONTRACTOR SUPPORT: Contractor support produced unclassified strategic assessments of El Salvador in English and Spanish, a Civil-Military Operations and a PSYOP assessment of the war in El Salvador. These were based primarily on the data collected for the oral history of the war. That document was accepted for publication by NDU Press (published in February 1989). A draft assessment of Peru's war against Sendero Luminoso was also produced. In addition, the contractor developed applications of common computer software for use by SWORD and other staff elements sustained and upgraded CINCNET; and worked on a deployable communication system for USARSO.

(U) CONCLUSION: In short, SWORD accomplished a great deal in a truncated year as it prepared to go out of business. Although personnel PCS'd or were transferred to USARSO or other staff elements (both within and outside SCJ5) the organization successfully phased out and handed off its projects and activities.

JOINT WARGAMING

(Formerly Research and Analysis Division)

(U) EXERCISE PARTICIPATION:

(U) FUERZAS UNIDAS 88 CHILE: Members of the War Games Branch participated in the Command Post Exercise (CPX) portion of the Fuerzas Unidas-88 Chile in July at the Academia de Guerra (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College equivalent) located in Santiago, Chile. Exercise participants were from USSOUTHCOM, U.S. Army South, the 7th Infantry Division (Light) from Ft Ord, California, and students and faculty members from the Academia de Guerra. The Joint Wargaming Division members supported the CPX with computerized modules of the First Battle:Battalion-Corps model.

(U) FUERZAS UNIDAS 88 PERU: Members of the War Games Branch participated in the Command Post Exercise (CPX) portion of Fuerzas Unidas-88 Peru in August at the Escuela Superior de Guerra del Ejercito del Peru (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College equivalent) located in Lima, Peru. The exercise participants were from USSOUTHCOM, U.S. Army South, and the students and faculty members from the Escuela Superior de Guerra del Ejercito del Peru. The Joint Wargaming Division members supported the CPX with computerized modules of the First Battle:Battalion-Corps model.

(U) COMPUTER WARGAMES: The Joint Wargaming Division planned, coordinated, and executed the first multi-lingual, fully computerized war game ever conducted by a Modern Aids to Planning Program (MAPP) Suite. Representatives of military forces of Chile and Argentina were combined with USSOUTHCOM, U.S. Army South, U.S. Air Force South, and U.S. Navy South representatives into a Joint Task Force staff and component forces. The two-week Fuerzas Conjuntas (Combined Forces) exercise utilized the Joint Theater Level Simulation as the driver for modeling force conflict and attrition. The exercise received the highest plaudits from all participants and observers. Based upon the success of the initial Fuerzas Conjuntas exercise, a series of war games will follow with participation of various Latin American nations.

(U) MODERN AIDS TO PLANNING PROGRAM: During CY 1988, the Modern Aids to Planning Program (MAPP) computer system was accredited to operate at the Top Secret level and a Joint Services Interior Intrusion Detection System (JSIIDS) was installed in Bldg 165 so that it now meets the requirements for storage of Top Secret materiel. With the completion of these events, the MAPP system has become capable of fully performing its mission. Additional hardware and software were received and installed in CY 1988 to expand the capabilities of the system. Additional memory and terminals have increased the performance of the system and Janus has provided a new vehicle for computer wargaming and analysis.

(U) JOINT THEATER LEVEL SIMULATION THREAT DATABASE: The Joint Theater Level Simulation Threat Database was prepared during 1988. The Joint Wargaming Division now possesses a database that will permit realistic analysis of operations and contingency plans to be accomplished at the theater-level.

POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS

(U) DIVISION ACCOMPLISHMENTS: The Division carried out a multitude of actions involving:

(U) Monitoring US national security policy and strategy for Latin America and advising CINC and DCINC on their integration in U.S. political, diplomatic, economic and military policy, programs, plans and actions within the region to further U.S. national security objectives.

(U) Developed new initiatives and improved present initiatives that used the military instrument of national power to further U.S. national security of objectives in Latin America, and advised the CINC and DCINC in these matters.

(U) Maintained close working relationships with the Departments of Defense, State, and Justice, with the Joint Staff and Service Staffs, and with the U.S. Embassy, Panama, and all the Security Assistance Offices and appropriate sections of the U.S. Embassy in each Latin American country.

(U) Closely monitored actions of the U.S. Congress that had impact on U.S. National Security Policy: Authorizations, and Appropriations for Defense and Foreign Assistance; Resolutions of the Congress that impact on U.S. foreign policy; The War Powers resolution an its implications in Latin America; Travel of Congressional Delegations into Latin America; Policies and resolutions relating to war and peace in Central America and the entire spectrum of U.S. military presence. Prepared appropriate reactions/interactions for the CINC, DCINC, and J5.

(U) Closely monitored the economic conditions in the region and correlated the effect on each country's National Security Strategy and perspective on regional security. Monitored debt levels, unemployment trends, trends in GNP, levels and trends in imports and exports, and public health indices.

(U) Served as the CINC/DCINC, CofS's and USSOUTHCOM staff's politico-military advisors. Prepared CINC and DCINC for visits to Washington and consultations with Assistant Secretaries of State and Defense and the President's Special-Assistant for Latin American Affairs. Prepared CINC and DCINC for official visits to Latin America that helped achieve U.S. national security objectives and accompanied them on these visit. Prepared CINC and DCINC for testimony to the U.S. Congress on U.S. national security policy and strategy and U.S. regional security objectives, plans and programs, and accompanied CINC/DCINC to hearings. Also prepared CINC/DCINC/CofS for attendance at Latin American Service Chiefs' Conferences (Conference of the American Armies, Inter-American Conference of Naval Chiefs, and Conference of Inter-American Air Force Chiefs).

(U) Served as a point of contact with U.S. Embassies and MILGPs for the integration of USSOUTHCOM policy, strategy and programs. Visited U.S. Embassies in this capacity and consulted with host country diplomatic and military personnel on regional security issues in coordination with the U.S. Embassy.

(U) Prepared special studies/projects on regional security, security assistance, economic conditions, etc. as directed by CINC/DCINC, CofS, and Director, J5.

(U) Wrote speeches and articles/OP-ED pieces for publication by CINC/DCINC, CofS and Director, J5.

(U) Served as members of the crisis augmentation team and provided politico-military advice to CINC, CofS, and director of Operations and acted as the prime point of contact with U.S. Embassy in these situations.

(U) Provided briefings and round table discussions of U.S. national security policy, strategy, and implementing actions to Congressmen, Senior Defense and State Dept. officials, journalists and civic leaders.

(U) Developed, managed and coordinated the command's policy, plans and programs for counter-narcotics in Latin America to fulfill U.S. national security objectives. Conducted seminars and staff assistance visits with Latin American countries in coordination with U.S. embassies to integrate anti-narcotics policy, plans, programs and resources and maintained a close working relationship with the Departments of Defense, State (Bureau of International narcotics matters), Justice (Nation Drug Policy Board and DEA), U.S. Coast Guard, etc., and Joint Staff (OJCS). CDR Edwards, the USCG Liaison Officer, while not assigned to J5 formally, supported LtCol O'Brien through counter-narcotics strategy development, riverine and coastal interdiction program development and maritime law enforcement and captain of port training programs.

(U) Placed major emphasis on sale/transfer of major systems to regional militaries: UH-60's to Colombia, HMMWV's and F5's to Honduras.

(U) Worked feverishly to lend stability to uncertain situation in CENTAM following the termination of lethal aid to the Contras in February 1988.

~~(C)~~ Assisted SCJ3 Plans in development of Noble Leader. Refer to page 52.

(U) Developed studies on options for the crisis in Panama.

COMMUNICATIONS

(U) J6 DIRECTORATE: Key personnel assigned to the J6 Directorate during 1988 are as follows:

a. [redacted] (b)(6) May 1988, Deputy Director.

b. [redacted] (b)(6) June 1988, Chief, Programs Division.

c. [redacted] (b)(6) December 1988, Chief, Automated Systems Division. Navy

d. [redacted] (b)(6) February 1988, Chief, Current Operations Branch.

e. [redacted] (b)(6) July 1988, Programs Officer.


f. [redacted] (b)(6) May 1988, Chief, Microcomputer Branch.

(U) EXERCISES.

~~(C)~~ FUERZAS UNIDAS - 88: Exercises were conducted in Chile (11-15 JUL 88), Ecuador (20-29 JUN 88), Uruguay (19-23 SEP 88), Peru (Phase I, 5-16 DEC 87 and Phase II, 8-20 AUG 88), and Paraguay (18-29 JUL 88). Various units from USARSO and the 1978th Communications Group provided the lion's share of the communications for the Joint Task Forces. This group of exercises continues to be an excellent forum for host countries and the U.S. to exercise interoperability and C3 assets.

~~(S)~~ AHUAS TARA - 88 (AT-88): AT-88 was originally scheduled as a 3 phase Honduras exercise. Phase I, the Engineering Phase, was held 15 JAN - 20 APR 88, Phase II, a CPX, was held 26 SEP - 8 OCT 88 and Phase III was cancelled. As in the past, this exercise stressed the importance of each communications section maintaining the ability to deploy their own assets to support both internal and external communications nets. This concept not only accented the importance of each unit maintaining organic communication assets, but also heightened awareness of joint tactical network employment of C3 systems.

~~(S)~~ GOLDEN PHEASANT-88: Golden Pheasant 88 was an unscheduled JCS directed show of force conducted in Honduras in March 1988. While this exercise demonstrated the ability to insert a Task Force on short notice in response to a crisis situation, it also surfaced several inadequacies in our C3 structure. Command relationships were not clearly defined prior to deployment of the task force. This led to untimely C3I connectivity, the improper call out of the joint COMSEC keying material and unauthorized use of illegal frequencies. Additionally, it identified inadequacies in the in-house C3I assets, CAT Team location and the training level of staff elements.


This exercise clearly revealed USSOUTHCOM'S shortcomings in C3I in a multiple crisis situation and showed the importance of good planning prior to the beginning of a crisis. [redacted] was SCJ6-O's key officer. (b)(6)

~~(S)~~ CABANAS-88: As a result of the 1988 Panama Crisis, the concept for Cabanas 88 changed on short notice. Originally scheduled as a special operations exercise, it was redesigned as a conventional scenario. Cabanas 88 was held in Honduras from 26 JUL - 15 AUG 1988 with the 7th Infantry Division as CDR JTF. In that this exercise was changed on short notice, the combined doctrine was not sufficiently defined. This led to a general lack of coordination in C3 asset deployment. JCSE services were requested with no defined mission. This proved to be a large waste of manpower, material and money. It also revealed that it is essential for the CDR JTF to be fully conversant in joint communications procedures. [redacted] and [redacted] represented SCJ6-O during this exercise.

(U) FUERTES CAMINOS (NORTH) 88 (FC-N 88): FC-N 88, also known as Blazing Trails - 88, was a joint US/Honduran engineering exercise that heavily involved Army Reserve and National Guard Forces. It was held between 14 DEC 87 and 14 MAY 88. Generally, individual units provided their own HF and FM assets, while the remaining communications equipment was provided from in-theater assets. Overall, this exercise was quite successful in honing joint interoperability procedures for all concerned.

~~(C)~~ KING'S GUARD 88 I/II (KG88 I/II): KG 88 I/II are annual JCS coordinated, USSOUTHCOM sponsored, multinational combined Naval SPECWAR CPX/FTX exercises. As in the past, COMUSNAVSO was the lead agency during both phases of these exercise which were held in Honduras 2-16 DEC 1987 and 15-29 JUL 88 respectively. C3 procedures for joint/combined Naval operations were exercised extensively and proved adequate for the given scenario. [redacted] was SCJ6-O communications coordinator.

~~(C)~~ GUATEMALA COMMUNICATIONS EXERCISE 88 (TIKAL-1): EXERCISE TIKAL 1 was a joint combined exercise between units of the US and Guatemala Armed Forces (GAF). This exercise, the first to be held in Guatemala in many years, took place 3-8 NOV 88 and evolved around a disaster relief scenario. It essentially exercised USSOUTHCOM'S ability to rapidly design and deploy a communications package to support a disaster relief effort and to provide external communications support for the US Ambassador and his role in this scenario. Additionally sub-objectives included: HF network evaluation, area frequency propagation chart development, develop field OTAR procedures, GAF and US communications interoperability development, exchange of info on equipment, training, employment and EMI protective measures, strategic and tactical interfaces and of course building military to military relationships. Not only were all exercise objectives attained but also Ambassador Michel recommended a FY-89 exercise to test VHF/FM tactical radios and repeaters. [redacted] SCJ6, was the exercise director.

(U) EXERCISE KINDLE LIBERTY 88, FUERZAS UNIDAS, BOLIVIA 88, FUERZAS UNIDAS COLOMBIA 88 AND ELLIPSE ECHO 88: cancelled for political or economic reasons.

(U) USCINCSO SUPPORT.

(U) EQUIPMENT ISSUES.

(C) STU III UPGRADES: During 1988, the most significant activity involved the procurement, delivery, and installation of secure telephone units (STU-III). During the March political crisis, [redacted] took delivery of 150 STU-III's at Howard AFB and installed them in less than one week. This provided the USSOUTHCOM command group a secure voice capability that was critically needed during this crisis period. Subsequent to the initial delivery, SCJ6 supervised the delivery and installation of 150 additional STU-III's. Thus USSOUTHCOM and its components went from minimal secure voice capability to sufficient capability at a time when is was most needed.

(C) [redacted] (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. § 424 — CIA


(U) COMSEC ISSUES.

(C) [redacted] Section 3.3 (b)(1), (b)(6) — Joint Staff

(U) OVER THE AIR REKEYING: SCJ6 took the lead in over the air rekeying (OTAR) in 1988 and was the first WWMCCS site to implenent OTAR on the WWMCCS host. Action began to implement OTAR on USSOUTHCOM controlled voice nets. [redacted] SCJ6 COMSEC Officer, [redacted] COMSEC Advisor, and [redacted] assistant, held numerous classes and practice sessions to ease operator implementation of OTAR.

(C) PROVISION OF CRYPTO MATERIALS: Throughout 1988, [redacted] assigned crypto material used for all joint exercises and contingencies. This was especially important during exercise Golden Pheasant when incoming forces did not have the correct crypto material and it was necessary to coordinate and supply material on very short notice. Through the efforts of SCJ6, the exercise was successful and participants were able to communicate securely.

(C)



Joint Staff
Navy

(C) PANAMA CRISIS: During the period March - July 1988, SCJ6 was heavily involved in supporting USSOUTHCOM efforts in Panama Crisis 88. SCJ6 manned the USCINCSO Crisis Action Team (CAT). Communications agencies in Panama were tasked with providing reliable command and control communications support to USCINCSO. JCSE provided a TSC-85A to support communications connectivity to CONUS. STU-III's, KY-65 secure voice, tactical facsimile (FAX), hot lines, and other communications were provided the CAT by SCJ6.

(U) J6 PROGRAMS.

(S/NF)

Section 3.3 (b)(1)

Joint Staff

(U) Automated Systems.

(U) General: This was the year that Automated Systems Divisi: (ASD) came into its own as a full fledged WWMCCS Host. Throughout the early part of the year, the division worked and directed all its efforts toward that goal. JCS allowed the South Host to enter the Network on 15 Nov 1988. At the same time, the work on WWMCCS was pressing forward, the Headquarters Staff had a pressing need for increased Office Automation capability. Over 300 new computers arrived at the Command and the challenge to distribute, install, and formulate a comprehensive plan to ensure accountability was met by Automated Systems Division personnel.

(U) Operations: Operations upgraded to a full time function; 7 days a week, 24 hours per day. This precipitated an increased training evolution which has produced highly qualified operators. Another aspect of the challenge for operations personnel was that of learning the communications side of WWMCCS in order to carry out over the air rekeying of the Crypto systems. Together with the Data Processing and Communications sides of WWMCCS, the operators have become more knowledgeable and well rounded personnel.

(U) Software Branch: In May organizational changes took place to combine the Applications Branch with the Systems Support Branch to form the new Software Branch. Throughout the Panama crisis in the spring, branch members served on the Crisis Action Team (CAT) and assisted the CAT with automation issues. The SCJ6 also provided planning cell augmentees to the CAT. An extensive customers manual was prepared and published in October to explain the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) Inter-computer Network (WIN) to our users and to help them in obtaining assistance from their ASD support personnel.

(U) The Systems Section met many major software and WWMCCS host implementation milestones. We were preparing the Honeywell DPS8 mainframe computer to become a full Host in the WIN.

(U). GCOS 8 TESTING: During most of the year the Systems Section was involved in the extended test of GCOS 8, a new software operating system for the DPS8, through four test releases. In November the final release of GCOS 8 was distributed by the Joint Data Systems Support Center and installation began in December.

(U) WWMCCS RECONFIGURATIONS: During the Panama crisis in March, several reconfigurations of the Level 6 WWMCCS Remote Network Processor (WRNP) were accomplished to provide for new WWMCCS terminal areas and to provide backup capabilities to meet crisis contingencies.

(U) DPS8 TRANSITION: In July, the transition of the DPS8 from unclassified to classified processing was successfully completed .

(U) In November, USSOUTHCOM successfully entered the WIN as a full network host.


(U) The Applications Section continued refinement and validation of existing systems.

(U) Big Biz (USARSO), Business Data Base, was updated and all control of the system was turned over to USARSO.

(U) The following projects were completed:

J3 - Z248 Standard Menus
J6 - Frequency Manager Data Base
CS - Protocol Historical File System
J6 - Joint Manpower Program
J6 - Trouble Log

(U) The following projects are under development or revision:



DIA

J6 - WIN Training for local users.

(U) The Database Section reviewed save procedures to ensure all files are being saved. The Database Section worked closely with the Systems Section to reconfigure devices to make more efficient use of the DPS8. To help the user community, this section wrote a user's guide for the WWMCCS File Transfer System (FTS), a user's guide for WWMCCS Teleconferencing (TLCF), and instructions for transferring files to a teleconference. During the Panama crisis in March we provided support to the Crisis Action Team (CAT) and to the Marine Forces (MARFOR) in the use of the program Extended Terminal Capability (ETC). The following systems were tested and activated on the DPS8 under the GCOS III operating system:

JDS (Joint Deployment System)
JOPS III (Joint Operation and Planning System)
TOSC4 (Tape Library System)
JPEG (Joint Planning and Execution Graphics)
CDTS (Computer Directed training System)
GIPSEY (Graphics Information Processing System)
CONUP (Automatic Restart of Teleconferences)

(U) The Configuration Management section reconfigured the WWMCCS Information System (WIS) workstations to give users the same type of software as the Z248s.

Multimate Advantage II	(Word Processor)
DBase III+	(Database)
LOTUS 123	(Spreadsheet)
Harvard Graphics	(Graphics Package)

(U) <u>SECURITY</u>: The branch was manned by two full time senior NCOs and a staff officer dual hatted as the branch chief for both the Security and Software Branches. In July the branch began classified processing on the Honeywell DPS8 mainframe computer and in November it entered the top secret World Wide Military Command and Control (WWMCCS) Inter-computer Network (WIN).

(U) The branch is responsible for administration of security procedures within ASD. This included the development, design, and implementation of physical, personnel, information, microcomputer and WWMCCS ADP procedures in compliance with DOD, AR, and JCS regulations. All of the in-house procedures were revised to reflect new methods of operation in our quickly changing operational environment. The branch supported the command with quick turn around on WWMCCS security issues and by performing the duties of the WWMCCS ADP System Security Officer (WASSO). These duties include: issue and control of all Personal ID Codes (PIC) for WWMCCS/WIN users; daily monitoring of the system messages and accounting data; and assisting customers as requested.

(U) The ongoing WIN upgrade in Building 1226, Ft Amador, was completed. The new Honeywell DPS8 computer WIN host " SOUTH " was activated on 15 November. The Honeywell Remote Network Processor (WRNP) Level 6 at Quarry Heights continued to operate in parallel mode. Remote terminal areas were being aggressively installed and connected to the DPS8. These actions greatly increased security responsibilities. USSOUTHCOM WWMCCS/WIN users grew from 75 to 250, with registered remote network users totaling over 1000 and continually increasing. The Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) contract was awarded in October and installation begun. Requests for the perimeter fence and JSIIDS alarms were resubmitted and revised as necessary. Advanced training on the security modules of GCOS 8 was attended by the WASSO and one of the AWASSOs.

(U) During the Panama crisis in the spring SCJ6 responded to emergency requests for five new terminal areas. Each area required a security evaluation and security training for the appointed WWMCCS Terminal Area System Security Officer (WATASO). A temporary CCTV system to was obtained to improve security. The branch coordinated and provided new watch team user ids, on an emergency basis, for use in management of the crisis.

(U) A training program for WATASOs was initiated to ensure compliance with security regulations and to provide support to the command through training which can be passed on to other users of the system.

(U) In December, we began building the new security database for the new GCOS 8 operating system. This new operating system for the Honeywell DPS8 mainframe computer completely changes the approach to automation security in WWMCCS. Its' implementation and maintenance is significantly more labor intensive.

(U) Accreditation was obtained for classified operation of the DPS8 WWMCCS computer and interim Network Certification was obtained from JCS for entry in the WIN. The Risk Analysis and Security Test and Evaluation (ST&E) were worked on extensively for required submission to JCS in early 1989 to obtain final security certification to operate on the WIN.

(U) MICROCOMPUTERS.

(U) INCREASED OFFICE AUTOMATION ASSETS: In the months of March and April of 1988, HQ USSOUTHCOM received 212 Zenith 248 desk top computers and 95 Zenith 184 lap top computers to enhance the office automation capability throughout the command. This increased the number of microcomputers to approximately 465. Enough supplies to supplement these computers were provided until normal procurement channels could adjust to the increased demand.

(U) ESTABLISHMENT OF INFORMATION SYSTEM OFFICERS (ISOs): The increased number of office automation assets within the command led to the establishment of ISOs within each Directorate. SCJ6 has assisted with the initial organization and periodic training affiliated with this program.

(U) STANDARDIZATION OF SOFTWARE: To accommodate software configuration policies, SCJ6 determined the following to be the USSOUTHCOM standard software: MultiMate Advantage II, dBASE III+, Harvard Graphics, Lotus 123, Procomm, and Automenu.

(U) ASSISTANCE EXTERNAL TO USSOUTHCOM.

(U) SAOs: Thirty (30) Zenith 248 microcomputers were purchased for and sent to the SAOs bringing their total to 51. NEC 3550 Spinwriter printers were purchased and sent to the [illegible] giving them OCR B compatibility for their message centers. The Standard SAO Management Information System (SSMIS) was supported by the Microcomputer Support Branch, SCJ6. SCJ6 transmitted a message offering site visits, and those SAOs that requested assistance received it. SCJ6 compiled all requests for additional microcomputers or supplies and prepared CAPRs to initiate the purchasing process.

(U) JTF-BRAVO: In June, SCJ6-A visited JTF-B to assess their office automation needs. SCJ6-A placed an order for twenty additional Z-248s to meet these needs. Until this order comes in, SCJ6-A issued JTF-B two Z-248s systems with color monitors. In October, SCJ6-A took enough equipment to JTF-B to set up an unclassified Remote Bulletin Board System with twenty modems.

(U) COMPONENT COMMUNICATIONS

(U) US AIR FORCE SOUTH (1978TH COMMUNICATIONS GROUP).

(U) JOINT EXERCISES: The 1978th Communications Group participated in ten successful DFTs (deployments for training). One of the more interesting suggestions made to improve service provided was to take a base telephone directory along so phone patches could be accomplished more efficiently. The support provided was primarily radio communications, and also provided bilingual air traffic control support on the two La Ceiba, Honduras, DFTs. There were three exercises in which the 1978th participated, a US Southern Command Disaster Relief Communications Exercise (COMMEX), Blue Horizon 88-Ecuador, and Fuerzas Unidas 88 Uruguay. The support provided for the COMMEX was greatest in terms of personnel (nine) and equipment. The USSOUTHCOM Communication Contingency Vehicle, which the 1978th maintains, was used for the first time. The vehicle proved to be ideal for that type mission. For Blue Horizon the support was limited to bilingual air traffic control support from two 1978th personnel, and Fuerzas Unidas support was one person for tactical switchboard operation.

(U) MISSION RADIO SYSTEM (MRS): The Mission Radio Station logged over 18,000 contacts in support of USMILGPs throughout Central and South America, averaging 1,557 every month. Phone patch requests averaged 875 a month, with 652 completions monthly. The number of phone patch completions was down from the previous year. There were 15 annual maintenance visits to service mission radio equipment throughout the region.

(U) US ARMY SOUTH (1109TH SIGNAL BRIGADE).

(U) The major events impacting on the 1109th US Army Signal Brigade during calendar year 1988 were a series of significant equipment upgrades, a reorganization, an organizational efficiency review, and several inspections.

(U) Throughout the past calendar year operational capabilities were improved by installing a new satellite earth terminal, three hundred new secure telephone units, a new dial central office and by completing a great portion of our technical control improvement program. These are but a few of the many continuing programs to upgrade communications service to the Commander in Chief, Southern Command and his component commanders.

(U) Additionally, to improve service to users, an organizational efficiency review was completed which recognized 62 more civilian personnel requirements for the command.

(U) To better utilize limited resources and better service users the 1109th Signal Brigade reorganized all internal support operations under one officer, the Chief of Support. The Plans and Implementation and Integration Branches of the Resource Management and Plans Division are now organized to include the new Projects, Plans and Policies Division. Additionally, an Information Center was created designed to provide automation support to customers. Over the past twelve months a general inspection, a command security inspection, and a maintenance and logistics inspection were completed.

(U) US NAVAL FORCES SOUTHERN COMMAND.

(C) SIGNIFICANT CENTAM DEPLOYMENT: On 12 Feb 88, three Atlantic Fleet hydrofoils deployed to the Caribbean Sea for three months. This deployment was the first extended Caribbean deployment conducted by a group of U.S. Navy Patrol Missile Hydrofoils (PMH). While deployed the PMH participated in anti-drug enforcement operations and various other at sea exercises with the VENAV/CG employing high frequency (HF) and very high frequency (VHF) voice and teletype communications.

(C) [redacted]

Section 3.3 (b)(1)(5)

Joint Staff

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Section 3.3 (b)(5)

THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

(U) INTRODUCTION: The Inspector General is principally concerned with Joint General Inspections of 16 Security Assistance Organizations (SAO). Inspections and investigations of subordinate commands and units required by uniservice directive are the responsibility of the appropriate Component Commands.

(U) ORGANIZATION: The Office of the Inspector General is staffed with one U.S. Navy Captain and one temporary hire secretary. The office is located in the Gorgas Hospital Administration Building 237 Ancon Hill.

(U) FUNCTIONS: The IG assists the CINC in maintaining high standards of joint operational readiness, inspects the SAOs biennially and provide reports as required by the CINC, JCS and DOD.

(U) The IG conducts scheduled inspections, no notice inspections and investigations of Component Commands, Units and SAOs as directed.

(U) The IG recommends necessary actions after identifying problems/deficiencies revealed during the inspections, analyzing and monitoring the actions initiated to correct the deficiencies.

(U) The IG coordinates necessary USSOUTHCOM Inspector General activities and matters with Inspector General of the Component Commands, The Joint Chiefs and The Department of Defense Inspector General.

(U) The IG monitors and investigates Fraud, Waste and Abuse claims for HQ USSOUTHCOM and the SAOs and has the primary responsibility for investigating DOD Hotline allegations.

(U) The IG monitors the USSOUTHCOM Internal Control Program.

(U) The IG insures compliance with Executive Order 12333 and DoD directives applicable to U.S. Citizens Rights and oversight of intelligence activities in the AOR.

(U) The IG is the USSOUTHCOM Primary Action Officer (PAO) for General Accounting Office (GAO) reviews, surveys and inquiries and the point of contact for coordination and audit liaison.

(U) SIGNIFICANT IG EVENTS IN CALENDAR YEAR 1988.

12 - 14	JAN	1988	IGSAV	USMILGP Honduras
08 - 11	FEB	1988	IGSAV	USMAAG Peru
21 - 26	AUG	1988	JGI	USMLO Brazil (Brasilia/Rio)
17 - 19	OCT	1988	JGI	USMLO Belize
25 - 28	OCT	1988	JGI/MEI	JTF-B Soto Cano AB Honduras
07 - 11	NOV	1988	JGI	USMILGP Venezuela
05 - 08	DEC	1988	JGI	USMILGP Bolivia

(U) GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO) COORDINATION/AUDIT LIAISON.

(U) The GAO concluded its draft report relating to GAO Review Code 463754 requested by Senator Jim Sasser, focusing on U.S. military activities and programs in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. The GAO reviewed trends in U.S. military activities and plans for future efforts. The scope of the review included direct U.S. involvement in exercises, construction and security assistance. The USSOUTHCOM Inspector General's office coordinated the Department of Defense comments in response to the GAO Draft. The GAO had five findings in their report:

Finding A: Establishment of the U.S. Military Presence Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras. DOD response partially concurred, objecting specifically to the GAO attempt to compare JTF-B to a unified command.

Finding B: Personnel assigned to the JTF-B at Soto Cano DOD response partially concurred again pointing out that JTF-B cannot be compared to a unified command. Additionally DOD pointed out that there is no ceiling for personnel strength at JTF-B specifically limited to 1,205 troops. SECDEF has approved a level of 1100-1200 troops with Secretarial review required to exceed that range.

Findings C: Logistics Support Capabilities of the JTF-B.
D: Composition and Maintenance of JTF-B Facilities.
E: JTF-B Operation and Construction Costs.
were concurred in by the DOD; however, DOD clarified specific expenditures for the GAO under Finding E.

(U) OTHER: During Calendar Year 1988, the USCINCSO IG conducted two formal inquiries, completed two informal inquiries and coordinated the initial efforts of an ongoing investigation into intelligence oversight procedures. Additionally, the SCIG completed a study forwarded to the Navy Military Personnel Command (NMPC) for quality recruitment to USSOUTHCOM billets.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND SOUTH

(U) GENERAL: SOCSOUTH, a Subordinate Unified Command of USSOUTHCOM, continued support to USCINCSO and country teams with theater-wide SOF operations in response to Foreign Internal Defense/internal stability requirements. Consistent with JCS Pub 2, SOCSOUTH exercised operational control of all theater Special Operations Forces (less NAVSOF) and focused all resources to the planning, preparing, conducting operations, and other activities as directed by USCINCSO in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility. U.S. Army South continued to be Executive Agent for administrative and logistical support of Army SOF in-theater.

(U) KEY PERSONNEL: (b)(6) COMSOCSOUTH since Jul 87, directed the publishing of a comprehensive strategy for FY 88, based on the framework contained in the USSOUTHCOM Priority Actions Agenda. This document provided subordinate units with long, mid, and short range SOCSOUTH objectives and served as a planning guideline for exercises, operations, and country-specific planning and activities. The Commander's primary staff and liaison officers assigned and attached to the headquarters were:

Deputy Commander:
Chief of Staff:
J1/4:
J2:
J3:
J5:
J6: (b)(6)
Chief, SOCSE-SCJ3: (b)(6) Navy
7th SFG(A) LNO:
3d Bn, 7th SFG(A) LNO: (b)(6)


(U) The following depicts SOCSOUTH CY 88 activities during the most challenging and demanding year in the Command's history.

(U) PERSONNEL.

~~(C)~~ The austere manning level of SOCSOUTH required numerous initiatives and expedients to achieve and sustain sufficient manpower for 1) Panama crisis planning and TF Grey operations, 2) SOF Targeting Programming activities, 3) mid- and long-range planning requirements, 4) providing OPCON and associated coordination and C3I for numerous deployments by in-theater and CONUS SOF, and 5) compartmented projects. Authorized the 5 Special Operations Command Staff Element spaces, but only 15 headquarters billets because of lack of internal compensation, the Command requested and received temporary support from numerous Reserve Component personnel attached for periods of two to twenty-six weeks of work/training. The temporary nature of many attached personnel degraded the impact of their numbers but sustained the synergism necessary for operational successes beyond SOCSOUTH's manning level capabilities.

(C) Normal SOC strength has been 36 personnel, 15 were assigned, 14 were TDY augmentees, and 7 were overstrength. Unusual augmentation occurred in February 1988 as a result of the deteriorating situation in Panama. Augmented to provide C3I for SOF security enhancement operations, SOCSOUTH strength grew to 98 for a two-month period.

(C) Although the Panama crisis escalated to the level of conflict necessitating the activation of an outside (CONUS) JSOTF, it was obviously apparent SOCSOUTH's manpower authorization of 20 personnel was inadequate to provide the foundation upon which to accomplish day-to-day operations of responding to LIC in-theater and developing/fielding the nucleus of a wartime JSOTF required for execution of USCINCSO OPLAN 6600 missions. The shortage of authorized grade structure and personnel in the headquarters remained the most serious readiness deficiency.



(U) Commanders of in-theater SOF OPCON to SOCSOUTH were [redacted] 3rd Bn, 7th SFG(A) at Fort Davis, and [redacted] 617th SOAD at Fort Kobbe with operations, maintenance, and 5 MH-60 aircraft at adjoining Howard AFB.

(S/NF) The 3rd Bn, 7th SFG(A) was assigned 100% of authorized Commissioned and Warrant Officer fill, greatly enhancing battalion leadership. A 20% shortfall in 18 series MOS personnel assigned to the 3rd Bn, 7th SFG(A) resulted in the internal redistribution (zeroing out) of two operational detachment-Alphas (ODAs). The shortage of experienced, trained SF military intelligence personnel resulted in three MI DET SOTA teams not deployable due to the lack of qualified 05H, 96C, and 98G personnel. This shortfall and the shortage of E6/E7 18 series MOS soldiers impacted adversely on this forward-deployed SF battalion's ability to accomplish their assigned missions. Specifically, the battalion's limited ability to field adequate numbers of sufficiently trained soldiers limited their ability to employ timely regional survey teams, execute Counterterrorism Enhancement Program activities, and conduct USCINCSO's In-Extremis Force missions. Although structured to accomplish assigned missions with some adapting, the battalion's capability to accomplish direct action, FID, and deep reconnaissance missions was challenged throughout the year by insufficient linguists.

(U) <u>LOGISTICS</u>.

(C) One phase of a total renovation of the Command headquarters facility began 6 Sep 88 and was completed in late 1988. The remaining two phases will complete the majority of the contract work required in a phased $214,187.14 facility upgrade. Additional contract changes were being incorporated to enhance physical security. SCIF certification in 1989, dependent upon JSIIDS equipment availability, will permit the headquarters access to national level intelligence via the on-site SIMS terminal and will provide the capability to develop and store hard copy data bases in support of compartmented plans and operations.

~~(S/NF)~~ The 617th SOAD completed occupation of permanent facilities at Fort Kobbe and Howard AFB in early 1988. Wire strike modifications to the MH-60 aircraft were completed and a secure HF capability was acquired for each helicopter.

~~(S)~~ Operational Project Stocks were submitted to DCSLOG, USARSO for review of the reformatting for portions of the project. Part IV (JSOTF Modules C through E) was initiated but remained in rough draft due to manning constraints during the Panama crisis. Part V (SFODA Emergency Resupply Bundles) was not developed beyond the conceptual stage.

~~(S)~~ Continued delays in the fielding of the new M24 Sniper System forces continued reliance on the aging and unreliable M21 System. However, the modification of a M1009 to provide various C2 functions has increased 3rd Bn, 7th SFG(A)'s ability to support OPLAN theater-wide operations.

~~(S/NF)~~ <u>INTELLIGENCE</u>: The J2 Directorate was consistently challenged throughout the year with activities and tasks inherent to supporting TF Gray operations, developing SOF TIAP initiatives, preparing workable planning documents, and a myriad of need-to-have intelligence-oriented requirements necessary to successfully interface this Command's intelligence operations with the rest of the intelligence community. Although severely hindered by insufficient personnel required for successful completion of all analysis and production missions and the lack of a SIMS terminal for theater SOF planning and support of tactical operations, the Directorate's assigned and attached personnel completed the following activities considered critical to improving the Command's intelligence capabilities:

~~(S/NF)~~ The construction of a SCIF within the headquarters complex and the simultaneous coordination and developing of the USSOUTHCOM SIMS will provide a tremendous operational capability upon certification of the SCIF proper by providing an automated data base tying SOCSOUTH into the National All-Source Data Base.


~~(S/NF)~~ The initial coordination and development of the SOF Sub-Theater Intelligence Architecture Plan with J2, USSOCOM and J2, USSOUTHCOM was necessitated because TIAP is the radiant for objective architecture to the year 2000. The goal of the Command's TIAP efforts was to possess the capability for a majority of existing intelligence shortfalls.

~~(S/NF)~~ The initiation and sustainment of the J2 Directorate's Staff Assistance Program with 3rd Bn, 7th SFG(A) and 617th SOAD increased subordinate unit mission capabilities and response time for numerous assigned missions.

~~(S/NF)~~

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(U) Since the majority of the Directorate's assigned and attached personnel lack SOF backgrounds, a SOF training program was developed, implemented, and later expanded to enhance the directorate staff's understanding of SOF capabilities and missions required by the Command.

(U) A Command debriefing program was developed and implemented to provide a primary source of human intelligence. The HUMINT obtained provided the Command a better knowledge in a variety of foreign information not previously known or obtainable. This ongoing initiative and other activities involving inter-staff collaboration, consultation, and communication successfully integrated the Directorate into the theater intelligence community and provided the groundwork for increased future value of the Directorate's capabilities.

(U) Specific program packages were initiated and developed to support SOF counter-narcotic operations. Intelligence annexes and estimates were produced to support OPORDS, planning, and coordination for enhancing in-country counterdrug-specific intelligence support to SOF.

(U) The Directorate provided the Command with day-to-day intelligence reporting and warnings, established a Defense Mapping Agency account, and developed an SOP for in-theater deployments. Support was provided DOS crisis management exercises and USCINCSO's CTEP activities. These activities increased SOCSOUTH's readiness posture and mission capable status even though adequate mapping, charting, and geodesy products were nonexistent in 1988 for all potential areas of CONPLAN operations.

(U) OPERATIONS AND TRAINING.

~~(S/NF)~~ Foreign Internal Defense Operations, an OPLAN 6600-88

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SOUTHCOM FOIA Office
Date: Oct 16, 2018

were conducted throughout the theater on a daily basis. SOCSOUTH, its subordinate units, and other Special Operations Forces based in CONUS participated in 206 deployments and exercises in 1988. These

Section 3.3 (b)(5)

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(U) The significance of these forward-deployed and CONUS-based SOF activities was a clear manifestation of USSOUTHCOM's commitment in the region, permitted integration with allied forces in peacetime as well as war, and provided unmistakable credibility to USSOUTHCOM's participation while increasing US SOF capability to conduct successful operations in LIC environments. The activities depicted above and briefly described hereafter, reflect the Command's support of USCINCSO's Regional Strategy, SOF capabilities in-theater, and SOF response to the unique requirements and capabilities in the region.

(U) MTTs: MTTs of one soldier to SF Company size were fielded in six countries to provide training suitable to host country requirements. In Bolivia, SF soldiers trained UMOPAR forces in unit and individual skill level one tasks. SF trainees upgraded numerous spartan UMOPAR camp facilities at very remote sites, and improved the quality of life considerably. One US SF soldier was killed in a training accident while training UMOPAR soldiers.

(C)

Section 3.3 (b)(5)

[redacted] Section 3.3 (b)(5)

(S) [redacted] Section 3.3 (b)(5)

(S) ANTI-NARCOTIC MTTs: Anti-narcotic MTTs were deployed to three nations. Funded by INM through Narcotic Assistance Units, these unique MTTs were successful in providing specific host countries with well-trained and capable counter-narcotic paramilitary personnel. SF instruction surfaced the need to curb corruption within paramilitary forces.


Joint Staff

(U) SOF MTTs provided unique and important training requested by allies who recognized their need for subject matter experts, yet often desired a low density of trainers for cost and/or political reasons. MTTs fielded in CY 88 considerably enhanced our SOF trainers' capability to operate within a LIC environment.

(S) [redacted] Section 3.3 (b)(5)

(S) CTEP DEPLOYMENTS: Twelve CTEP deployments and associated activities by 3/7th SFG(A) improved the ability of several countries to plan and execute successful operations and to prepare for disasters at the national and tactical level. Trainers instructed high level officials how to effectively employ their country's national level forces. One US SF soldier was killed in a training accident while participating in a Colombian exercise.

(U) SOF DFTs: SOF DFTs were ideally suited to provide significant contributions toward accomplishing regional goals. Their low density of personnel and the requirements to conduct training suitable to host nation desires permitted access to countries normally unable to accommodate larger US force presence. SF DFTs further enhanced military-to-military relations and benefited host countries and US soldiers with the opportunities and experiences derived from conducting combined training exercises.



(S/NF) During the height of the Panama crisis, SOCSOUTH was augmented with a 100-man plus task force including planning, intelligence, operations cells, a communications package, and logistics/administrative support personnel. SOCSOUTH was unable to field a JSOTF to support necessary contingency efforts and simultaneously maintain day-to-day operational control of other USCINCSO theater-wide priority missions. As a result, USCINCSOC provided temporary CONUS JSOTF support.

(S/NF) SOCSE: SOCSE never exceeded two personnel until the end of the year, but was instrumental in supporting COMSOCSOUTH in his additional role as the Director for Special Operations. SOCSE officers were involved in the coordination of counter-terrorist MTTs, DFTs, and CMEs throughout the theater, and were active in staff support to overt and clandestine initiatives during the crisis in Panama. On 1 November, SOCSE was designated a division within the J3 Directorate, USSOUTHCOM. Two officers from the USSOUTHCOM Deployable Joint Task Force and the CINC's Special Actions Officer were assigned to the element to enhance continuity and capability. COMSOCSOUTH continued to provide direction and guidance to the staff element, and as representatives of COMSOCSO, the division continued to serve as the primary conduit for actions worked within the staff that emanate from USSOCSO or involve SOF forces/operations.

(U) The numerous US SOF activities in-theater reemphasized that USSOUTHCOM's military challenges and operations are varied in and range from low to mid-intensity conflict. SOF activities supporting Latin American Armed Forces and selected host nation police forces achieved country specific objectives and provided training opportunities to US Southern Command not possible by any other DOD organization.

(S/NF) PLANS: Full staff and significant augmentee support were required in successfully planning Elaborate Maze and in developing Special Operations annexes to USCINCSO CONPLANS 6666, 6600, 0300, and Fulcro Firme.

(S/NF) Two intelligence NCOs from 7th Group were consistently augmented by two to four SO technicians and NCOs in support of the 7B Project. Close collaboration and constant interface with USSOUTHCOM and USARSO planners were paramount in SOCSOUTH contingency planning accomplishments.

(S/NF) SOCSOUTH was tasked to provide planning, intelligence, and operational support during the local crisis. The Command provided planning assistance to the JSOTF, conducted compartmented planning requirements, coordinated and conducted TF Gray missions, and provided sub-unified command level staff input to USSOUTHCOM on a day-to-day basis. Contingency planning efforts to support the crisis resulted a delay in completing several major projects and CINC-level planning requirements.

(S/NF) COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS: The J6 Directorate's activities in satisfying the Command's garrison secure communications requirements included the acquisition of mission-essential equipment

[redacted]

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~~(S/NF)~~ The 112th Signal Battalion, tasked by JCSP to support SOCSOUTH, provided constant SOLCA personnel by rotating teams from Fort Bragg to Panama to support signal requirements inherent with the Command's security enhancement capability requirements. SOLCA personnel provided 24hour per day communications support to SOCSOUTH, 617TH SOAD, and 3rd Bn, 7th SFG(A) when necessitated by several tactical fieldings of SOF in Panama and other operational C3 requirements.

(U) Additional activities included the preparation, coordination, and periodic updating of Annex K for numerous CONPLANs, and the maintenance of joint CEOI documents to support these plans, and the preparation of tactical communication orders in support of ongoing operations.

JOINT TASK FORCE - BRAVO

(U) INTRODUCTION: Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-B is the Command and Control Headquarters for U.S. forces and exercise activities in Honduras. It is located at the home of the Honduran Air Force Academy, Emique Soto Cano Air Base, Camayagua, Honduras.

(U) MISSION: The mission of JTF-B is to provide a continuing U.S. force presence in Honduras. This was accomplished by coordinating all in country exercises with the Honduran Armed Forces Staff, the Estado Mayor. JTF-B assisted U.S. forces with exercise planning and assumed operational control when they entered Honduras. Communication, security, aviation, medical, logistical and services support were provided to all units that came into Honduras for exercises and deployments for training (DPT's). This support was available continuously in 1988, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Finally, JTF-B acted as the Southern Command's directive authority in the field of logistics and coordinating authority in Honduras for engineering functions. This outstanding support resulted in several highly successful joints/combined training exercises for U.S. forces from all services including significant Reserve and National Guard component participation.

(U) MAJOR EXERCISES SUPPORTED.

(U) FUERTES CAMINOS 88: Exercise Fuertes Caminos 88 (FC88) was conducted by the Task Force 111 (TF 111) from the 111th Engineer Group, West Virginia Army National Guard, St. Albans, WV. Other engineer units participating were elements of two active component US engineer units, the 52d Engineer Battalion (Combat)(Heavy) from FT Carson, CO and the 92d Engineer Battalion (Combat)(Heavy) from FT Stewart, Georgia; as well as the 1st Honduran Engineer Battalion. Fuertes Caminos means "Strong Roads" in Spanish.

FC88 was the fourth such exercise since 1985 in a series of exercises scheduled to be conducted through 1992. The FC exercises (known as Blazing Trails prior to 1988) are designed to provide realistic training for engineer and combat service support units of the reserve components as well as to perform nation building for the government of Honduras through construction of a farm to market road linking the rich agricultural north to markets in the central and south part of the country.

The first phase of the exercise began on 28 October 1987 with the 52d Engineer Battalion constructing the task force's base camp, Camp Powderhorn, in the vicinity of Puente Grande, HO. The base camp was designed to provide required mission and life support to the exercise participants and included facilities for postal, laundry and bath, medical, maintenance, exchange, dining, chapel, Class IV and billeting operations. Peak camp population was approximately 600 personnel. Construction cost of the base camp was approximately $350,000. At the conclusion of the exercise, the camp was "mothballed" in preparation for use by FC89 participants.

FC 88 road construction began on 13 December 1987. TF 111 was assigned and accomplished three major missions:

a. Construct 11.1 kilometers of new two lane gravel surfaced road from Puente Grande to Jocon including 49 culvert crossings.

b. Repair and upgrade ten kilometers of road constructed during the 1986 Blazing Trails Exercise.

c. Repair, upgrade and apply a gravel wearing course to 5.5 kilometers of road constructed during the 1987 Blazing Trails Exercise.

Exercise command and control was accomplished by a duration staff of approximately 100 members. Exercise participants deployed from CONUS every two weeks and numbered approximately 420 personnel per rotation.

FC88 road construction was valued at approximately $2.44 million.

~~(S)~~ AHUAS TARA 88: Exercise Ahuas Tara 88 (AT88) was a three phase exercise conducted by active component units of the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy and U.S. Marines. Exercise Related Construction (ERC) is designed to support U.S. Southern Command contingency plans for Central America.

(U) ENGINEER PHASE.

(U) ARMY TASK FORCE CONTRIBUTIONS: The AT89 Army phase was conducted from 15 January 1988 through 15 April 1988 under the direction of the 20th Engineer Brigade (Airborne), XVIII Airborne Corps. Subordinate units participating were the 27th Engineer Battalion (Airborne), 362d Engineer Company (Combat Support Equipment) and the vertical construction section from the 37th Engineer Battalion (Airborne). All elements were deployed from FT Bragg, NC. During the AT88 Army phase, two major ERC projects were completed:

(U) San Lorenzo Port Staging Area: A 10,000 square meter (to be expanded during FC89 to 50,000 SM) gravel staging area with six reinforced concrete loading ramps and an access road constructed in the vicinity of San Lorenzo, HO at cost of $650K.

(U) Punta Raton Port Staging Area: A 12,000 square meter gravel staging area with tidal protection break walls constructed in the vicinity of Choluteca, HO at a cost of approximately $370K.

(U) AIR FORCE TASK FORCE CONTRIBUTIONS: The AT88 Air Force phase was conducted from 5 January - 30 April 1988 by the 820th Civil Engineering Squadron (Red Horse) from Nellis Air Force Base, NV. The following major ERC projects were completed:

(U) Class V Hot Apron: An asphalt surfaced apron constructed at the north end of the runway at Palmerola Air Base near Comayagua, HO to facilitate off loading and storage of Class V into existing bunkers. Cost is not available.

(U) Palmerola Cargo Staging Area: A 19,000 square meter cargo staging area constructed at Palmerola Air Base. Cost is not available.

(U) Goloson Cargo Staging Area: A 15,000 square meter gravel surface hardstand area constructed at Goloson Air Base near the Caribbean port city of La Ceiba, HO at a cost of $187K.

(U) Goloson Parking Apron. A 4300 square meter soil-cement stabilized parking apron constructed at Goloson Air Base at a cost of $56K.

(U) Goloson Class V Storage Area. A 4000 square meter concrete open storage hardstand constructed at Goloson Air Base at a cost of $252K.

(U) Le Mesa Air Base Improvements. Construction of a 47,000 square meter gravel surface cargo marshalling area and upgrade of an existing access road at a cost of $370K.

(U) NAVY TASK FORCE CONTRIBUTIONS: AT89 was conducted by the 1st Amphibian Battalion (Seabees) from San Diego, CA from 22 February 1988 through 15 September 1988 supported by the 7th Engineer Detachment (Diving) from FT Kobbe, Panama. These units were engaged in construction of the Off Shore POL Delivery System in the vicinity of San Lorenzo, HO. This project included the underwater installation of a 6041' eight inch diameter petroleum pipeline with an ancillary 4point mooring system at a cost of $950K.

(U) FTX AND CPX PHASE: The FTX and CPX phases of AHUAS TARA are addressed elsewhere in this history under the SCJ3 Exercise input.

(U) CABANAS 88: PHASE I: JAN - APR.

(U) ENGINEER PHASE: Exercise Cabanas 88 was conducted from 15 January 1988 through 15 April 1988 under the direction of the 20th Engineer Brigade (Airborne), XVII Airborne Corps. Subordinate units participating were the 27th Engineer Battalion (Airborne), 262d Engineer Company (Combat Support Equipment) and the vertical construction section from the 37th Engineer Battalion (Airborne). All elements were deployed from FT Bragg, NC. The following major FP´ projects were completed:

(U) Jamastran Airfield Maintenance: Soil-cement stabilization of the 60' X 4700' gravel access road was repaired. The airfield is located in the vicinity of Danli in east central Honduras and was completed at cost of approximately $400K.

(U) Mocoron Airfield Maintenance: Provide repairs as needed to the 60' x 4100' compacted earth FLS constructed during previous exercises in the vicinity of Mocoron in northeast Honduras. Repairs cost an estimated $18K.

(U) Puerto Lempira Airfield Maintenance: Provide repairs as needed to the compacted earth 60' x 4100' FLS constructed during previous exercises in the vicinity of Puerto Lempira which provides access to the Caribbean Sea in northwest Honduras. Additionally, 500 square meter gravel cargo staging area and four CH-47 M8A1 mating helipads were constructed. The final phase included an upgrade of 66 kilometers of road from Mocoron to Puerto Lempira.

~~(C)~~ FTX PHASE: Cabanas 88/ Jose Santos Guardiola exercise was conducted in August 1988. It was a USCINCSO sponsored; joint/combined field training exercise. Counter insurgency warfare operations were conducted in the Guimaca area by elements of the 7th Infantry Div (Light), the 7th Special Forces group and the Honduran Armed Forces. JTF-B played a key role in coordinating all facets of the exercise with the Estado Mayor and U.S. service components. In addition, JTF-B supported the 7th ID on two civic action projects, one engineer project (school construction), and one Medical Readiness Training Exercise (MEDRETE) in the exercise area.

~~(C)~~ GOLDEN PHEASANT 88: Golden Pheasant was a JCS sponsored emergency deployment readiness exercise that occurred simultaneously with two other JCS sponsored exercises (Ahuas Tara Engineer Phase and Fuertes Caminos). JTF-B supported the deployment of elements of the 82nd Airborne Division and the 7th Infantry Division (Light) in order to achieve the objectives of a show of force, relevant training, and collateral training with Honduran forces. The deployment of over 2900 U.S. personnel taxed JTF-B personnel and support activities to the limit to include internal aviation assets which ferried numerous U.S. and Honduran soldiers on joint air mobile operations; the dining facility which operated 24 hours per day; airfield control activities which received and dispatched over 50 aircraft within 65 hours during both deployment and redeployment; and all base logistics systems. This highly successful exercise demonstrated the readiness of FORCES COMMAND (FORSCOM) to rapidly and smoothly deploy and JTF-B's ability to support these efforts in Honduras.

(U) KING'S GUARD 89-1: King's Guard 89-1 was a JCS coordinated, USSOUTHCOM sponsored exercise that occurred in NOV 88. This Navy special operations exercise provided valuable training for U.S. and Honduran naval elements. JTF-B was a key player in assisting the planning and execution of all phases of the exercise which helped ensure all training objectives were met.

(U) DFT SUPPORT: In addition to the five JCS sponsored exercises, JTF-B supported over 80 DFT's ranging from three battalion - sized tactical exercises to small unit training. Among these units were an infantry Task Force from the 10th Mountain Infantry Division (LT), a Marine Battalion Task Force from the I MEF, and an infantry Task Force from the 82nd ABN DIV, other units that participated in the DFT program included medical detachments, engineer platoons, Navy small boat detachments and Air Force flights. Over 13,800 personnel participated in these activities. Some of the larger combined training exercises occurred in the July - August time frame when elements of the Arkansas, Florida, and Illinois National Guard participated in nine two week artillery training rotations with the

Honduran 1st and 4th Artillery Battalions at Zambrano and Choluteca. Lempira 88 and 89 were conducted as continuations of combined exercises begun in 1985 wherein U.S. Special Forces units conducted unilateral and combined training with the Honduran Armed Forces, joint training with U.S. Air Force aircraft and humanitarian/civic action activities. In conjunction with the Lempira exercise, Special Operations Forces Humanitarian Assistance Teams (SOFHAT) (conducted medical and humanitarian assistance) programs in villages around the northern coast of Honduras. Medical teams dispersed curative medicines while engineering teams constructed wells, schools and sanitation facilities. JTF-B coordinating activities played a key role to ensure Lempira 89-1 exercise was successful.

(U) <u>CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS</u>: Humanitarian/Civic Action Assistance Programs (HCA) were a part of every training exercise in 1988. JTF-B fully coordinated these activities with the Honduran Government and the U.S. Embassy to ensure the entire effort supported and contributed to an overall development plan. An important aspect of the humanitarian assistance effort is the involvement of the Honduran Government. JTF-B worked closely with the Honduran Army Brigade Commanders who established the civic action priorities in their areas.

(U) <u>ENGINEER HCA</u>: The number and scope of these activities was particularly significant. Over 150 HCA projects worth more than 1.4 million dollars were completed in 1988. Forty-six schools were repaired/built; eight wells were dug to bring potable water to many villages for the first time; and sixty-seven other villages had repairs or construction made to orphanages, churches and other public buildings including the construction of thirty-four latrine facilities. These actions were in keeping with JTF-B's objective to support the development of a strong civic action program in each brigades' area of operation.

(U) <u>MEDICAL HCA</u>: JTF-B's medical outreach program was also significant in 1988. This program was coordinated with the Honduran Armed Forces and Ministry of Health. U.S. medical personnel visited approximately 30 villages 3 times per year along with their Honduran counterparts to provide medical, dental, and veterinary care to these selected remote areas. Each visit provided treatment for approximately 700 patients, 500 animals, and dental care for 400 people. Sanitation instruction, water and sanitation surveys and epidemiologic data gatherings were also conducted in each village. To help prevent the spread of polio in the Copan region near the Guatemalan border over 600 booster shots were provided to children in villages originally treated for an outbreak in 1987. Repeat visits to these villages allowed follow up treatments that would otherwise have not been available. Local care in the Del Valle clinic at Soto Cano Air Base was also extensive. About 20 fracture reductions per month were performed for referred Honduran citizens, and the stasis ulcer clinic treated 75 Hondurans per week. The other areas averaged treating 200 patients per week both in medical and dental categories. Besides the actual benefits of medical treatment to the patients, valuable training was obtained by our medical personnel in tropical medicine and humanitarian assistance throughout 1988.

Overall medical readiness training exercise (MEDRETE) data is as follows:

Immunizations - number administered 6,216; patients 4,147

Dental - procedures performed 14,186; patients 3,651

Physician seen - patients 19,003

Dewormed - patients 14,007

Prescriptions - number issued 25,515; patients 15,868

Veterinary care - animals treated 15,139; vaccinations 21,949

(U) HIGH LEVEL VISITORS: Due to the significant level of interest in the Central American region and Honduras in particular, JTF-B hosted numerous visits in 1988 from high level military and civilian leaders. Senior military officers, Congressional delegations, civic leaders, church groups, allied officers, defense attaches military staff agencies, and college students were among the many visitors to stop at Soto Cano AB. JTF-B provided briefings, tours, and quarters as applicable to all these visitors which numbered in excess of 650 people. This group included 67 General officers, 80 Colonels, 285 civilians and the balance a mixture of military officers from all services, allied countries, and various other agencies. Some of the more noteworthy visitors included:

ADM CROWE	CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
HON GEORGE SHULTZ	U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE
HON EVERETT BRIGGS	U.S. AMBASSADOR TO HONDURAS
GEN WOERNER	USCINCSOUTH
GEN CASSIDY	USCINCMAC/USCINCTRANS
GEN LINDSAY	US CINCSOC
LTG MCPEAK	CDR, 12TH AF
MG LOEFFKE	CDR, USARSO
MG CONWAY	DIR, AIR NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
MG BURDICK	DIR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

Members of U.S. Congress included - SEN REID (NV) and the following representatives: MONTGOMERY (MS), LLOYD (TN), MCEWEN (OH), HUNTER (CA), DARDEN (GA) HAMMERSCHMIDT (AK), SISKY (VA), ORITZ (TX), LUKIN (OH).

(U) LANDMARK EVENTS: The very nature of JTF-B's mission causes it to be the center of activity in Honduras. While exercise support and DFT's received a great amount of attention, there were several events, visitors, and key personnel changes in 1988. These highlights are as follows:

JAN - (b)(6) took command of JTF-B Army Forces (ARFOR) from (b)(6)

JAN - Task Force Southern Eagle arrived with 13 UH-1, 3 UH-1v medevac, 4 CH-47 and 10 UH-60 helicopters. The Blackhawks (UH-60's) marked the first time they were deployed to Honduras for an indefinite period.

JUN - [redacted] took command of the Military Intelligence Low Intensity MI(LI) Bn from [redacted]

JUN - [redacted] U.S. Secretary of State visited Soto Cano AB. He toured base facilities and met with the troops.

JUL - On 11 Jul, [redacted] assumed command of JTF-B from [redacted]

JUL - On 17 Jul, 9 members of JTF-B were attacked outside of a nightclub in San Pedro Sula as they were preparing to leave in a mini-van. The vehicle was damaged by a hand grenade explosion and received approximately 12 rounds of gunfire. Six of the nine people were wounded in the attack.

SEP - A UH-1H crashed shortly after take-off from Palmerola AB. The 3 crew members aboard sustained no serious injuries although the helicopter was severely damaged. Prompt response by crash and rescue personnel were key factors in limiting personal injuries after the crash.

SEP - On 9 Sep, [redacted] took command of JTF-B Air Force Forces (AFFOR) from [redacted]

OCT- Palmerola AB changed it name to Soto Cano AB in honor of retired Honduran Air Force [redacted] Soto Cano.

NOV - MAC established a weekly channel flight from Charleston AFB. The mission helped improve the flow of rotational personnel and people on leave.

DEC - A CH 47 helicopter crashed and burned approximately 8 miles East of Goloson AB. Five crew members were killed in the accident. The aircraft was on a routine resupply mission when the incident occurred shortly after takeoff due to apparent mechanical failure.

The year ended on a positive note when Admiral William J. Crowe Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff visited Soto Cano AB in DEC. Admiral Crowe toured base facilities and addressed a formation of JTF-B personnel. He stated that "I'm aware of the very, very strong support which you give to over 15,000 of our service people from all branches who come through here every year for joint exercises and training. Close cooperation and close work with the Honduran Armed Forces has helped cement a very, very important bilateral tie between the United States and the government of Honduras."

(U) BASE IMPROVEMENTS: Improvements and upgrades to JTF-B facilities were actively pursued in 1988. Several engineering DFT's were used to complete over 26 projects on Soto Cano AB and JTF-B related facilities. Construction project highlights included the following:

JAN - constructed recreation center (6000 square feet).
MAR - completed swimming pool (33'x77' - 132,000 gallon capacity)
APR - constructed base theater
MAY - constructed new dining facility on Blackjack side
MAY - constructed base exchange annex in Air Force Village

Other projects included a medical screening bohio, new shower facilities, base road improvements, prefabricated hangars, a library and several warehouses. Upgrades to existing facilities included electrical connections to C-huts, rifle range improvements, extended concertina on the perimeter, and lighting at several guard posts. Individual self-help projects greatly enhanced living facilities in several hootch areas throughout the base. JTF-B continued its' emphasis in 1988 of providing the best possible living and working conditions for its personnel within the limits of fiscal constraints and the environment.

(U) CONCLUSION: JTF-B's key role of coordinating U.S. military training activities in Honduras continued unabated in 1988. The personnel of JTF-B provided round-the-clock support to all units deployed for training or exercises which included close coordination of these activities with the Honduran government. JTF-B executed all missions in an expert manner while operating in an austere low intensity conflict environment. The members of the Task Force exemplified the professionalism and values of U.S. Armed Forces and proudly represented the strategic interests of the United States in Central America.

COAST GUARD LIAISON OFFICE

(U) INTRODUCTION: The billet is currently filled by [redacted] From July to December 1988 he was assisted by the USCG Liaison Officer to COMUSMILGP Panama, [redacted] Navy

(U) MISSION: The office is responsible for security assistance pertaining to Coast Guard matters for all of Central and South America through providing support in formulating training for coast Guard/brown water navies in the various countries in the AO; providing information on USCG equipment, training and operational capabilities; facilitating Coast Guard/CINC cooperation in joint and combined efforts to stop the flow of drugs from the region; monitoring U.S. military plans and programs to insure compatibility with U.S. Coast Guard plans and programs.

(U) GENERAL USCINCSO SUPPORT.

(FOUO) Performed site surveys in Venezuela, Ecuador, Belize, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. Recommended appropriate Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) training and related equipment for host country military/law enforcement agencies.

~~(FOUO)~~ With the assistance of USCGLO to Panama, SCCG developed a LATAM special Captain of the Port (COTP) training program to assist interested host countries improve their port operations, ship and cargo control, and customs collection.

~~(FOUO)~~ Increased USCG training from four to eleven LATAM countries.

~~(FOUO)~~ Initiated international underway training program for Guatemalan naval personnel to be placed aboard USCG cutters during inter-coast transfers of new construction vessels.

~~(FOUO)~~ Initiated USCG instructor billet augmentation for COMUSNAVSCIATTS.

(U) USCINCSO COUNTER DRUG TASK FORCE.

~~(FOUO)~~ Assisted with maritime and waterborne law enforcement strategy and training program development. Conducted site surveys with USSOUTHCOM and COMUSNAVSO representatives.

~~(FOUO)~~ Coordinated between USCINCSO, SCJ5-CD, and Commandant, USCG, on narco-trafficking waterborne related issues.

~~(FOUO)~~ Developed and prioritized MLE counter-narcotics training for Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, Costa Rica, Guyana, Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Brazil. Training to be received during FY-89.

~~(FOUO)~~ Initiated USCG billet augmentation request for HQ USSOUTHCOM, SCJ5-CD. Billet to be filled summer 1989.

~~(FOUO)~~ Assisted host country and U.S. country team members in developing maritime and port counter-narcotics law enforcement strategies and supporting training programs.

~~(FOUO)~~ Prepared COTP training program in conjunction with Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (DOS/INM) and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) Chemical Diversion Branch.

~~(FOUO)~~ Assisted in setup of MLE operations between USCG and Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Belize.

COMMAND SURGEON

(U) GENERAL: 1988 was a year of growth in medical activities conducted within the USSOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). The Command Surgeon and his staff served on two Crisis Action Teams (CAT's) - the Honduran border incursion CAT which monitored the XVIII Airborne Corps Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (EDRE) to Honduras and, - the Panama CAT which was formed as a result of the Noriega regime activities. As a direct result of the lessons learned from these crises, medical planning has improved for USSOUTHCOM Operation and Contingency Plans (OPLANS/CONPLANS). The staff also developed new medical initiatives in the countries of Guatemala, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Uruguay, Peru, Colombia, and Guyana. Progress toward meeting the Commander-In-Chief's (CINC) guidance to expand medical activities in the AOR has been significant.

(U) ORGANIZATION: The Command Surgeon's Office is a special staff directorate. Periodically, the staff is tasked to examine the reorganization of the Directorate. The three main ideas for reorganization have been: "download" the functions of the Directorate to the component surgeons' offices; realign the directorate under the J4 as is the medical staff at the Joint Chiefs of Staff; or, dual-hat the USSOUTHCOM Surgeon with the US Army, South Surgeon. After much debate and analysis the facts support retaining the Command Surgeon's office as a separate special staff directorate, manned as justified in the current Joint Manning Document (JMD). Some facts bearing are:

(U) Component surgeon staffs are all dual-hatted with other responsibilities and functions already. The US Army, South (USARSO) Surgeon is also the U.S. Army Medical Activity Commander. The Southern Air Force (USSOUTHAF) Surgeon is the Commander, 24th Medical Group and USAF Health Clinic, Howard Air Force Base. Finally, the US Navy, South (USNAVSO) Surgeon is the Dental Officer in charge of the Navy Dental Clinic at Naval Station, Panama. None are staffed with additional personnel to support the major command surgeon role, with the exception of USARSO having an Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) officer assigned to handle reserve component issues. Pushing joint functional responsibility downward would entail either providing additional personnel slots at the component level or straining the existing personnel resources by "triple-hatting" the component surgeons. In the first case, there would be no overall personnel savings. In the latter case, joint staff medical planning and supervision would be ineffective.

(U) Recent history has shown us the necessity for a special command and staff organization for medical support. A conclusion quoted from the Department of the Army book Vietnam Studies: Medical Support 1965-1970 states, "Medical Service is an integrated system with its treatment, evacuation, hospitalization, supply, service, and communications components. It is not a subsystem of logistics, nor is it a subsystem of personnel." The importance of sound medical staff planning and supervision at a Unified Command

level was again learned as a result of the terrorist bombing of the Beirut Marine Barracks and the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983. Because the medical staffs were previously under-emphasized, these events showed the lack of coordinated medical support available to the marine/soldier when really needed. At the risk of discounting the importance of a special medical staff advisor for peacetime activities, direct command access by the Command Surgeon is the Commander-In-Chief's (CINC) "insurance policy" when a crisis unfolds.

(U) Finally, other "forward deployed" unified commands are generally organized as special staffs reporting directly to the Chief of Staff. This is true of European Command (EUCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), and Central Command (CENTCOM). Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) is dual-hatted with the Navy Component (Atlantic CINCLANTFLT) Surgeon, and is the only "fighting CINC's" Surgeon to report to the J4.

(U) <u>COUNTRY ACTIVITIES</u>: The following is a by-country summary of medical activities for 1988:

(U) <u>ARGENTINA (AR)</u>: US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) organized a one-week psychiatry Subject Matter Expert Exchange (SMEE) visit to Buenos Aires in August. Three distinguished US Army psychiatrists participated in a series of lectures on combat psychiatry and post traumatic stress syndrome. AR expressed interest in more psychiatry SMEE visits for 1989.

(U) <u>BELIZE (BH)</u>. From 5-9 December, the USSOUTHCOM Surgeon hosted an official visit to Panama by two military physicians. One was (b)(6) British Forces, Belize Medical Officer. The other being (b)(6) Belizean Army. The two physicians were escorted by (b)(6) US Defense Attache's Office, Belize City, BH. The group toured USSOUTHCOM facilities and the Canal, and were guests of honor, at a dinner party hosted by the Command Surgeon, (b)(6)

(U) <u>BOLIVIA (BL)</u>.

(U) Significant events included the Surgeon's final country team coordination of Army National Guard (ARNG) rotations to BL and the completion of the first two stand-alone missions. The first humanitarian/civic assistance mission was performed by the 217th Evacuation Hospital, San Antonio, Texas, 1-16 October. This unit provided medical, dental, and veterinary care to rural populations of Corque, Toledo, and Huachacalla. The second success was achieved by the Illinois ARNG, 1-16 December, in the towns of Challapata, Pazna, and Poopo.

(U) Earlier in the year, 13-22 July, a veterinary training team deployed in support of the Narcotics Assistance Unit (NAU) effort. This team provided evaluation of: food purchasing, preparation, sanitation, and nutritional quality; water potability and treatment; sewage and waste disposal; and, general sanitation. Later, 14-29 September, a dental element as part of a Mobile

Training Team (MTT) provided dental support of the "UMOPAR" (BL National Rural Narcotics Police).

(U) The Command Surgeon coordinated for the November delivery of five complete dental operatories with the National Guard Bureau. This prepositioned equipment will be used for 1989 U.S. dental deployments for training during which restorative care will be rendered to rural populations in BL.

(U) BRAZIL (BR): (b)(6) Deputy Surgeon, was the delegate to the Medicine in Air Forces of the Americas (MEDFAA) XIV Committee in Rio de Janeiro, 7-11 November. The inter-american committee met under the auspices of the System of Cooperation Among American Air Forces (SICOFAA - pronounced "sic-o-fa"). Work sessions outlined plans for future cooperation among member countries. One future effort will be an U.S. presentation of a paper on Careers in Aviation Medicine during the MEDFAA XV Committee scheduled in Rio again in 1989.

(U) CHILE (CI): Since 1986, epidemiologists from Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) have made team visits to Santiago in conjunction with a Group B Meningitis vaccine development program. By August 1987, 40,811 volunteers in Isuique (1,000 mi... north of Santiago) had been immunized. Three follow-on visits by the WRAIR team occurred in 1988. Results of the study should be available in 1989.

(U) COLOMBIA (CO): USSOUTHCOM Deputy Surgeon, (b)(6) accompanied a 3 member Subject Matter Expert Exchange (SMEE) team to the military hospital in Bogota, 17-23 April. The program presented by the team was titled, "Surgical Reconstruction in the Setting of Mass Casualty". This SMEE program provided the opportunity for further assessment of CO combat medicine program and to discuss future initiatives. CO requested future SMEE visits in prosthetics and combat corpsman training. The first of a series in prosthetics was subsequently carried out in November. Plans were made for additional SMEE visits in 1989.

(U) COSTA RICA (CS).

(U) The first "stand-alone" dental deployment opened new medical training opportunities in our AOR and stirred Costa Rican interest in purchasing field dental equipment for their rural dental program. Following the April 1988 site survey involving representatives from the Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation (CHODC), CS Ministry of Public Security, USSOUTHCOM Command Surgeon's Office, and 257th Medical Detachment (Team "HA": Dental Service), CS representatives were invited to Fort Bragg, NC to get acquainted with the 257th Medical Detachment and the equipment to be used during the deployment. This observer training was conducted in June 1988.

(U) In July 1988, the 257th Medical Detachment deployed to CS via C-5A Galaxy USAF aircraft. After a highly successful dental deployment to the Limon region, where restorative dental care

replaced the previous "extraction only" missions, the Costa Ricans showed interest in purchasing similar U.S. field dental equipment used by the 257th.

(U) In September 1988, representatives from USSOUTHCOM Command Surgeon's Office conducted a staff assistance visit to CHODC with dental equipment information to present to the CS Ministries of Health and Public Security. The purpose of the visit was to give CS a general idea of what was available and related purchase, operating, maintenance, and training costs. The Costa Ricans were to review the information provided (essentially a modified Total Package Materiel Fielding Plan from the US Army Medical Materiel Agency) and use the lists in conjunction with actual in-use U.S. equipment during the second dental deployment in November 1988. Ultimately, a Military Assistance Program Foreign Military Sales case was developed using the provided information and the CS requirements.

(U) In November 1988, the CS Ministries of Public Security, Health, and Agriculture, offered training opportunities for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991. Four Medical/Veterinary and four Dental exercises were proposed for each fiscal year.

(U) <u>EL SALVADOR (ES)</u>.

(U) Continued work in the areas of orthotics/prosthetics production, medical supply and maintenance, combat medic training, preventive medicine, and dealing with the continuous delays in the opening of the modern military hospital in San Salvador were the MMTT focus. Optimism was not the sentiment of the Command Surgeon's "desk officer" for the Medical Mobile Training Team (MMTT), iterations X and XI, because of the perceived frustration experienced in trying to change the inefficient way the ES Armed Forces (ESAF) medical system does business.

(U) A Surgeon's staff visit conducted 23-26 August confirmed that the two greatest logistics problems were inventory management and distribution of medical supplies - the bottom line being the front line medics were not receiving their requirements. One opinion why these problems continue to plague the ESAF is that a basic leadership problem exists. Those who control the critical medical supply and equipment assets rarely if ever visit the "front line" to define and resolve problems.

(U) [redacted] (b)(6) Team Chief through July, stated that "the Army Medical Department (should) participate in the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program by training selected personnel to be qualified regional medical experts". [redacted] (b)(6) Team Chief since July, stated the major concern of the MMTT was the system's inability in "...identifying replacements for departing Medical Mobile Training Team Members". He also said that qualified personnel are identified but are not necessarily assigned due to their personal preference or their commander's objection to losing them for 6 months.

(U) GUATEMALA (GT): 1988 marked the first two deployments for stand-alone medical readiness exercises into GT. Both were Army National Guard (ARNG) missions supervised by Panama-based Filed Medical Training Site (FMTS), 142nd Medical Battalion, 324th Support Group, USARSO. During the 4-17 August deployment, the 209th Medical Company, Iowa ARNG, treated 2,913 medical patients and 2,047 animals in the Chimaltenango region of GT. The 5-19 November exercise, conducted by the 138th Medical Company, Georgia ARNG in the same region, saw 8,198 patients and 2,016 animals. The missions were successful enough for GT to invite US participation in four more exercises in 1989.

(U) GUYANA (GY): General Woerner, Commander-In-Chief, Southern Command (CINCSO), visited GY in July 1988 and offered the Guyanese Defense Forces (GDF) the opportunity to initiate contact/training with their U.S. military counterparts. MG McLean, Commander, GDF, accepted the offer. As a result, two Surgeon's representatives, (b)(6) and (b)(6) traveled to GY 26-30 September 1988 and successfully negotiated with the GDF and civilian medical authorities for combined GY-U.S. medical civic action initiatives to commence in 1989.

(U) HONDURAS (HO).

(U) The Joint Task Force-Bravo Medical Element (JTF-BME), experienced a number of "firsts" this calendar year. The JTF-BME Commander, (b)(6) was the first to extend to a full year tour in that position (Jan 88 - Jan 89). In March, the first "show-of-force" exercise (actually termed Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise - EDRE) by the XVIII Airborne Corps was conducted as a result of the Nicaraguan border incursion into HO. The first funds ($750,000) of the "Title 10, Humanitarian/Civic Assistance (HCA)" legislation were provided for medical supplies in support of U.S.- HO combined civic action missions. The first combined, cogent plan for conducting those missions, with a focus on a long-term strategy, in three northern provinces, was implemented (1988 treatment statistics for HO nationals: JTF-BME U.S. Hospital-541 inpatients; 1,915 outpatient visits; 477 surgical; 8,004 dental. Del Valle [or "Gate"] Clinic-4,315 visits; 1,923 stasis ulcer treatments. Medical Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETEs)-22,511 medical patients; 6,800 dental patients; 14,116 immunizations; and, 16,034 animal treatments).

(U) The first USSOUTHCOM General Inspection of JTF-BME since 1986 was conducted in October. The first U.S. government contract was established in September to employ the services of Honduran (b)(6) as a HO - JTF-BME liaison to develop the U.S. military interface with the HO national health care system. Plans were finalized for next year's fielding of a Deployable Medical Systems (DEPMEDS) operating room (OR) and central material section (CMS) - another first. The primary mission of JTF-BME - providing health care to U.S. forces in HO - was accomplished (1988 estimated statistics for treatment of U.S. forces: 265 inpatients; 9,400 outpatient visits; and, 16 surgical).

(U) PANAMA (PM): Political tensions continued to mount in Panama during 1988. Because US-PM relations deteriorated, no combined

medical exercises, programmed in 1987, were conducted. The medical readiness posture of USSOUTHCOM and components improved markedly during the year with joint exercises conducted in mass casualty, medical regulating, and wartime blood management. The USSOUTHCOM Surgeon supervised medical planning activities of JTF-Panama since the latter's inception in March.

(U) PERU (PE): Deputy Surgeon, (b)(6) completed a site survey to Lima, 24-29 July, to plan for future Subject Matter Expert Exchange (SMEE) visits. He later returned 16-25 October to accompany a four-member SMEE team of active and reserve component physicians who made presentations in the areas of combat psychiatry and combat casualty care. Combined audiences of 800 physicians, nurses, and students participated in these lecture programs. More SMEE visits were planned for 1989.

(U) URUGUAY (UY): (1) (U) As the result a June 1988 phone conversation with the US Army Security Assistance Agency Latin America (USASAALA), the Command Surgeon's Office discovered that the Government of Uruguay (GOUY) had been given $500,000 in Military Assistance Program funds (FY 87 appropriation) and that they wanted to spend all of it on medical equipment. The Command Surgeon's Office contacted the U.S. Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), UY to offer assistance in defining the requirement in terms of U.S. military standard or commercial equipment. Two iterations of a list of requirements had been sent to J5 and ultimately to the U.S. Army Medical Materiel Agency (USAMMA) in May and June. Because the equipment was not identified specifically enough by the GOUY, no price and availability data could be obtained.

(U) In August, ODC UY requested assistance in translating the GOUY requirements into U.S. products. In November, a representative from the Surgeon's Office and one from Panama US Army Medical Activity Logistics Division conducted a staff assistance visit (SAV) to ODC UY. Equipped with commercial and DoD catalogs, the SAV successfully identified over 110 separate items which was estimated to be worth over the $500,000 mark. The Surgeon closed the year optimistic about other potential medical initiatives with UY having "opened the door" with the SAV.

(U) OFFICE PERSONNEL.

1988 Arrivals:

(b)(6) Deputy Surgeon, January.
(b)(6) Medical Logistics Officer, February.
(b)(6) Medical Plans Officer, June.
Preventive Medicine Officer, June.
(b)(6) Command Surgeon, June.
(b)(6) Secretary, July.
(b)(6) Secretary, October.

1988 Departures:

(b)(6) Command Surgeon, July.
(b)(6) Medical Planner, July.
Preventive Medicine Officer, July.
(b)(6) Secretary, July.
, Secretary, September.

Other Members:

(b)(6) Senior Medical Operations Officer.
(b)(6) Operations Officer.
(b)(6) Secretary.

SOUTHCOM ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE

PERSONNEL.

Director

(b)(6)
(b)(6) Departed 10 May 88

Project Officers

(b)(6)
Arrived 12 Oct 88
Arrived 1 Dec 88
Departed 15 Jul 88

Staff Noncommissioned Officer

(b)(6)
Arrived 10 Aug 88
Departed 15 Jul 88

(U) PROGRAMMING ACTIVITIES: 1988 was the second year in the two year FY 90-91 budget cycle. As such, activities were limited primarily to refinement of the previously accepted program. The CINC initiatives in the Integrated Priority List (IPL) have received good service support for the most part. The FY 92-97 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) was initiated in late 1988 with the services and the USSOUTHCOM Staff developing the initiatives that will be considered by the components during 1989. The only initiative strictly sponsored by SCEN is the Theater Infrastructure Initiative for the accomplishment of improvement of any type in the AO. Construction Programs in Panama have effectively been put on hold due to the political consequences of the treaty and the Noriega situation.

(U) MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS (MCP or MILCON): Projects approved for accomplishment in 1988 included the $10 million Howard AFB Upgrade (hazardous cargo pad, arm/de-arm pads, south overrun extension, maintenance facilities, combat control facility, and ramp lighting) and the $4 million Phase I and $3 million Phase II of the Palmerola/Soto Cano AB Troop facility Upgrade program (billets, road, and utilities). The Howard project was awarded and is under construction with completion dates in mid -1989. Both of the Soto Cano projects were put on hold by language in the FY 89 MILCON bill that required validation of need for the work by the incoming administration of President Bush. At the end of 1988, DOD was still attempting to obtain this validation. An additional project approved in 1988 was a $2.4 million Dormitory Rehab job at Howard AFB. At the end of 1988, this project was also on hold by Congressional language requiring a Treaty Implementation Plan briefing to Congress.

(U) TREATY IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING (TIP) During 1988 a TIP management division was established in the J-5 directorate. As this

cell was manned, they assumed more of the planning functions. Also in late 1988, the Mobile District of Corps of Engineers' South Atlantic Division become more involved in planning activities. Major accomplishments included drafting a TIP framework plan to identify the numerous events that would need to take place during the remaining Treaty period. This was based on a nominal relocation sequence and will be revised as actual dates are established. The Mobile district also developed a draft DD Form 1391 for the eventual programming of a new headquarters facility. A significant SCEN contribution was to supply background information to the new TIP cell engineer.

(U) <u>EXERCISE AND TROOP CONSTRUCTION</u>.

(U) There were two major JCS Exercises in 1988 involving engineer forces: AHUAS TARA (AT) 88 in Honduras and Fuertes Caminos (FC) 88 in Honduras. During AT 88 (15 Jan - 25 Apr 88) the 27th Engineer Battalion (Airborne) FT Bragg, NC completed projects at Puerto Lempira, Mocoron, San Lorenzo, Jamastran and Punta Raton; the 820th Civil Engineer Squadron (Heavy Repair) Nellis AFB, NV completed a project at La Mesa AB and PHIBCB ONE and UCT TWO, San Diego CA completed an off-shore POL discharge facility at San Lorenzo. The Army projects included airfield improvements at Puerto Lempira and Mocoron, the repair of the runway at San Lorenzo using lime-soil stabilization, the construction of a 50000 sm unpaved cargo staging area at the port of San Lorenzo, the construction of a 10000 sm unpaved cargo staging area at Punta Raton, the upgrade of 10.5km of road at Punta Raton, and repair of the Jamastran runway and parking apron. The Air Force projects included the construction of a 35000 sm unpaved cargo staging area and repairs to the runway at La Mesa. The repairs to the runway were done by contract. The Navy project included construction of a four point mooring system and a 7700 foot submerged pipeline. The off-shore POL discharge facility was designed by the Chesapeake Div Naval Facilities Engineering Command. AT 88 was the first Joint Engineering exercise in USSOUTHCOM involving engineer forces form the Army, Air Force, and Navy, and trained a total of 1474 personnel. AT 88 was the first deployment of a a Red Horse Squadron to USSOUTHCOM. AT 88 was the first use of lime-soil stabilization which has proven to be satisfactory for unpaved airfields when applied in adequate depth, i.e. greater than 18 inches. Army engineer forces also supported Exercise Golden Pheasant in Mar 88.

(U) FC 88 (13 Oct 87 - 30 June 88) was the first Reserve Component engineer exercise which included an active component engineer element from start to finish. The 11th Engr Group West Virginia ARNG was augmented by units from the 13th En Co Ft Knox KY, the 52nd En Bn Ft Carson Co, and the 92nd En Bn Ft Stewart GA, during various phases of the exercise. The combination of RC and AC soldiers provided greater continuity and efficiency. The exercise resulted in 13.7 km of two lane, gravel surfaced road from Puente Grande to Jocon in the Yoro Province, Honduras. FC 88 trained 12,000 personnel.

(U) Exercise Related Construction (ERC) funds continued to be

a vital aspect of engineer support to JCS directed OCONUS exercises. USSOUTHCOM received $4.16 million out of a total $6.0 million worldwide ERC funds. These funds were used during AT 88 and FC 88.

(U) The FY 88 Engineer Deployment for Training program was also an important program in achieving USCINCSO theater objectives. In addition to including Army (Active and Reserve Component), Navy, and Air National Guard engineer forces, the program expanded to include Air Force Reserve Prime Beef and Red Horse units. The US Army sent units from the 34th En Bn Ft Riley KS and the 46th En Bn Ft Rucker Al to Soto Cano AB to support JTF-B and to conduct humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) projects. The 43rd En Bn Ft Benning GA provided an Engineer Company to construct a UH-60 helicopter hangar and parking apron at Soto Cano AB. Two RC Utility Detachments, the 158th Util Det Idaho and the 122 Eng Bn Utility Section South Carolina, provided general engineering support to JTF-B. The 536th En Bn Ft Kobbe Panama, augmented by an engineer company from the 19th En Bn Ft Knox KY, constructed 11.2 Km of unpaved road and two Bailey bridges in Valle La Estrella, Limon Province, Costa Rica. The Air National Guard provided twelve two week deployments of Prime Beef and Red Horse engineers to do Base Civil Engineering tasks at JTF-B and conduct HCA activities vicinity Soto Cano AB Honduras. The ANG also provided a 28 man element from the 151 CES Utah to perform electrical repairs at the Miraflores Public Hospital in La Paz Bolivia. The Air Force Reserve sent 6 two week Prime Beef deployments and 3 two week deployments from the 307th CES (HR) to JTF-B to perform Base Civil Engineering tasks at Soto Cano AB.

(U) Finally, a 5 person team from the Air Force Engineering and Services Center performed airfield pavement evaluations at Chiclayo and Talara Airbases in Peru. US Navy Seabee detachments conducted engineer training in Costa Rica and Puerto Castilla Honduras. NMCB 4 drilled 18 wells in the Guanacaste Province Costa Rica and NMCB 1 constructed two pre-engineered metal buildings on a Honduran Naval Base. Service funding for FY 88 DFTs covered all requirements. USNAVSO provided $600.0K for Seabee deployments, USARSO used $1.2 mil in Short Duration Exercise funds for the engineer deployment to Costa Rica, and FORSCOM provided $3.4 mil for all other Army DFTs. The ANG and Air Force Reserve deployments were internally funded. There were no Active Duty Air Force Deployments.

(U) <u>SOTO CANO AB (FORMERLY PALMEROLA AB) ACTIVITIES</u>.

(U) A combination of contract, DFT, and self help construction again were used to improve the operational capability and standard of living of US forces assigned to JTF-B. Major work done in 1988 included :

a. Blackjack volleyball/basketball court
b. Arts and Crafts Center
c. Recreation facility
d. New Blackjack dining facility
e. Wash rack for heavy equipment
f. Upgrade of the 224 MI Bn Motor Pool
g. Sling load point for helicopters

h. Lighting improvements on "B ramp"
i. Paving the access road to the GCA radar
j. Pole barn at the "C" ramp
k. Non-directional beacon
l. 11 C-huts for billeting
m. Integrated Physical Security System
n. UH-60 helicopter hangar and parking apron
o. Repair to the TACAN road
p. FESA maintenance facility
q. Extension of north perimeter road
r. New Blackjack shower facility
s. Pesticide facility
t. Chain link fence at various locations
u. Lighting improvements at various locations
v. Dust control (seeding) at various locations
w. 11 guard towers
x. Upgrade of rifle range
y. Theater
z. New Self Service Supply building
aa. Paving the ADAGG road
bb. Second fabric hangar for Quality Dragon
cc. AAFES warehouse expansion
dd. Four new pole barns for ARFOR PBO
ee. Library

(U) Air Force active duty 7 man design teams provided five 45 day deployments to Soto Cano AB. The design teams provided critical support to the JTF-B Base Civil Engineer. The JTF-B DCSENGR office continued to solidify its management of engineer activities in Honduras. An Army major and CPT and Air Force CAPT were added to the DCSENGR staff as well as two quality assurance NCOs and a supply specialist. Honduras continues to be the hub of engineer activity in the SOUTHCOM AOR. FY 88 involved 2 major JCS Exercises and 32 DFTs in Honduras. Soto Cano AB construction and maintenance, funded from O&M accounts, totaled $2.8 mil in FY 88 and involved DFTs and contracts. Unspecified minor MILCON totalled $1.[illegible] mil and involved two projects the integrated physical security system and the UH-60 parking ramp/hangar. The base maintenance contract totalled $6.5 mil with $1.73 mil allocated to Facility Engineering. All of the FY 88 ERC, $4.6 mil, was allocated to engineer projects in Honduras.

(U) <u>HOWARD - KOBBE - FARFAN ROAD PROJECT:</u>

(U) This is a $2.9 million project funded in the FY 1988 contingency military construction (MILCON) program. The project involves the construction of approximately five and one-half miles of a two-lane asphalt roadway along the outer edge of the Howard-Kobbe Defense site. The project was justified based on the enhanced security it would provide and has had high visibility resulting from the political situation in Panama.

(U) The Panama Canal Treaty provides for open access through Howard AFB to the town of Veracruz. This arrangement leaves Howard AFB and Ft. Kobbe vulnerable to subversion, espionage and terrorist activity during periods of increased tension since the bases cannot

be sealed off in time of crisis without violation of Treaty provisions. This project provides an alternative route to Veracruz and allows the Howard-Kobbe Defense sites to be closed off to non-DOD personnel when necessary.

(U) As of December 1988, the project was 95% designed with final design and initial construction being accomplished concurrently to expedite completion. The project will be accomplished jointly by the 536th Engineer Battalion and a civilian paving contractor.

(U) Security Assistance Construction: The program of Corps of Engineer managed construction, funded through the Military Assistance Program (MAP) or the foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, continued for Honduras and El Salvador. Projects administered and completed included:

El Salvador

Pier Repairs	Punta Ruca	$0.4 Mil
Construct Hangars	Comalapa	$2.3 Mil
Barracks Complex	Comalapa	$1.3 Mil
Barracks Complex	Punta Ruca	$1.9 Mil
ESAF Temp Facilities	Various	$1.7 Mil

Honduras

National Training Facility	Juticalpa	$6.2 Mil

(U) Ongoing work in El Salvador includes a number of training facilities for the El Salvadoran Armed Forces. In Honduras, planning was started for battalion base camps at Trujillo and Jamastran.

(U) OVERSEAS BASING STUDY: This project was an offshoot of the base closure study done by DOD on CONUS bases. The purpose was to define the units and mission of overseas bases to look at possibilities of accomplishing mission from stateside locations. A secondary purpose was to see what units were returning to CONUS in the foreseeable future and where they could end up. The study is an analysis of all main installations in Panama and Soto Cano AB in Honduras. Data contained in the study includes major units, numbers of personnel, operating costs, housing assets, primary and secondary functions, and peacetime/wartime missions.

(U) HONDURAN AIRFIELD AGREEMENT: The purpose of the Honduran Airfield Agreement is to establish responsibility, both U.S. and Honduran, for the use of Honduran paved airfields. The agreement is needed because the U.S. uses certain airfields extensively. The agreement covers Soto Cano AB, Goloson AB, Tegucigalpa Int, La Mesa Int, and Trujillo. San Lorenzo will be added to this agreement when it is paved. According to the agreement the U.S., will fund a percentage of the repair of Honduran airfields based on U.S. usage and fair wear and tear. The agreement will provide justification for the USAF to budget funds for repairs. This technical agreement is the implementation of the Bilateral Agreement for Maintenance and Repair of Honduran Aerial Ports, dated 20 May 85. The formula for

determining a fair percentage of repair costs is a function of airfield construction criteria, types of aircraft, and number of passes of each type of aircraft on each airfield. This agreement is still being negotiated and is expected to be implemented in FY89.

(U) OTHER ENGINEER INITIATIVES.

(U) Bolivia - SCEN conducted visits to coordinate engineer exercises. These visits led to one engineer DFT and one JCS engineer exercise in FY 89. COE provided technical assistance to COMUSMILGP concerning a military hospital in La Paz.


(U) Paraguay - COE provided technical assistance to COMUSMILGP Paraguay on ammunition storage facilities.

(U) Honduras - COE completed a study of how to improve the trafficability in three major rivers in northern Honduras. The purpose of the study was to give the Govt of Honduras direction in how to proceed with their desire to harness the river systems in northern Honduras. COE completed programming documents for two infantry battalion complexes at Trujillo and Jamastran and port improvements at Puerto Cortez.

(U). Costa Rica - SCEN conducted a disaster relief survey vic Turriabla after heavy rains caused serious flood damage to several bridges. COE provided project programming documentation to CHODC for Naval Base facility improvements and ammunition storage improvements.

(U) Guyana - SCEN and COE conducted coordination which led to an FY 89 well drilling DFT.

(U) Guatemala - SCEN conducted an evaluation of Guatemalan Corps of Engineers (CIEG) engineer equipment and made recommendations concerning the most appropriate expenditure of $750.0K of supplemental security assistance funds earmarked for engineer repair parts.



DECLASSIFIED IN PART
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SOUTHCOM FOIA Office
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TREATY AFFAIRS

(U) GENERAL: During CY 88, the Center for Treaty Affairs (CTA) settled into the organizational scheme developed during the HQ USSOUTHCOM reorganization of 1987. The Center maintained its status as a semiautonomous organization responding to the Command Group through the Director of Operations. The arrangement worked well, given the close interaction among Treaty-related and operational issues occasioned by the political differences between the US Government (USG) and the Noriega regime throughout the year.

(U) ORGANIZATION: The Center for Treaty Affairs operated through most of 1988 with two divisions representing the US Delegations of the binational Treaty-mandated Joint Committee and Combined Board. A third operating division, the Treaty Reserve Division, continued to stress the Total Force policy, the integration and training of reserve personnel. In addition, a Special Assistant for Treaty Implementation Planning was appointed in October 1988 to provide and interface between the long-range Treaty implementation planning (TIP) effort under the supervision of the Director, Strategy, Programs and Policy (SCJ5), and day-to-day current Treaty implementation activities of the Center.


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
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Section 3.3 (b)(5)

Joint Staff





~~(FOUO)~~ Several HQ USSOUTHCOM staff elements contributed to, or were involved with, various Treaty-related projects. The Intelligence Directorate was involved in discussions relating to the Panama Defense Force's (PDF) brief refusal to recognize mutually agreed upon courier cards. The Communications Directorate was involved in securing operating frequencies for newly acquired systems. The Operations Directorate was involved in a myriad of activities, the most significant of which dealt with freedom of movement issues and air safety/airspace management conflicts. The Exercise Division planned and executed two Deployments For Training (DFT) for high performance aircraft which served to enhance US Forces (USF) rights in respect to freedom of movement in Panamanian airspace. The Logistics Directorate assisted in the development of plans and strategies to counter the PDF's attempts to impede the use of the Port of Las Minas and the confiscation of USF cargos.

~~(FOUO)~~ Since USF presence in Panama is predicated on a unique Treaty-established relationship, the Directorate of Public Affairs played a critical role in informing internal and external audiences concerning such matters in 1988. Close coordination was required to document, define and inform on matters related to harassments of US military personnel, their dependents and DOD civilians. Included in this effort were actions taken by the US Delegation of the Joint Committee in protest of these harassments. Interviews with Treaty Affairs personnel were arranged concerning Treaty-related matters, both for internal and external purposes both with US and international media. Treaty Affairs input was developed for use in articles in Tropic Times and features on SCN television that dealt with Treaty-related matters. These stories also provided information of use to US citizens during the crisis, such as the nonintervention clause of the Treaty, rights under the Agreement in Implementation of Article IV of the Treaty and actions personnel could take in the interest of their welfare and security vis-a-vis Treaty matters.

~~(FOUO)~~ Perhaps the most significant public affairs related activity was long-range Treaty Implementation Planning (TIP) declassification. Following this action, SCPA initiated national and international release of all related information along with prepared questions and answers for response-to-query worldwide.

~~(FOUO)~~ Treaty Affairs coordination with the Directorate of Public Affairs was a key element in assuring accurate, sound advise on Treaty matters for US personnel living in Panama. It also provided credible representation of US and SOUTHCOM positions on Treaty-related matters both nationally and internationally.

~~(FOUO)~~ Both the Command Provost Marshal and the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate were deeply involved in a myriad of Treaty- related activities. The Provost Marshal contributed primarily in those activities relating to the Public Security element of the Joint Committee. The Staff Judge Advocate's

advice was sought on practically every issue arising through either the Combined Board or the Joint Committee.

(U) A coordinated effort among the HQ SOUTHCOM staff elements, the Components and the Center for Treaty Affairs resulted in the publication of SC Pam 1-1, The Treaty and You. The pamphlet provides an overview of Treaty rights and responsibilities. It was designed as a command information item for all current and prospective members of the command.

(U) The ongoing political crisis within Panama and the deterioration of political relations between Panama and the United States greatly affected relationships among the Panama Defense Forces and the US Delegations of both the Joint Committee and the Combined Board. US Delegations were engaged throughout the year in efforts to enforce Treaty rights and limit attacks upon these rights.

(U) COMBINED BOARD ACTIVITIES.

(U) CY 88 was not a successful year for binational relations between the US and PDF Delegations of the Combined Board (CB). A Jan 88 congressional resolution dictated that there would be no joint training or military exercises conducted with the PDF in 1988. Consequently, the JCS-directed Combined Joint Field Training Exercise series KINDLE LIBERTY was postponed for 1988. Joint airborne, small unit, medical and engineering exercises were also postponed.


~~(C/NF)~~ Operationally, the PDF implemented a campaign of limiting and restricting USF personnel and vehicle movement while in the performance of official duties. Besides overtly interfering with USF vehicles, by stopping, detaining and processing USF drivers, they also issued new laws/rules regarding vehicular movement. These new rules, which attempt to invalidate the USF rights to designate "official" vehicles and invalidate the USF right to have drivers with an official US military license, are discussed below.

(U) The US Delegation of the Combined Board attempted to keep the lines of communication open throughout CY 88, but, as the crisis continued, communication became strained and at times vitriolic on the part of the PDF. Early on, the PDF Delegation of the Combined Board became a political arm of the Noriega regime. It developed unilateral legal interpretations of the Panama Canal Treaty (PCT) as they applied to the USF rights under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). As such, the PDF delegation attempted to dictate the outcome of the communications in favor of the PDF's political goals and agenda.

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Joint Staff



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Joint Staff

(U) Regardless of the strained relationship, the US Delegation continued to attempt to coordinate search and rescue missions, air medical evacuation and USF convoy escort requirements. At times, the PDF refused the requests for coordination and selectively exploited incidents.

(U) AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT.

~~(C/NF)~~ [redacted]

Section 3.3 (b)(5)

~~(C/NF)~~ At the same time, the DAC's air traffic service had deteriorated to the point that it could not be considered safe for the USF. The USF aircraft then routinely had to fly relying on their own navigational aids or controllers at Howard AFB. Specifically, the DAC's VHF Omnidirectional Radio Range (VOR) and Nondirectional Beacon (NDB) equipment, FM/VHF radios, and secondary radar were approximately 85% inoperable at any given

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
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
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(U) FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT (FOM).

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(U) USF response to these PDF violations of Freedom of Movement rights consisted principally of letters of protest and occasional meetings with Combined Board or Joint Committee members to obtain clarification of PDF policy or to reinforce the letters of protest with personal contact.

(U) JOINT COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES.

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
Joint Staff

(U) ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL.

(U) The major issues involving the Administrative and Legal Subcommittee remained unresolved during the year. Close coordination with USSOUTHCOM staff elements, particularly SCSJA, was essential. There were more than twenty major issues dealt with.

(U) Panama brought negotiations on the following JC arrangements to a virtual halt by their unwillingness to discuss issues in a constructive manner: waiver of jurisdiction; request for transfer of custody; traffic accident investigations; control of unauthorized persons on US installations; and penal citations.

(U) Throughout CY88, Panama attacked USF Freedom of Movement through the following tactics: impeding vehicle inspection procedures by USF; passing restrictive, Treaty-violating decrees; denying the official status of rental cars used by the USF; not accepting official duty certificates for USF drivers driving in the performance of official duty (this denial resulted in more than 60 USF driver's licenses being held by Panama for six months or longer); attacking US contractors through incidents such as the repeated interdictions of the theater Main Supply Route (MSR) at Las Minas; and attempting to deny the USF Treaty-granted right to wear military uniforms and drive official vehicles through Panama while on official duty.



(U) Procedural guarantees were continually denied. Many USF members were detained without charges. Joint Committee Arrangements governing notification of detentions and transfer of custody were frequently violated by the PDF.

(U) Taxes were another Panama regime target area. They continued to refuse to allow exemptions from the ITBM tax for designated contractors. They illegally charged USF members an airport departure tax at Torrijos Airport. However, when Panama attempted to raise its airport departure tax to $30.00, it was unsuccessful in charging the USF the higher fee. The GOP continued to threaten the seizure of assets of Panamanian citizen US Forces employees for non payment of Panama income taxes by the USG.

(U) Privilege issues were also a major area of Subcommittee Group activity. Among topics worked were: Privileges for TDY contractors and dependents of PCS personnel; privileges for contractors who are military retirees; options for providing health care to DOD and PCC personnel; commissary support for US Embassies outside Panama; coordination to insure SC Reg 606-2 compliance with Treaty; Bilingual ID card authorization guidelines; and the Bilingual Card report to the Panamanian Delegation of the Joint Committee.

(U) The Social Security Subcommittee provided the mechanism for passing Panama the funds which were released from the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA) account by presidential authority.

(U) PUBLIC SAFETY.

(U) Violations of the Panama Canal Treaty provisions escalated significantly during 1988. Incidents involving USF members, civilian component members, and dependents averaged 45 per month. The violations were applied selectively, especially in the case of Freedom of Movement incidents. Major categories of violations from 6 Feb - 31 Dec 88 were:

Denial of Freedom of Movement	80
Excessive force/endangerment	78
Procedural Guarantee Violations	35
Detention without Charges	217
Confiscation/destruction of personal/government property	77
Violation of USF installations	208
Other violations of Treaty Documents/Joint Committee Arrangements	56

(U) The Joint Committee submitted over 350 protest letters to the PDF Delegation of the Joint Committee. Of approximately forty (40) responses, only one was of substance and informed of contemplated corrective action against the PDF member.

(U) The Contraband Control Information System Program continued with the projected completion of Phase I on 30 June 89. Phase I consists of a complete ID card check system, but does not track purchases. Photographic equipment to issue a card, separate from the existing bilingual card, is on site and ready for implementation. The contract for Phase II has not yet been awarded.

(U) In Dec 88, the Transit Police (DNTT) closed the Ancon inspection facility for vehicle registration to members of the USF community. The two-week-long Treaty violation continued in force for approximately two weeks until USSOUTHCOM ordered removal of its security blockades in the Curundu Military Area of Coordination for Housing.

(U) COMMUNITY SERVICES.

(U) The Postal Subcommittee experienced disruption of postal services (pickup and delivery of mail at the Torrijos Airport) over several days during Jun 88.

(U) USF cargo at the Port of Las Minas was frustrated by the PDF as were the contracted trailers which move the goods across the Isthmus. Three containers with USF goods were confiscated by the PDF for three weeks. A gun tube and field kitchen unit were also temporarily sized. They were released only after vigorous US protests and posturing to retrieve the material.


(U) LANDS AND WATERS.

(U) The USF initiated construction of a bypass road within the Howard/Kobbe Defense Site to enhance the security and safety of the site. Construction continues over the objection of the PDF. Project is in compliance with the Treaty and is expected to be completed in early 1990.

(U) Squatter removal from defense sites and Military Areas of Coordination remains at a standstill. The issue was addressed repeatedly in the JC to no avail. Squatters have increased in Venado Beach near the glide path of the Howard runway, causing concern for their safety. Abetted by regime officials, a group of squatters were issued land licenses within the Kobbe defense site. Further expansion of the settlement was contained, although some squatters remain within the defense site boundary.

~~(C/NF)~~ The US Delegation of the Joint Committee worked closely with the State Department and JCS delineating what US policy would be in reference to real estate licensing and property transfers to Panama. Outstanding licenses have not been renewed. Continued access to installations required for public safety (Cerro Galera, Patacon) is permitted.

(U) There have been various instances in which the US Delegation of the JC has had to intervene in construction



projects bordering on defense site boundaries. Projects are on hold pending further review of boundaries.

(U) Open dumping continues to be a severe problem on defense sites and Military Areas of Coordination. Panamanian officials have been urged to cooperate, but there has been very little response.

(U) The US economic sanctions prevented the USF from paying rent on the housing leased from the regime. As a consequence, Panama pressed for US eviction.

(U) No progress was made on the upgrade of the PANAM Highway which Panama had proposed in CY87, due to current crisis.

(U) PUBLIC SERVICE: There has been a lack of cooperation from both sides in utility improvement projects, due in part to the economic sanctions imposed on the Noriega Regime.

(U) TREATY RESERVE ACTIVITIES:

(U) The Treaty Reserve Division of the Center for Treaty Affairs was established in late 1987 to act as the Center's liaison office for all Reserve Forces participating and training at the CTA. The division provided a comprehensive joint command program and educational framework for Reserve Forces' personnel and units to facilitate the attainment/sustainment of individual soldiers MOS proficiency, professional development and unit readiness necessary to meet mobilization mission needs. Personnel serving with the CTA accomplished 455 RPA/MPA days of duty during CY 88. A major focus was on the cultivation of the almost-mirror-image relationship between Civil Affairs specialties and Treaty Affairs activities.

STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE

(U) ADMINISTRATIVE/MANPOWER: In mid 1988, the office of the Staff Judge Advocate (SCSJA) was moved from Building 83, Quarry Heights, to the third floor of Building 237, Gorgas Complex. The distance from other directorates and parking problems at the new location resulted in an estimated 80 percent decrease in the number of face to face contacts between the attorneys and the staff with regard to official command business. During 1988, SCSJA experienced several personnel changes: In May, (b)(6) departed for a stateside assignment. Also in May, (b)(6) civilian, replaced (b)(6) as the SCSJA clerk-typist. In August, (b)(6) replaced (b)(6) as Assistant Staff Judge Advocate. In November, (b)(6) civilian, replaced (b)(6) as the SCSJA clerk-typist. Navy Navy

(U) PANAMA CANAL TREATY EVENTS: Once again in 1988, SCSJA actively participated in Panama Canal Treaty issues, including regular involvement with the binational Combined Board and with the many subcommittees of the Joint Committee. Those specific Panama Canal Treaty events which arose during 1988 are discussed in the Treaty Affairs' portion of the USSOUTHCOM Historical Report.

(U) PANAMANIAN UNREST: In January 1988, President Arturo Del Valle told Gen. Manuel Noriega to step down. Noriega responded by attempting to arrest Del Valle who reportedly escaped dressed as a woman. Del Valle as a consequence of the foregoing was recognized by the U.S. embassy as the legitimate president of Panama. This was a change in the position which formerly characterized him as the inheritor of a job acquired by Barletta in a fraudulent election, and who was subsequently fired by Noriega. An unsuccessful coup attempt took place in March. Subsequent street demonstrations were suppressed in a manner reminiscent of the Chicago police activities at the 1968 Democratic Convention. SCSJA participated in many crisis action activities concerning the problems in Panama.

(U) PANAMA EXERCISES: Due to the deteriorated relationship between the U.S. Forces and Panama Defense Forces caused by the continued presence of General Manual Noriega, there were no combined exercises held for the defense of the Canal throughout 1988.

(U) HONDURAN BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS.

(U) SCSJA served as a principal representative on the U.S. Team pursuing completion of the proposed Protocol II (Conduct of Combined Military Exercises and Maneuvers), the technical arrangements establishing procedures for Maintenance and Repair of Honduran Aerial Ports, and proposed Protocol III (Construction and Facilities Use). Protocol III was signed by both Governments on 14 November 1988 and the technical arrangement for Maintenance and Repair of Honduran Aerial Ports was signed on 13 April 1989. While final agreement has been reached on Protocol III, it awaits final approval and signature by the Honduran Government.

(U) SCSJA participated in securing the cooperative agreement between the two Governments in the setting up and operating of a radar to be located in the northern part of the Republic of Honduras that will be part of the Caribbean Basin Radar Network (CBRN). SCSJA also was involved in the development of the agreement on mutual cooperation to combat the production of and illicit trafficking in drugs, dated 14 November 1988.

(U) SCSJA continued as action office in negotiating resolution of ongoing disputes with Honduran port authorities on the payment of port charges, claims, and contract services. This process continues toward resolution. Finally, SCSJA participated in a dispute resolution process whereby outstanding Honduran fuel bills resulting from exercise obligations were set off against telephone charges owing due to Joint Task Force Bravo operations. This dispute resolution facilitated the continuance of a vigorous exercise program in Honduras.

(U) JOINT TASK FORCE BRAVO (JTF-B): SCSJA and JTF-B/SJA continued in the cooperative effort to identify and preserve operational and recurring legally-related issues that may assist in future doctrine development regarding the provision of legal services to deployed JTF's. SCSJA also sponsored separate orientation visits by MG Overholt, the Judge Advocate General of the Army, and (b)(6) (b)(6) the General Counsel, Department of Defense, to observe military exercise and humanitarian and civic action activities being conducted in Honduras. (b)(6) was replaced by (b)(6) (b)(6) as the JTF-B SJA. The supervisory and technical relationship between the SJA's of USSOUTHCOM, USARSO, and JTF-B continued to work effectively.

(U) OPERATIONS/OTHER EXERCISES

(U) SCSJA prepared Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) for numerous small exercises in Central and South America. These MOUs, in English and Spanish, list the forces which the United States and the host country will furnish for the exercise, as well as specify the status of U.S. participating forces (usually assimilated as if members of the MILGP or the administrative and technical staff of the U.S. Embassy). Agreements also cover basic terms of reference and specify that U.S. Forces will not participate in any operations outside the scope of the exercise. Basic rules of engagement are provided in exercise-related Letters/Memoranda of Instruction. Political sensitivities in some countries, e.g., Ecuador, against entering into MOUs could jeopardize future U.S. Forces participation in exercises if other means for protecting the de jure status of U.S. participants are not established.

(U) The problems with effecting MOUs points out the legal and practical difficulties involved in carrying out exercises in Latin America. In many countries, the bilateral MILGP agreements from the 1940s and 1950s have expired or have been abrogated, or do not contemplate exercises. To do a true international agreement often requires approval from the host country's legislature, which makes

the proposed exercise a so-called political football. The military-to-military MOU often becomes the only written document that can be obtained, although it is usually not a fully, legally binding international agreement. Adherence to the commitments in the MOUs, then, is much more a result of good military-to-military relationships, rather than of the application of legal norms.

(U) SCSJA also reviewed MOUs for large-scale engineer exercises carried out in Honduras. SCSJA review ensured that the planned projects were properly financed and were within ambit of Congressionally mandated guidance. Additionally, SCSJA reviewed numerous planned Deployments for Training and Mobile Training Team activities, and assisted in the validation process. Because of increased threats, War Powers Resolution concerns surfaced in counternarcotic DFT and MTT actions.

(U) With regard to Exercises, the SCSJA participated in Exercise Golden Pheasant in Honduras; the exercise was a large-scale combined forces exercise involving the deployment of additional CONUS-based U.S. Forces to Honduras during a period of increased Sandinista activity near the Honduras-Nicaragua border. With regard to other JCS exercises, SCSJA provided response cells and trusted agents for USSOUTHCOM related activity. Additionally, the basis was established for increasing SCSJA participation in combined CPXs and FTXs throughout the AOR.

(U) LEGISLATION

The passage of the International Narcotics Control Act of 1988, and part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4261), will lead to greater USSOUTHCOM involvement in military assistance for counter-drug efforts. Specifically provided for is a 1 year (FY 89) waiver of Section 660 (a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which would normally prohibit the U.S. military from training host nation police. Previously, a waiver had to be requested through State Department channels for each country. Unfortunately, the funding for this counter-drug military training is a $2 million slice from regular IMET funding. This has the potential of exacerbating host nation police-military tensions. This is typical of the "many-strings-attached" approval of the U.S. Congress to counter-drug funding. Congress used the same earmarking mechanism when it set aside $300 million of regular DOD appropriations "for operating costs of the Department of Defense related to the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States." [Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1989, 102 Stat. 2270, 2270-16 (Title VII, Drug Interdiction, Defense.] It is clear that the Congress expects greater DOD involvement in counter-drug activities. USSOUTHCOM has been, and with these appropriations and authorities should continue to be, in the forefront of DOD counter-drug support efforts.

(U) FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) PROGRAM: During 1988, a total of 43 separate requests were made for information related to USSOUTHCOM activities, operations, policy and programs. There were 22 requests by non-governmental research institutes, 8 requests by news

media, 5 requests by private citizens, 4 requests by business vendors, 2 requests by an educational institution and 1 request by a nonprofit organization. Of the 43 requests, 11 public requests were completed and 5 of the 11 were denied releasability; 1 request is held in abeyance per OASD/PA's instruction pending prosecution of Oliver North; 12 of the 43 cases were referred to this Command by other Government agencies; 31 of the 43 cases have been referred by this office to other SOUTHCOM staff offices located in Panama and in other countries within this Command's AOR, and are pending completion. Finally, 1 appeal case was referred to this Command by OASD/PA and is being reviewed.

(U) LEGAL ASSISTANCE: During mid-1988, legal assistance services to personnel assigned to USSOUTHCOM Headquarters were forced to be reduced to a minimum as a result of the relocation of our office, along with the increase in office workload caused by the ongoing disturbances in Panama. As our resources permitted, emergency services still provided included powers of attorney, bills of sale, wills, tax advice, and notary services. Full legal assistance services are normally provided by component legal offices (Army, Navy and Air Force).

PROVOST MARSHAL

(U) INTRODUCTION:

(U) The United States Southern Command Provost Marshal, serves in three duty capacities; Command Provost Marshal (CPM), USSOUTHCOM; Provost Marshal, USARSO; and Commander, MP Cmd.

(U) As the Command Provost Marshal USSOUTHCOM, he is responsible for providing military police support and coordinating planning Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps law enforcement operations in support of USSOUTHCOM operations/exercises in Central and South America. Additionally, he is responsible for establishing law enforcement operational policy, and directs and controls all Military Customs operations for all service components assigned to USSOUTHCOM.

(U) REORGANIZATION: Military Customs Division was realigned from the Directorate of Logistics to the Military Police Command effective 1 Jun 88. A total of 35 civilian positions were affected. This division, conducts examinations/inspections of household goods, unaccompanied baggage, equipment, cargo, rolling stock, aircraft, passengers, etc., experienced a significant increase in workload during FY 88, primarily due to augmentation forces buildup, Panama unrest and exercises in Ecuador and Honduras.

(U) CUSTOMS PROCEDURES: The Howard Air Force Terminal (HAFB) experienced several changes in operations during FY 88. Beginning in May 1988, passengers destined for the CONUS with an immediate stop in Honduras, no longer were required to off-load their checked baggage for customs examination at Soto Cano Air Base. In lieu of this procedure, all passenger checked baggage was examined at the HAFB terminal and palatalized until the arrival of the aircraft in CONUS.

(U) DRUG SMUGGLING: The discovery that illicit drugs were being transported through the DOD transportation system initiated the need for a 100% examination of passenger checked and hand carried baggage. In March 1988, an examination uncovered an attempt to smuggle in, excess of 10 kilograms of cocaine through the HAFB terminal.

(U) VEHICLE SEARCHES: Beginning in Aug 88, the Customs personnel re-assumed the responsibility of examining privately owned vehicles bound for CONUS in an attempt to prevent the introduction of illicit drugs into CONUS.

(U) CONTRABAND CONTROL: The USSOUTHCOM Joint Services Contraband Control Section under the operational control of the Provost Marshal has been able to detect and deter many contraband/black market operations. The Provost Marshal is continuing to work with GSA contractors to complete automation operations of the Contraband section with the Automated Contraband Information System to be installed and tested in the Atlantic community.

(U) In March 1988, Contraband Control section (CCS) prepared and trained six military police soldiers to conduct ID checks on a daily basis at DOD commissaries. By accomplishing this, it has deterred many violators falsifying identification and from shopping more than once a day, as it has been done in the past.

(U) In May 1988, a new filing system for control forms was established, which has proved to be a success by yielding 240 suspected violations.

(U) <u>PDF RELATIONS</u>: During this year, the deterioration of relations between the United States and Panama due to the political situation caused great difficulty in maintaining a working relationship with the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) at the operator and subcommittee level. Notwithstanding, the SOUTHCOM Provost Marshal kept communicating with its PDF counterparts. Both Forces recognized that this channel of communication was, at times, the only one that works during periods of increased tensions. Therefore, it was fully utilized by both countries.

(U) <u>TREATY VIOLATIONS</u>: This year was characterized by a sharp increase in violations to the Panama Canal Treaty, harassment of U.S. service members and their dependents, and violations of U.S. citizens' civil rights as guaranteed by the law and the Constitution of the Republic of Panama. This was the first time since the Treaty was implemented in 1979 that the number of treaty-related incidents made it necessary to establish a system to report violations and harassment by PDF. Among the incidents reported this year were beatings and life threatening treatment of American citizens while in custody of the PDF; strip searches; baggage inspections; confiscation of U.S. military equipment, weapons, clothing, and personal property; extortion of money; illegal detentions and questioning; high speed chases; isolated bans on travel outside Panama City; fondling of female dependents and military personnel; denial of human rights; interference with the unloading of American equipment from ships; and armed intruders at U.S. military installations.

(U) Some changes occurred at the subcommittee level. The PDF counterpart to the Co-Chairman of the Police, and the Licensing and Registration Subcommittees were replaced four times. In March 1988, (b)(6) was replaced by (b)(6) who was later replaced by (b)(6) in June 1988. (b)(6) served in that position until August when he was replaced by (b)(6) (b)(6) During December, (b)(6) then PDF Provost Marshal, replaced (b)(6) Towards the end of the year, the work at the subcommittee level had slowed down. (b)(6) became the SOUTHCOM Provost Marshal on 16 Dec 88. The current Treaty Affairs Officer came on board in June 1988.

(U) Numerous cases of human rights and procedural violations were reported to the Police Subcommittee. Among them, the time limit requirement for the notification to U.S. Forces of detainees, detainees were wrongfully arrested, mistreated, and denied the use of a telephone. These incidents were formally protested to the PDF.

(U) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS: Some of the most significant events that occurred in 1988 were:

(U) On 22 and 23 February 1988, the PDF conducted an organized operation targeting U.S. service members for allegedly wearing their military uniform while traveling to and from work. A total of 33 service members were detained in two days, violating the U.S. right to impose the wear of uniform as stated in the Treaty, freedom of movement, and the combined defense of the canal since these 33 individuals were not permitted to go to work.

(U) PCC employees were authorized to shop at the shoppettes during early March 1988.

(U) Security and police forces were augmented by approximately 1,600 troops during late March 1988.

(U) Increased tensions in Panama caused an immediate increase in security at Fort Amador, much of which remains today.

(U) New signs to indicate the Personnel Movement Limitation (PML) were placed at the entrance of each installation. These signs made it easier for drivers to read the PML condition at all times.

(U) A run in Fort Espinar was coordinated with the PDF every week during the stay of an MP battalion there.

(U) In April 1988, new procedures were established for reporting data concerning detention by PDF of U.S. Forces members. DOD civilians, and their dependents due to numerous procedural guarantee and Treaty violations by PDF.

(U) The Provost Marshal was tasked with operation of military customs throughout the Southern Command. New procedures were instituted and more emphasis was placed on the elimination of illegal activity involving drugs.

(U) As part of the ongoing Army Equipment Modernization Program, U.S. Army South received approximately 330 tactical vehicles during June-July 1988. A close coordination with the PDF was necessary for the security of these vehicles at Las Minas and for their movement to the Pacific side. The complete operation lasted over 10 days.

(U) A new form of harassment and bribe solicitation was apparent during July 1988 and with little or no variations continued throughout the end of the year. This trend consisted of uniformed PDF or Transito Police stopping U.S. drivers, entering into their vehicles and charging the driver with a traffic violation. While in the back seat, telling the driver to take them to the police station. In the meantime they would inform the driver how much money the fine would be if they had to pay it at a police station requesting that the driver pay them instead. They would normally reach an agreement on the amount of money and the driver would end up paying for a mock traffic violation.

(U) The activation of Joint Task Force Panama and the addition of 1,600 security forces to Panama addressed the need for a ruling law enforcement control cell. The USSOUTHCOM Provost Marshal founded a Joint Desk Operation Center. This cell is manned by members of each service is responsible for the coordination of law enforcement operations in Panama, particularly between police and tactical forces.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

(U) INTRODUCTION: Calendar year 1988 proved to be one of the most eventful and exciting years in the history of Panama. The crisis between the Panamanian people and the oppressive government of General Manuel Noriega provided numerous challenges in public affairs, notably due to General Noriega's attempts to redirect the hostility of the public from himself to the U.S. military in Latin America. As the crisis worsened, the USSOUTHCOM Public Affairs (SCPA) Directorate was forced to transfer increasingly large amounts of its efforts to the counteraction of the regime's continuous attempts at anti-U.S. disinformation. In order to accomplish this without sacrificing the numerous and vital public affairs programs normally provided to the command, personnel augmentation was requested and received, bringing the Directorate up to a record strength.

(U) This additional capability was soon needed. By March, the USSOUTHCOM Commander in Chief (CINC), General Fred Woerner, had directed that every U.S. action from the Department of Defense (DoD) to USSOUTHCOM to the U.S. Embassy in Panama be preceded by Public Affairs Guidance (PAG). He directed that PAG and public affairs considerations were to be included in every decision and frequently derive these decisions. This meant an unprecedented opportunity for the Directorate - a challenge which was accepted and overcome.

(U) An indication of the success of the extraordinary efforts of the entire SCPA staff 1988 was the receipt by the Directorate of the most prestigious recognition in international public relations - the Silver Anvil Award. This citation, which is given annually by the Public Relations Society of America (PRSA), was bestowed on the Directorate for its public affairs actions during a crisis period. This was a unusually significant honor in that it was won in competition with civilian as well as military entries, nationwide.

(U) CRISIS DOCUMENTATION: In order to provide an accurate and complete record of the numerous actions performed during 1988, SCPA maintained a running chronology in the form of Situational Reports (SITREPS). Although these SITREPS are not included in this document due to length, they are available on file; USSOUTHCOM Public Affairs SITREPS numbers 1 - 11 contain all SCPA activities which took place in 1988.

(U) WAR OF INFORMATION: Although originated by the former Commander in Chief of USSOUTHCOM, General Galvin, USSOUTHCOM Public Affairs has taken the lead on a concept called the War of Information. The idea is that the U.S. military, rather than emphasize the direct application or threat of use of military power, should "fight" more a battle of words, ideals and principles - a War of Information. The field of battle is public opinion, and the weapons are the accurate facts and the media which disseminates them.

(U) STRATEGY: The overall strategy of this idea is to establish and maintain a broad constituency for USSOUTHCOM doctrine, missions,

programs and policies. It is aimed at the U.S. public, Congress and media as well as Latin American audiences. It is meant to accurately inform USSOUTHCOM military while protecting the public from disinformation.

(U) The War of Information cuts across all boundaries of our activities. Simply put, it is all communication by word or deed that tells our story, our needs and our requirements to all of our publics. Its overarching principle is insuring that accurate, precise and planned information concerning U.S. ideals is available throughout the theater and in the continental United States.

(U) Due to recent events, Panama was the primary focus of the SCPA War of Information effort in 1988. This plan included a greatly expanded role for the command newspaper the Tropic Times, enhanced usage of the Southern Command Network (SCN), and an aggressive, pro-active Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) program.

(U) PUBLIC INFORMATION/MEDIA RELATIONS: The increasingly unstable political crisis in Panama was the focus of widespread U.S. and international media attention throughout the year, often directly involving U.S. military activities and personnel. Accordingly, USSOUTHCOM's public information and media relations activities and support were extensive, handling significantly more news media visits and queries than has been seen in recent years. Much effort also went into keeping the U.S. military and Panama Canal Commission communities informed of the unfolding crisis. A great deal of additional effort was also necessary in order to counter the increasingly anti-U.S. propaganda/disinformation campaign being propagated by the General Noriega/Solis Palma regime. Further, several other events and U.S. military activities elsewhere in the region received considerable media attention during the year.

(U) MAJOR 1988 MEDIA EVENTS: The major events occurring in Panama in 1988 which attracted considerable media interest included:

(U) The indictment on drug related charges of Panama Defense Forces (PDF) commander in chief General Manuel Antonio Noriega and 15 codefendants on 4 February by Miami and Tampa federal grand juries. Shortly thereafter, General Noriega began the first of many attempts throughout the year to divert attention from himself and the other root causes of the political crisis. Through some of his some mid-level officers in the PDF, he publicly labeled the U.S. Southern Command's presence in Panama as being in violation of the Panama Canal Treaty and called for its departure from Panama.

(U) The 25 February abortive attempt by Panamanian President Eric Delvalle to fire General Noriega. This attempt failed when Noriega succeeded, within hours, in engineering Delvalle's ouster instead through an unconstitutional action by the National Legislative Assembly. Delvalle was immediately replaced by Education [redacted] (b)(6) who was given the title of minister in charge of the Presidency. This action was followed by the PDF closing of the last remaining opposition news media, including the television station owned by Delvalle. Due to the illegality of his

ouster, however, Delvalle continued to be recognized by the U.S. Government as the legitimate President of Panama.

(U) Days after the 3 March freezing of Panamanian government funds in U.S. banks, a poorly coordinated armed coup against Noriega by a group of PDF officers was attempted on 16 March at the PDF headquarters near Quarry Heights. Following the abortive attempt, the regime instituted more repressive measures, beginning with the declaration of a state of emergency throughout the republic by Solis Palma. These moves were justified by Palma because of an "undeclared war being waged by the United States against Panama."

(U) Media interest during the week of 7 - 12 March which centered around the announcement on 4 March of the USARSO's Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) and the National Guard dry season exercises known as Total Warrior, scheduled in the Panama Canal area.

(U) Total Warrior which actually began on 4 March, was the four-week annual training exercise by the Army National Guard's 53d Separate Infantry Brigade from Florida and Puerto Rico's 92d Separate Infantry Brigade, supported by U.S. Army South units. Although the initial public announcement in the 4 March edition of the Tropic Times failed to generate many queries, Panamanian government accusations early in the week claimed that the exercises were a prelude to an invasion of Panama. This caused numerous queries and requests for on-camera interviews requesting the USSOUTHCOM position on the accusation. SCPA responded to over 40 international queries with the prepared PAG which emphasized that the exercises had been planned since last year and were part of a comprehensive year-round training program designed to maintain our proficiency in carrying out our primary responsibility, the defense of the canal.

(U) The coup attempt on Noriega which took place on 16 March. This attempt, though unsuccessful, drew intense media interest causing SCPA to set up a press center which operated six days a week. SCPA also assisted the international media with telephone calls, film processing and other necessities when utilities were interrupted for extended periods of time. Complicating the matter during this period, the Panamanian government refused the local media the opportunity to uplink video feeds from Panama.

(U) Another event that led to high media interest (including numerous international queries to USSOUTHCOM) was the defection by two of General Noriega's personal pilots (two Panamanian Air Force majors) to the United States shortly after the coup attempt and their publicly aired first - hand accounts of having transported Soviet and Cuban arms from Cuba to Panama in March.

(U) Four deployments of U.S. security augmentation forces to Panama took place from 14 March-25 June. These deployments totaled approximately 2,200 troops and were intended to provide added security of U.S. military installations during the period of unrest. These actions were immediately characterized by the regime - controlled press as another prelude to an invasion of Panama.

(U) The first deployment quickly developed the potential to be a public affairs disaster when news of the then-secret action was somehow leaked to ABC news in advance. Although public affairs guidance had been prepared well before the exercise, with an intended release 24-48 hours prior to arrival, it became necessary to move it up quickly. With some expeditious efforts on the part the Office of the Secretary of Defense Public Affairs (OSD-PA), SCPA was able to get the PAG approved and released within about an hour's timeframe. From initial notification at 1700 hours, a complete press conference was put together by 1800. Extensive media coverage of the second deployment on 5 - 8 April was arranged by the USSOUTHCOM Public Affairs Media Center. Media opportunities with the troops from the deploying units continued throughout the month.

(U) President Reagan signed the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA) 8 April, which barred all U.S. origin payments to the regime-controlled entities. Also included in the IEEPA was a prohibition of all U.S. Government agencies in Panama against paying income taxes withheld from the salaries of their Panamanian employees to the regime. This become an issue which was manipulated in various ways by the regime, particularly in the extensive propaganda campaigns.

(U) The formation by SCPA on 11 April, of a Joint Information Bureau (JIB) to work in concert with the Media Center. The JIB was formed in response to the continuing crisis in Panama and the associated continued high level of media interest in the activity of USSOUTHCOM. The JIB was headed by the USSOUTHCOM PAO and had the overall responsibility for the coordination of public affairs action and assets in Panama.

(U) Intrusion activity beginning in early April at the Arraijan Tank Farm (ATF) and the nearby Rodman Ammunition Supply Depot. The ATF is a DoD bulk fuel storage facility managed by the U.S. Navy and located near the Pacific entrance to the Panama Canal. The intrusion activity, which included several exchanges of gunfire between intruders and U.S. Forces guarding the facilities, attracted considerable media attention.

(U) The 12 April accidental shooting death of Marine Corporal Ricardo M. Villahermosa caused a flood of media interest by the many U.S. reporters in Panama at the time as well as in Washington. CPL Villahermosa had been a member of a 12-man patrol providing security at the Arraijan Tank Farm. During an extensive exchange of gunfire he was caught in a crossfire between members of his own patrol and fatally wounded. Intrusions continued at both facilities throughout the year with a number of engagements, however, no confirmation was ever made of the identity of the intruders. Over 75 media came to the JIB for information on the shooting and related incidents. A statement of questions and answers was released by SCPA immediately, containing all of the verifiable information available.

(U) Immediately following the Arraijan shooting incident, General Noriega and the Panamanian government-controlled media began a campaign to discredit the actions taken by U.S. forces. Their

campaign focused on the fact that no hard evidence of intruders had been found (releasable to the media), such as shell casings, bodies, etc. They accused the Marines of "shooting at shadows".

In order to counteract this public relations problem, SCPA arranged a press conference which featured the First Sergeant of the Marines actually involved in the incident to act as an eyewitness spokesman. While the final results were mixed, the media and SCN interviews which resulted helped to counter much of the propaganda.

(U) The DODDS school teacher AIDS incident. During the week of 12 June, a large and particularly nasty disinformation effort was put forth by the regime-controlled press regarding a Diablo Elementary School teacher who had been arrested for receiving child pornography through the U.S. mail system. The teacher in question was confirmed as being infected with the AIDS virus. The local headlines capitalized on the immediate SCPA release of information concerning the event, running statements such as "The people demand that gringos with AIDS leave" and "Panamanians don't want gringo AIDS carriers". Some of the stories actually stated unequivocally that the teacher had abused 10 Diablo elementary school students, spreading the virus among them.

Fortunately, the community reaction was low key due primarily to the early release of all of the facts by SCPA. The Directorate used the Tropic Times to tell the full story, set up a hotline to answer questions by concerned citizens and publicized community meetings. U.S. and international media attention to the story was minimal.

(U) The terrorist attack of U.S. service members in San Pedro Sula, Honduras. On 17 July, nine U.S. soldiers were involved in an apparent terrorist attack. JTF-B PAO, USIS Tegucigalpa and SCPA coordinated closely to ensure the best information possible was provided to DoD in time to handle numerous queries. International press coverage was generally favorable.

(U) The increasing number of incidents of harassments by the Panama Defense Forces since early 1988 was a continual source of media attention. This attention resulted in many media queries and several significant interviews with appropriate USSOUTHCOM officials throughout the year. While the incidents involved primarily members of the U.S. military, some civilian military employees and dependents reported problems as well. Particularly troublesome was the interference by PDF with local mail delivery.

(U) In view of the number of such incidents in 1987 since the beginning of the current political crisis, the USSOUTHCOM Center for Treaty Affairs began documenting such incidents along with treaty violations to determine trends. The total number from 8 February through 31 December 1988 was 452, accounting for at least 751 violations of the Panama Canal Treaty and associated documents. These included violations of procedural guarantees following detention and denial of the right of freedom of movement of military vehicles in the Republic of Panama while on official business, among others.

(U) The first of several New York Times articles on the subject

of harassments reported that the Noriega regime had orchestrated a harassment campaign against the U.S. military and quoted State, Defense Department and USSOUTHCOM officials, drawing the conclusion that this campaign was intended to lower the morale of Americans and make normal diplomatic and military operations difficult.

(U) To cushion the ensuing media blow, a background statement was used with the press in which USSOUTHCOM's position on PDF harassment was explained without "softening" the U.S. position on Noriega. It basically acknowledged a climate conducive to such increased harassments perpetuated by General Noriega's anti-U.S. rhetoric and disinformation campaigns. Then end result of the publicity which followed was a marked reduction in U.S. harassment since that time.

(U) The extensive activities of September. This proved to be one of the most active months in Panama in 1988. There were five intrusions recorded within the Arraijan Tank Farm area, only one of which was positively identified as innocent (local hunters). Next came a story by the New York Times which published copies of files on all harassments in Panama. This caused much increased interest for the safety of Americans in Panama. An SCPA release denied the existence of a specific harassment "campaign".

(U) Additionally, a delegation from the Comite de Prensa de las Fuerzas Armadas (COPREFA) of El Salvador visited USSOUTHCOM from 20 - 23 September sponsored by SCPA. This group was headed by the chief of the Salvadoran C-5 (Civil Affairs and Propaganda). The purpose of the visit was to the fruition of mutual attempts by SCPA and the USMILGP in El Salvador to establish some contacts and further military-to-military relationships with USSOUTHCOM The group met with the USSOUTHCOM Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff, Political Advisor to USCINCSO, Directors of J-5, J-2 and SCPA as well as component representatives.

(U) But probably the most significant event of the month was what has become known as the Las Minas Incident. The U.S. military routinely stored inbound cargo at the private port of Las Minas, on the Atlantic side of the Canal. Movement of that cargo had been frustrated from more than 30 days, with the PDF claiming nonexistent treaty provisions and that U.S. military use of the port was illegal. Then, on 29 September, members of the PDF armed with rifles, illegally seized the equipment as a large number of pro-Noriega press arrived at the scene. The following day, the government-controlled press showed pictures of an inoperative 120mm gun tube from an M-1 tank which was described as a 155mm, nuclear capable howitzer, brought to Panama for the purpose of the destruction of the city. In reality, the gun was destined for use by the U.S. Army Tropic Test Center, testing the effects of humidity on ammunition.

(U) This Treaty violation incident was particularly significant in that the PDF opened four of the containers and moved the gun tube from Las Minas to Cristobal. High level meeting between the PDF and the Joint Committee finally resolved the issue, but only after the

PDF first threatened the operation of the Crawley Caribbean Transport Company (the commercial operator of the Las Minas port) and U.S. forces responding by flying armed combat soldiers to the Atlantic side area.

(U) Throughout the incident, SCPA published and broadcast updates on the situation as they became available, an action which considerably offset the impact of the anti-U.S. disinformation in the regime-controlled press. As an example, the regime's press had published a photograph which was so taken as to make the gun appear to be an enormous seige-type weapon. Upon recovery the gun, SCPA had the Tropic Times run an accurate photo, showing soldiers standing next to the weapon, thereby illustrating it's actual size.

(U) The arrest of a Tropic Test Center employee. [redacted] a DA civilian who worked at Fort Clayton, was detained for six days in Carcel Modelo (prison) in early November. [redacted] was apprehended for drawing pictures of PDF in front of the Presidential Palace in Panama City, the PDF citing this behavior as a "crime against the security of Panama". As this activity was a hobby of [redacted] and there were ample sketches of other militaries uniforms as available as proof, he was eventually released. SCPA placed a low-key story in the Tropic Times in order to raise the U.S. community's consciousness to the overall situation in Panama and the appropriate behavior under the circumstances.

(U) With all Panamanian opposition media closed by the regime since 25 February 1988, the remaining media, consisting of three directly PDF - controlled daily newspapers, another three pro - regime dailies, one television station and a number of radio stations, constantly disseminated uninhibited and increasingly anti-U.S. propaganda and disinformation. This PDF effort was aimed not only at the U.S. Government in general but the American Embassy and the U.S. military in particular. In the absence of an opposition press, USSOUTHCOM was forced take an unusually active role in news dissemination in order to counter the propaganda. SCPA took the lead in this effort, reprinting news releases from the wire services, articles from both regional and U.S. news media and original material in the command's tri - weekly newspaper, the Tropic Times. The command television medium, the Southern Command Television and Radio Network (SCN), ran commercial network news programs, particularly those from the Cable News Network (CNN). CNN had been periodically cut from the package of cable television programming to subscribers in Panama City by the Noriega regime.

(U) Since February, Tropic Times and the Southern Command Network had been the only "free" news media in the Republic of Panama. Because Panamanians throughout Panama City could pick up the SCN-TV signal, the normal "shadow audience" increased dramatically as local citizens were left with no other avenue with which to obtain unbiased crisis reporting. The Tropic Times, distributed free to the American community, actually became popular enough to be (illegally) sold in certain areas of Panama City.

(U) PROPAGANDA/DISINFORMATION THEMES: Some of the principal themes played during the year by the regime-controlled media were:

(U) That the United States Government intends to abrogate the Panama Canal Treaty and remain in Panama well past the 1999 deadline for the departure of the Southern Command.

(U) That the United States, not General Noriega, is to blame for all of Panama's problems, particularly the economic and political crises which were "caused by U.S. aggression."

(U) That in addition to its economic war, the United States started a psychological war by disproportionately increasing its troops and equipment in the military bases, by making strong threats of an imminent armed invasion of Panama and by threatening to assassinate Panamanian leaders.

(U) That the goal of all the aggressions by the United States against Panama is to impose a U.S. - controlled government that would be docile and favor all U.S. interests. This would be the means with which the U.S. government administration, which supposedly has no interest in achieving democracy in Panama, would keep its military forces in in Latin America beyond 1999 in violation of the Panama Canal Treaty.

(U) That some of USSOUTHCOM's military officers are among the U.S. Government officials who are constantly intervening into the internal affairs of Panama. It was further alleged that some of them were spies for the Central Intelligence Agency. U.S. military officers were also said to be instrumental in harassing Panamanians and increasing provocations to justify an invasion by the United States. Examples of some of the USSOUTHCOM officers targeted by such disinformation efforts are the Commander in Chief, the Director of Operations USSOUTHCOM, and a former Deputy Chief of Staff.

(U) An example of such "reporting" was a 5 June article in one of the regime - controlled newspapers alleging that U.S. Embassy and USSOUTHCOM officials were involved in efforts to sabotage General Noriega's and other Panama Defense Forces aircraft through the use of sophisticated electronic jamming equipment. This equipment was supposedly located at military bases, on aircraft and in mini-submarines. It was also alleged that the United States was involved in recent crashes by Nicaraguan, Peruvian and Ecuadorian aircraft.

(U) U.S. troops deploying to Panama were depicted as being potential carriers of the Acquired Immune Deficiently Syndrome (AIDS) disease. They were said to be heavy users of drugs as well and to engage in orgies on their bases. Additionally, the regime-controlled press reported that U.S. troops constantly endangered Panamanian lives during exercises by leaving unexploded munitions in open areas. Low-level flights by aircraft were mentioned, along with the use of chemical/biological warfare agents and the aerial release of bombs over populated areas. Furthermore, U.S. military aircraft were claimed to constantly violate Panamanian sovereign airspace.

(U) Another story printed locally claimed that a shipment of 5,000 body bags had arrived recently in Panama for contingency purposes by the U.S. military. This scare tactic, aimed at the U.S. military, was used twice in the media and suggested that the bags had been brought to be used to store the bodies of U.S. troops after battle with the PDF.

(U) Finally, it was alleged that U.S. journalists were lying to the public regarding the Panamanian crisis, and that USSOUTHCOM was paying journalists to conduct disinformation campaigns.

(U) Throughout the disinformation campaigns of 1988, SCPA has strived to counteract it by accurate and very timely distribution of the actual facts of each case. As much as possible, SCPA has striven to be pro-active, producing PAG well in advance for any conceivable contingency. As there had become no such thing as a "routine" U.S. event or activity in Panama (thanks to the extremely active Noriega disinformation apparatus), prior to any U.S. - sponsored occurrence of any consequence whatsoever, SCPA had prepared PAG along with questions and answers for the press as soon as the event itself became known. This technique has been very successful, although the closure of the free press by the regime has increased the need for this treatment of the news. In one way, however, this free press "vacuum" has worked in USSOUTHCOM's favor since it has simply increased the impact and audience of the only free media left in the country; the Tropic Times and the Southern Command Network.

(U) OTHER ISSUES: Following several months of development and extensive coordination locally and in Washington, USSOUTHCOM formally announced the initial planning for a phased withdrawal of the U.S. military presence from Panama by 31 December 1999 as stipulated by the Panama Canal Treaty. The Treaty Implementation Plan (TIP) announcement also identified the major military agencies involved in the on - going treaty implementation planning process. The initial release of the TIP was made by SCPA on the 8 December SCN Evening Report with a follow-up story in the 9 December Tropic Times. Additionally, copies of the plan along with forty-six questions and answers were disseminated locally, internationally and to all wire services and Military Groups/U.S. Information Service offices in Central and South America. This announcement was the first public release describing planning which had been underway since 1986.

(U) Beyond simply informing the public, this announcement was intended to support and demonstrate that the United States Government fully intends to continue to honor and comply with the Panama Canal Treaty. The long-awaited release of this material allowed SCPA to much more effectively counter on-going disinformation regarding U.S. compliance with the Treaty.

(U) It wasn't to be until 12 December that pro-regime press finally reacted to the TIP release. Prominent headlines announced that the foreign ministry had no knowledge of any plans by USSOUTHCOM to leave and called the plan contradictory. But on the whole, the reaction was subdued by Panamanian standards, indicating an effective dissemination of information by U.S. sources.

(U) The final significant local public affairs activity came on 30 December, when Mediodia, a new local publication, released a story which alleged official Panamanian concern over the interference by the Tropic Times in the internal affairs of Panama. This was followed by an official Panamanian protest through the Binational Joint Committee which charged that the Tropic Times was "clandestine, interventionist, underhanded and reckless. The document further demanded immediate cessation of the production of the paper. The official U.S. answer was "Thanks for your interest and expect our efforts to continue since the Tropic Times is the only free press in the country and we have a right and responsibility to our soldiers."

(U) REGIONAL MEDIA EVENTS: Elsewhere in the region, widespread media attention was given to continued aid for the Nicaraguan resistance fighters (Contras). Other issues of note were the future of the Central American Peace Plan, the National Assembly elections in El Salvador, presidential elections in several countries (Mexico, Haiti, Ecuador, Suriname, and Venezuela) and rebellions by dissident Army elements in Argentina during 16-18 January and 2-6 December. Many large U.S. military activities or events in the region were covered by the USSOUTHCOM Theater Support Element's Public Affairs Detachments (PADs). These various activities received extensive media attention and included:

(U) FUERTES CAMINOS: Fuertes Caminos, a U.S. - Honduran road building Engineer Exercise which took place in northern Honduras from November 1987 - June 1988. This exercise utilized engineers and support personnel from the U.S. National Guard and Reserve forces, working in concert with the Honduran Armed Forces.

(U) CAMINO DE LA PAZ: Camino de la Paz, a Bridge/road building Deployment for Training (DFT) in Costa Rica which took place from February - May. This was an active - duty Army exercise incorporating military personnel from Panama, Kentucky, Puerto Rico and various Costa Rican ministries.

(U) GOLDEN PHEASANT: Golden Pheasant in Honduras occurred from 17 - 23 March and featured the deployment of about 3,200 troops from the U.S. Army's 7th Infantry and 82d Airborne Divisions as part of an Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (EDRE). In addition to coverage by JTF-B Joint Public Affairs Office (JPAO) personnel, the exercise was widely covered by local/international media and the Department of Defense media pool which was deployed to Honduras from the 17 - 18 of March. Support to the DoD media pool was provided by JTF-B JPAO and the SCPA Directorate.

(U) This deployment was exceptionally significant as it served as an EDRE for the public affairs community. Initial notice of deployment of the DoD media pool for this exercise came to USSOUTHCOM on the morning of 17 March, the actual date of the deployment. In spite of this lack of notice, however, SCPA was able to move immediately since a plan (along with checklists for the pool itself) were already prepared and two personnel experienced in emergency deployments were on hand to assist. The exercise was very successful. Coverage included the incoming 82nd Airborne lifts on

the 17th, coverage of the 18 March Airborne drop, interviews with the U.S. Ambassador to Honduras as well as CINCSOUTH and the Minister of Defense's welcome to the troops at the drop zone. Over 130 media were present during these activities, and over 500 media visits were handled throughout the Golden Pheasant exercise.

(U) There were also extensive disaster relief assistance operations during the year. First, assistance was given to Jamaica in September which involved the use of C-130 flights to carry relief supplies to that country from Howard Air Force Base. This effort was covered by USSOUTHCOM's Air Force component Public Affairs personnel and a television crew from the Southern Command Network.

(U) Next, in October, relief was required for Guatemala which utilized two U.S. Army UH-60 helicopters attached to JTF-B in Honduras to carry 100,000 pounds of food and supplies to communities in the northern part of the country isolated by floods. Finally, also in October, two Panama - based U.S. Army UH-60 helicopters airlifted supplies to stranded and endangered persons from villages in the southwestern portion of Costa Rica which had also been isolated by serious flooding following Hurricane Joan.

(U) The crash of a U.S. Army CH-47D Chinook helicopter in La Ceiba, Honduras, on 8 December drew extensive media interest. All five Army soldiers on board the aircraft were killed. The helicopter had been assigned to the 18th Airborne Corps and attached to the JTF-B Aviation Task Force.

(U) There were two other serious military accidents in 1988. The first occurred in Honduras on 12 May, when a Fort Stewart soldier participating in the Fuertes Caminos road building exercise was killed in an accident involving his military vehicle.

(U) The second, an accident in Costa Rica on 20 December, resulted in the death of a U.S. Navy service member who was participating in a well - drilling deployment for training.

(U) <u>NEWS MEDIA VISITS</u>: In addition to a large number of news media visits and news media queries directed to USSOUTHCOM, its component services and the JTF-B JPAO throughout the year, SCPA established a media center at Quarry Heights on 18 March as the central point for all public information activities associated with the Panama crisis. Manned by members of SCPA, the components and augmentation Public Affairs personnel deployed from the United States, it was the first such media center established by USSOUTHCOM in many years. By the time it was closed 29 April, the media center had handled 230 news media representatives delineating 138 different news media organizations from around the world. These members generated a total of 236 individual media visits and interviews, 786 media queries, four major media briefings, and four major media opportunities which included the arrival to Panama of the security augmentation forces.

(U) A Joint Information Board was established 11 April with the responsibility for coordinating all Public Affairs actions and assets in Panama and the theater. It too was closed 29 April.

<u>SOUTHERN COMMAND NETWORK</u>.

(U) The contract for USSOUTHCOM's second channel/cable initiative was awarded to the Panamanian cable company VISAT 18 Jan 88. The purpose of the establishment of a second channel was to enable SCN, the most heavily restricted AFRTS outlet, to broadcast all available television programming. The system uses Multichannel Multipoint Distribution System (MMDS) technology to deliver a protected signal to members of the authorized audience living on U.S. Government-controlled installations.

(U) When complete, the MMDS system will provide an encoded AFRTS cable channel and ESPN free, a package of basic cable services (13 channels) for $20.75 per month on a subscription basis, and a locally packaged movie channel for $6.95. Current SCN television channels 8 and 10 will continue to be broadcast. As a result of the banking crisis (in turn a result of General Noriega's indictment and U.S. economic sanctions), VISAT was delayed in contract execution. U.S. equipment manufacturers were reluctant to accept orders from Panama without advance payment. VISAT was granted a contract extension until 30 Apr 89, and in consideration agreed to provide the cable sports service ESPN to the authorized audience at no charge.

(U) <u>KEY PERSONNEL CHANGES</u>: (b)(6) assumed command of Southern Command Network from (b)(6) on 24 Jun 88. (b)(6) (b)(6) assumed responsibilities as network sergeant major from retiring (b)(6) in May. (b)(6) took over as program director from (b)(6) in January.

(U) <u>OTHER EVENTS</u>: The 222d PAD from Bell, CA, the 340th PAD from Fort Totten, NY, and the 209th PAD from Rome, GA again conducted their annual training with the Southern Command Network during the months of February, March and June respectively. The three units are the only broadcast public affairs detachments in the U.S. Army Reserve.

(U) <u>RELOCATION</u>: With the relocation of the <u>Tropic Times</u> to Corozal, SCN took control of all of Building 209. Major systems and equipment upgrades included air conditioning and electrical power upgrades in preparation for second channel; installation of the second channel master control; and installation of 1/2 inch format videotape editing equipment. Additionally, old AM towers at Fort Clayton and Fort Davis were dismantled and removed by contractors.

(U) <u>NEW FORMATS</u>: SCN radio underwent a complete change in October. After months of planning and production of promotional spots, AM and FM received new formats "overnight" on 3 October. SCN disc jockeys were moved to FM which was reformatted to a contemporary hit radio style with the new image of "Transcontinental FM." In keeping with stateside trends, AM radio became the command's "News, Sports and Information Station" using an automated broadcast system.

(U) <u>OTHER PROGRAMMING AND PRODUCTION DIVISION ACCOMPLISHMENTS</u>:

(U) Coverage of major theater events such as CFA fairs, Fourth

of July, the reinstated Turkey Bowl; total in-house design and production of a new station image package at an estimated savings to the U.S. Government of thousands of dollars; institution of a formal on-the-job training rotation for broadcasters and production personnel; obtaining the right to broadcast the Summer Olympics live.

(U) Throughout the Panama crisis, production personnel have provided command information support in the form of special network news breaks, local special reports, emergency crawls, operation of the command PML hotline, production of an information feature on the PML system, and expansion of television broadcast hours to 24 hour operation. These actions were in addition to normal SCN productions of the Midday and Evening Report newscasts, "Just For Kids!" (a Saturday program which provides command information (CI) to children), Answerline (a live television call-in program which replaced "Family Forum") and production of CI and promotional spots. SCN also implemented a new CI plan and coordinated with theater public affairs offices, to ensure effective use of limited production resources.

RESERVE COMPONENT PUBLIC AFFAIRS DETACHMENT TRAINING.

(U) During calendar year 88, the Theater Support Element (TSE) trained 14 Public Affairs Detachments (PADs). Twelve of these deployments ran consecutively from January to June and primarily covered reserve component activities in Panama and Honduras. Two other rotations were conducted in October and December and covered activities in Honduras, Bolivia and Chile.

(U) The PADs and the TSE staff combined to produce 255 print stories which were sent to 840 media outlets (internal and external), 39 radio stories provided to 192 commercial outlets and 13 television stories distributed to 80 stations.

(U) Specifically, PADs covered the Fuertes Caminos 88, a series of road building exercises in Honduras. Although road construction was of primary interest, numerous stories were done on humanitarian assistance missions such as Medical Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETE), schoolhouse construction and clothing donations to area villagers. The PADs also deployed to Chile and Bolivia. In the Chilean excursion, the PADs covered the Virgin Islands National Guard Band which performed at an international trade fair at the request of the U.S. Ambassador. In Bolivia, coverage was given to a National Guard unit which had deployed to provide Bolivians with medical services.

(U) PAD training was enhanced by the addition of three USAR full-time AGR positions in June, July and October: commander, media-training officer and print (marketing) officer. For the first time in Exercises PAO/TSE history some degree of corporate memory became possible. These positions allow a consistency of operations and long term planning. Also during 1988, National Guard Bureau agreed to provide three more AGR positions which will give TSE a core staff of six. Initially, the Guard positions were designated as commander, public affairs supervisor and broadcast supervisor.

(U) Training opportunities for visiting PADs remained excellent. Reserve Component activity within the Theater is increasing as is TSE's related mission. TSE became more involved in exercise planning and thus improved its overall ability to tell the Reserve Component (RC) story. PADs were broken down into mobile teams to provide both print, video and audio capability. These teams deployed from the TSE facility to numerous Latin American sites. Upon arrival, the teams covered other assignments for a three to five-day stretch and then returned to Panama to produce their print, audio and TV stories and photos.

(U) There was an approximate three month period between PAD rotations (late June to mid-October). During this time, the TSE staff created an organized tape library, covered assigned stories, and completed the FY89 budget. Two of the first three PAD rotations dropped out of the cycle. Both units had participated in REFORGER in Germany and could not respond to another Overseas Deployment for Training (ODT) requirement that quickly. This reduced the scheduled 17 PAD rotations to 15.

(U) The Theater Support Element proved its versatility and value as an additional asset to the Director, USSOUTHCOM Public Affairs. In January, a three person team was immediately dispatched to Honduras to cover the EDRE, Golden Pheasant. The team deployed and was waiting on the drop zone as the first elements of the 82nd Airborne Division parachuted into Honduras. As this was the only videotape made of the drop, it was subsequently rushed to Washington where it was used on civilian network news programs that night. The team remained in Honduras to provide public affairs support to the overwhelmed JTF - B public affairs staff.

(U) During the February - April time frame, TSE served as the focal point for the Joint Audio-Visual Detachment (JAVDET) summoned to Panama to cover security enhancement operations during political turmoil in the local area. The unit was placed under the operational control of the TSE commander and was responsible for not only documenting daily activities but also providing news material to local command information outlets. The JAVDET, supplemented by TSE personnel, covered and documented 81 operational missions, a humanitarian mission and several community events, producing more than 3,000 color slides and black and white negatives and 1,500 minutes of videotape. The JAVDET/TSE team also shipped 13 priority packages of products to Washington, DC for use by various military commands, transmitted 18 photos electronically to Washington for use by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Command Authority and provided daily updates and weekly summaries of significant events for the U.S. Southern Command commander and his staff.

(U) Besides the multitude of public affairs products generated by TSE, three video pieces received wide circulation and benefited the USSOUTHCOM mission. Golden Pheasant 88 captured the essence of this important emergency deployment operation. A Fuertes Caminos 88 wrap-up tape and a video production on a plastic surgery team working in Honduras received wide dissemination.

USSOUTHCOM COMMUNITY RELATIONS PROGRAM.

(U) The primary mission of the USSOUTHCOM community relations program is to maintain and improve the image of the Southern Command throughout its Area Of Responsibility (AOR). In an effort to accomplish this goal, the command has as it's primary community relations tools, the command parachute team known as The Jumping Ambassadors and the 79th Army Band. These units participate in various community relations trips to different countries throughout Latin America. In 1988, the 79th Army Band made a total of six trips to eight different countries, four of which were also attended by The Jumping Ambassadors. In addition, the Jumping Ambassadors performed solo in Belize and participated in the annual jumpfest in Guatemala along with the USCINCSO, General Woerner.

(U) The 1988 community relations trip schedule follows below:

DATE	LOCATION	UNIT/S
25-30 Aug	Uruguay	Band
23-26 Sept	Bolivia	Band/Para Team
27 Oct - 5 Nov	Honduras/Guatemala	Band/Para Team
16-22 Nov	Venezuela/El Salvador	Band/Para Team
30 Nov - 6 Dec	Ecuador	Band/Para Team
3-14 Feb	Costa Rica	Band
28-29 April	Belize	Para Team

(U) Mrs. H. B. "Pearl" Behrend, the national president of the American Legion Auxiliary, accepted the invitation to be the keynote speaker at the 29 May Memorial Day celebration at the Corozal Cemetery. While in Panama, Mrs. Behrend made courtesy calls to the U.S. Ambassador, component commanders and local Legion officials. This was her second trip to Panama, the last being in December 1987.

(U) Unfortunately, due to the deteriorating political situation, all performances by the 79th Army Band and the Jumping Ambassadors scheduled for civilian audiences in the Republic of Panama, were cancelled.

(U) The annual Christmas sponsorship program for 1988 was also cancelled after the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) denied U.S. officials permission to implement it. This has historically been one of the most eagerly anticipated events in the local civilian and military communities.

(U) Also due to the political crisis, visits by the American Legion and associated organizations were severely curtailed. In 1988, the American Legion National Commander was only able to make one 20 hour visit in April.

(U) Community projects which were implemented in spite of the crisis were limited to those which could be accomplished on military installations for service members and their dependents only. These included such traditional activities as the 4th of July, Memorial Day and Veteran's Day services.

(U) One community relations highlight which wasn't cancelled was the visit, coordinated by SCPA, of Willard Scott, an NBC celebrity weatherman, and [redacted] (b)(6) a U.S. medal of honor winner, to Panama. Their visits were arranged so that they might participate in the Independence Day activities of the American community. Their visits were overwhelmingly successful and provided a much needed boost in community morale.

THE TROPIC TIMES.

(U) The USSOUTHCOM command newspaper, the Tropic Times, is the authorized, unofficial, unified command newspaper for USSOUTHCOM and its components. It is collocated with the 1109th Field Printing Plant in Corozal, Panamà. Policy supervision and direction for the Tropic Times was provided by the USSOUTHCOM Director of Public Affairs. Circulation as of December 31, 1988 was 16,500 copies for the Monday and Wednesday editions and more than 32,500 for the Friday edition.

(U) Manning for the Tropic Times was provided by component services based upon the proportion of their personnel assigned in the area. At the end of 1988, authorized personnel were as follows: one Air Force senior master sergeant as the NCOIC, four Army enlisted personnel as journalists and three DA civilians. Funding for the newspaper was provided through the 193d Infantry Brigade and totaled $115,000 in 1988.

(U) 1988 was one of the busiest and historic years in the Southern Command newspaper's 23year history, with four major events occurring that dramatically affected its operation.

(U) First, on January 20, the newspaper operation was relocated from the Southern Command Network, Bldg. 209 on Fort Clayton, to the 1109th Field Printing Plant, Bldg. 405 located in Corozal. This action was necessary in order to allow additional office space for SCN personnel and to eliminate the need to hand-carry camera ready copy from Fort Clayton to the Corozol printing plant. Prior to the move, as many as 10 to 15 trips were necessary in order to complete the transfer of all copy to the printing plant for each addition of the newspaper. The loss of valuable man - hours, as well as the unnecessary delay in printing, helped to fuel this decision.

(U) The relocation began January 20 and was completed simultaneously with the publishing of the January 21 edition, with movers working alongside newspaper staff performing their respective duties. The move was completed the following day. The new office was organized over the weekend and ready for operation by Monday morning. In spite of some move-related equipment damage, the January 29 edition was published on schedule.

(U) The next significant event took place two weeks after the move. Starting with the February 5 edition, the name of the newspaper was changed from The Southern Command News to the Tropic Times. To solicit a cross section of input for the new name, a contest was held, whereby members of the reading audience were encouraged to submit recommendations for a new name. As an incentive, the American Express Bank in Corozal offered a $100 Savings Bond to the individual submitting the winning entry. During the contest, more than 450 entries were submitted and a panel, comprising of members of the component public affairs offices, selected the winning entry.

(U) One month following the name change, the new Tropic Times was expanded from a weekly to a tri-weekly newspaper. The first edition of the tri-weekly concept began March 14, with the idea of publishing an eight-page edition every Monday, a 12-page edition on Wednesday and a 24-page edition each Friday. The implementation of the tri-weekly concept was necessary in order to provide the military and civilian members of USSOUTHCOM with a source of printed English language news after the following extraordinary events:

(U) Following the U.S. Grand Jury's indictment of General Manuel Antonio Noriega, the de facto ruler of Panama, the U.S. military and civilian community in Panama suddenly found itself cutoff from all U.S. newspapers and magazines. This was due to an embargo of U.S. news, initiated by the Panamanian government with the intent to deprive the Panamanian people of the truth surrounding the political crisis in Panama. The loss of these newspapers, however, also deprived the U.S. community of any printed English language news. While it was not and is not the purpose or intent of the Tropic Times to interfere with the internal affairs of the Republic of Panama, the newspaper staff did have an obligation to the U.S. community to keep them informed. The expansion of the Tropic Times to a tri-weekly publication was suggested to help fill the void. Although manned and equipped to publish only a weekly newspaper, the tri-weekly concept became a reality through extraordinary dedication to duty by the Tropic Times staff. Additionally, the newspaper staff expanded its coverage of events occurring in the Republic of Panama and increased its use of Associated Press and United Press international wire services. Wire service photos were also incorporated to compliment the U.S. and international news stories, while crossword puzzles and comics were added to round out the new format. Although the tri - weekly concept was initially intended as a temporary measure designed to meet the contingency situation in Panama, it remained in effect through the end of the year.

(U) The final major event occurred during April with the addition of new typesetting equipment. This equipment had been necessary to produce camera ready copy and had been originally ordered three years earlier. While funding delays by the Department of the Army caused the process to be unusually slow, it was eventually approved and the equipment purchased from Varityper International. The addition of the new equipment greatly increased the amount of copy produced by the Tropic Times and its ability to sustain the new tri-weekly format.

THE CRISIS IN PANAMA

The current crisis in Panama began with a seemingly routine event which took place within the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) in 1987. On Tuesday, the 2nd of June, [redacted] was retired from his position as the Chief of Staff of the PDF, by General Manuel Antonio Noriega, his commander in chief. [redacted] who was a cousin of the late Panamanian leader General Omar Torrijos Herrera, reportedly had aspirations of becoming the commander in chief himself upon the retirement of General Noriega.

On 6 June 1987, newly retired [redacted] publicly accused General Noriega of direct involvement in fostering the 1984 electorial fraud, the 1985 murder of prominent opposition leader [redacted] (the investigation of which led directly to the Noriega - ordered removal of Nicolas Ardito Barletta, the then President of Panama from office), the alleged murder of General Torrijos, and participation in large-scale money laundering and drug trafficking. Because [redacted] was the first high-ranking officer to break the code of silence within the PDF and confess his own role in both the fraud and corruption, his declarations had tremendous impact on public opinion.

On Monday, 8 June, crowds gathered at the [redacted] home and in front of the opposition radio station, KW Continente. By Tuesday the first serious outbreak of unrest erupted. The PDF used tear gas, truncheons and birdshot to disperse crowds of students and oppositionists who gathered near KW Continente and the University of Panama.

On Thursday, 11 June, the President of Panama declared a state of emergency in Panama, suspending freedom of the press and assembly, among other constitutional guarantees. It was also at this time that the formation of the National Civic Crusade Coalition was announced. The Crusade consisted of more than 100 local civic and business organizations which banded together in order to coordinate the protest movement. It would later expand and eventually divide into local chapters which presently include well over 200 groups. An indefinite strike was called, demanding that General Noriega be removed from office pending a full investigation into the [redacted] allegations. The state of emergency effectively ended the first wave of rioting.

On 11 June, the United States issued a press statement calling for the full disclosure of the facts by a free and unfettered media.

By 12 June, the strike was fading. The Civic Crusade organized a mass/rally which drew over 1,200 supporters to the Church of El Carmen. The PDF surrounded the church with troops in battle dress, camouflage face paint, hand grenades and automatic weapons, but the rally remained peaceful.

On Saturday, 13 June, a Crusade-organized mass attracted approximately 3000 supporters back to the Church of El Carmen. The PDF arrived with large numbers of troops as well as helicopters which were used for support and intimidation.

By 15 June, most of the businesses reopened. The following day the Crusade officially suspended the strike and the city began a tense calm. Only sporadic demonstrations occurred which were quickly neutralized by the PDF. On 26 June, the U.S. Senate led by Senator Edward Kennedy, passed a resolution regarding Panama which called for Noriega to step down as commander of Panama's Defense Forces pending an investigation into the [redacted] (b)(6) allegations. On 29 June, the Panamanian government lifted the State of Emergency, passed a resolution rejecting the U.S. Senate resolution and called for United States Ambassador Davis to be declared Persona Non Grata. That night the U.S. Embassy was splashed with red paint.

The next day an actual attack on the Embassy took place. A group of "protesters" openly led by Panamanian government figures, marched to the U.S. Embassy, Consulate and Information Service Library. Supplied by trucks hauling rocks, the group spent an hour pelting the buildings and vandalizing parked vehicles. PDF in uniform were on hand to watch but did not interfere except to prevent the rock throwers from climbing the fence surrounding the Embassy building. Riot police eventually did arrive 15 minutes after the rock-throwers had all, on cue, departed together.

The U.S. State Department issued a strong protest the following day accusing the Panamanian government of organizing the riot. Ambassador Davis suspended all economic and military assistance to Panama and demanded $100,000 compensation for damage done to the buildings and vehicles which had been parked on and around the Embassy grounds. Meanwhile, throughout Panama city, numerous demonstrations both pro-government and opposition took place. The government directed press called for a July 9th rally in support of Panamanian "sovereignty."

On the 2nd of July, armed civilians burned the opposition-owned department store, La Mansion Dante, while riot police watched. The Crusade called for an all-out rally on July 10th.

On the 5th of July, President Delvalle delivered a speech calling for a "truce," dialogue and investigation of [redacted] (b)(6) charges by the Attorney General. The Crusade refused, saying that no resolution was possible while Noriega was in power. Widespread opposition protest erupted with pot-banging and a car caravan of 2000 vehicles. The following day, an even larger car caravan took to the streets.

President Delvalle issued a decree on the 7th of July, prohibiting both the pro-government rally of July 9th and the opposition rally of the 10th. A pro-government march on 8 July consisting of approximately 5,000 persons took place, but by not holding the scheduled rally the next day, the pro-government groups honored the decree. Meanwhile, the opposition continued to call for full participation during the 10 July gathering.

On Friday, the 10th of July, thousands of people attempted to attend the opposition rally. Approximately 130 demonstrators were wounded and as many as 600 detained in clashes with the PDF. Tear gas was fired into the National Sanctuary Church and there were reports of widespread property damage aimed at Crusade/opposition figures.

Four days later, on the 14th of July, all prisoners who still remained under detention from the July 10th demonstration were released. Many of those detained reported human rights abuses during custody. An uneasy calm again settled over the city. On the 24th there was a massive opposition motorized rally at 50th St. Through the 25th of July, only limited opposition skirmishes occurred with the PDF. A mass at the church of El Carmen failed to attract a crowd when the PDF deployed. Extensive PDF intimidation tactics against the opposition were reported.

On the 26th of July, an opposition youth was shot and killed by PDF in the resort town of El Valle; it marked the first death resulting from the unrest. The PDF then closed all opposition press. The next day PDF troops supported by two helicopters staged a dawn raid on the home of (b)(6) There was a 15 minute, furious exchange of gunfire with (b)(6) bodyguards before everyone in the house was arrested. By the 2nd of August, (b)(6) (b)(6) had formally released a document through his lawyer recanting all of his previous charges against Noriega and stating that he had no proof to support any of them.

On the day of (b)(6) capture, the Crusade began a successful two-day national strike. Pro-government car caravans replaced opposition caravans on Calle 50. On the 29th of July, a government-sponsored carnival was staged for approximately 30,000 people. For the next week, the government press was filled with anti-U.S. rhetoric as Noriega attempted to place the blame for the disturbances on the U.S. government. On the 4th, the government raided the headquarters of the Civilian Crusade and seized what it termed to be "seditious" documents.

A Crusade sponsored rally which was held on the 6th of August attracted 30,000 animated supporters who met at the church of El Carmen. In spite of the decree by Delvalle, no PDF disturbed the rally which was subsequently peaceful.

On August 10th, the government charged six Crusade leaders with sedition - an offense which carries no bail and has a minimum sentence of 15 years. Although this forced the six leaders to go into hiding, new leaders were immediately named.

On August 12th, the PDF hosted a celebration at Ft. Cimarron. Both Noriega and Delvalle made speeches blaming the U.S. for Panama's situation.

On August 17th, an opposition strike failed but was followed by a 5,000 - 10,000 car caravan bearing white banners. At this time, Delvalle lifted the ban on demonstrations.

The next notably large demonstration was the womens' march which took place on the 22nd of August. An estimated 10,000 - 20,000 anti-government protesters participated. From the 20th to the 26th, there were almost daily protests by the students from the University of Panama, which were fought routinely by the PDF utilizing tear gas, birdshot, and rubber bullets. The lawyers marched on the 26th, and the journalists marched against the government shutdown of the opposition media.

There was more violence on the 30th when a crusade-sponsored march in San Miguelito was ambushed by an armed pro-government paramilitary group, leaving one youth killed and many others injured. Throughout this period various Crusade member organizations staged individual protests with varying degrees of violence. The PDF continued to harass opposition members by fire bombing their homes as well as individual rights violations. On September 13th, another Crusade march in San Miguelito marking the two-year anniversary of the Spadafora murder was fired upon by pro-government forces, leaving one Crusade supporter dead and several wounded.

On the 15th of September the opposition newspaper, La Prensa, in danger of bankruptcy due to its government-ordered closure, held an auction in front of the burned out Dante building to raise money.

On September 24th, the U.S. Senate unanimously passed a nonbinding resolution urging Panama to restore constitutional guarantees, take steps toward civilian government or face binding resolution in 45 days which would eliminate the sugar quota and cut off all aid to Panama. Panamanian media disinformation increased with sensational stories of an impending U.S. invasion and troops in combat gear deployed to guard the embassy.

The next day, a government of Panama diplomatic note protested various alleged U.S. violations of the Panama Canal Treaties and International law.

On October 4th, the oldest (and last English language) newspaper in Panama, the Star & Herald, closed. It was reported in the government-controlled press that the Star & Herald had been forced out of business due to financial problems. But the following day, in a letter to the Miami Herald newspaper, the last editor of the Star cited political pressure from the Panamanian government as the actual reason for closure.

On Oct 7th, President Delvalle announced in a televised speech that there would be tough measures against civil disobedience. Immediately following the speech, anti-government demonstrators clashed with riot police and several Panamanians along with nine U.S. service members were arrested.

On the 19th, the GOP announced a ban on a Crusade sponsored rally scheduled for the 22nd. The day before the rally, trucks carrying PDF troops were seen driving through various Panama City neighborhoods. There were reports of troops stopping citizens on the street to intimidate them into not participating in the rally that

was to take place the next day. That night, after several local businessmen, including the owner of the Machetazo department stores, had expressed open support for the rally, the largest Machetazo was destroyed by arson.

On the day of the scheduled rally, thousands of PDF troops deployed in Panama City. The rally had been organized to start from half a dozen locations which would then march through the streets to converge at the church of El Carmen. But this time the PDF changed tactics by employing soldiers from their well-trained Battalion 2000 instead of simple riot police to guard the church. They also utilized helicopters which featured door gunners manning M-60 machine guns. The helicopters flew dangerously low between the rows of buildings and, along with the soldiers (who were armed with shotguns and rifles), successfully routed all the small groups of people <u>before</u> they were able to build into formidable crowds. All obvious leaders were targeted first, beaten and arrested. This had the effect of decapitating the structure of the demonstrators. The rally failed completely. Later, an electrical pylon toppled causing power outages throughout the city which further demoralized the opposition. There was not another rally until the 13th of November, when a small demonstration broke out at the El Carmen church. It was put down quickly by police who arrived in force.

On November 18th the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed a resolution calling for an economic and military assistance cutoff to Panama with a vote of 19 - 0. Surprisingly the reaction from the government of Panama was muted. Within a week, however, the Panamanian Legislative Assembly had approved a nonbinding resolution calling for restrictions on U.S. military presence in Panama. Also, the sub-secretary of the government controlled political party, the PRD, said that discussions with the Soviets to open consulates and to establish trade ties were nearing completion. Strikes within the government unions as well as public school teachers, Education Ministry employees, and University of Panama administration workers continued.

On December 2nd, Panama announced the formation of a Panamá-Libyan Joint Cooperation Committee, a revival of a long dormant agreement. The next day, U.S. Senator Dodd arrived in Panama for a two day visit and met with Delvalle, the Crusade and Christian Democratic Party (PDC) representatives.

On December 7th, [redacted] and seven codefendants pleaded guilty to plotting against the state in a brief closed-door session in court.

On December 11th, the electric workers and the University of Panama workers formally ended their strike after reaching an agreement with the government.

By December 22nd, President Reagan signed a bill passed by the U.S. Congress which contained restrictions on U.S. assistance to Panama until there was evidence of a meaningful transition to

democracy. The same day, Delvalle formally issued a limited amnesty decree which specifically pardoned 90 members of the Crusade, opposition political parties and closed the media. [redacted] and seven codefendants were, however, sentenced the next day to five years in prison. But the following day, [redacted] was granted a special presidential pardon and flown into exile in Venezuela. Six of his seven codefendants were given conditional liberty and released.

On January 5th, 1988, the Crusade stated that incompetence and corruption within the GOP had destroyed Panama's democratic institutions and accordingly, they released a proposal for a transitional government. The proposal included an appointment of a three-person provisional junta to govern for 18 months and prepare for elections, closure of the National Legislative Assembly and replacement of Panamanian officials dealing with the Canal. Pledging respect for the military, the plan called for a military institution which would be subordinate to civilian authorities.

The next day, Delvalle began a private visit to the U.S. during which he granted an interview with the Washington Times. In the interview, Delvalle admitted that he was seeking a way out for Noriega, that Noriega was the real power in Panama and suggested the establishment of the Ministry of Defense to bring the military under civilian authority.

On 19 January, Jose Blandon, the Panamanian consul general in New York and close advisor to Noriega, was fired by Delvalle on charges of having sold out to the U.S. Blandon had authored the controversial Blandon Plan which had been an attempt to negotiate a political settlement to the crisis.

On February 4th, Noriega and fifteen codefendants were indicted by Miami and Tampa federal grand juries on drug-related charges. The next day small groups of demonstrators protested the Noriega indictment while large numbers of PDF watched. Other PDF units fired teargas at university students who were attempting to block the streets. The GOP closed KW Continente, an opposition radio station and the opposition tabloid, El Siglo. Two days later, the opposition radio stations Exitosa and Chiriqui were closed as well. Noriega called for the expulsion of the U.S. Southern Command from Panama. The opposition newspaper Extra was closed on the 18th.

On the 25th of February in a nationally broadcast, taped television statement, Delvalle officially relieved Noriega as the commander of the PDF and named Noriega's Chief of Staff, Colonel Justine as the new commander. The PDF quickly closed ranks behind Noriega and vowed that Delvalle would leave before Noriega. Shortly thereafter, Channel 5 (owned by Delvalle), the opposition newspaper La Prensa and several radio stations were closed by PDF. That night, the National Legislative Assembly dismissed Delvalle and Vice President Esquivel for violating the constitution. Later the next day, the Council of Ministers appointed Education Minister Manuel Solis Palma as Minister-in-Charge of the Presidency.

On the 29th, the Crusade, supported by the opposition political parties, began a national strike that lasted four days.

On March 3rd, the U.S. announced a freeze on Panamanian funds. On the 7th, a pro-government rally at the Embassy delivered only a small group instead of the thousands promised. Pensioners, unable to cash their government checks, blocked streets in protest. The next day the PDF repressed a Crusade rally at the Church of El Carmen. Three days later, they arrested up to 50 opposition demonstrators in another abortive Crusade rally at the church. A prominent Crusade supporter was shot in the leg and then dumped along the airport road.

At this time, the government began to cut costs. It delayed government employee paydays, including the PDF, and ordered the public sector work schedule reduced to half days.

On the 13th, gunmen attacked oppositionists and journalists outside the Cristo Rey Church.

On the 14th, the public school teachers clashed with police in both Panama and Colon during a day of anti-government protests. The port workers and public utility employees walked off the job. The following day, the public sector medical employees and university students joined other anti-government demonstrators throughout Panama to protest government-mandated pay delays and reductions . The PDF successfully broke up all protests.

On the 16th of March, a group of PDF officers attempted an armed coup against Noriega at their main headquarters in Panama City. The effort which was poorly coordinated and apparently anticipated, failed completely. Noriega was left unharmed. Later that day, public employee and other demonstrations occurred throughout Panama City, and a power blackout covered the entire nation. The absence of police during this period caused chaos and lootings. However, after several hours PDF units reappeared to restore order. The GOP ordered the National Council of Security and Defense to take over all major public services in the country.

The next day, following the failed coup attempt, the streets of Panama and Colon were empty of protests while full of heavily armed troops. Power outages continued in spite of the government take-over of utilities. On the 18th, a state of emergency was again declared throughout the republic because of an "undeclared war" being waged by the U.S. in order to abrogate the Canal Treaties. This decree was different from the last state of emergency in that it did not automatically suspend constitutional guarantees. The Crusade called for a general strike to begin on March 21st and continue until Noriega left power.

The two days prior to the Monday strike were eventful, with the PDF arresting public school teachers, utility workers and others. In spite of the threats, the first day of the strike proved to be a huge success. Simultaneously, Solis Palma delivered a nationwide address attacking the U.S. and stating that Noriega had offered to resign.

On March 22nd, another victim of PDF violence died, bringing to four the number of deaths resulting from the conflict.

The following day, a pro-government rally attracted only 40 demonstrators. Noriega publicly rejected dialogue with the U.S. while the opposition political parties and the Crusade refused dialogue with the regime until Noriega's departure.

On the 26th, the military occupied striking flour mills, and seized the flour which had been donated to Caritas, (a Catholic Church affiliated, nonprofit, charitable organization based in Panama). The next day they announced that all 1.3 million pounds would be sold on the open market.

On the 28th of March, the PDF conducted an attack on the Marriott Hotel following a large anti-Noriega march which had been broken up by police. Many journalists (some of whom were American) and Crusade leaders were beaten and arrested only to be released the next day. Two of the victims were hospitalized. The Catholic Church publicly condemned the PDF violence during the demonstration and raid. The Episcopal Conference revealed that it had secretly asked Noriega and Solis Palma to step down and now publicly asked for Noriega's resignation. But strike support had already begun to slip as store owners gave in to government and economic pressures.

On the 8th of April, the White House issued the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA), which barred all U.S. origin payments to the regime-controlled entities.

On April 18th, a GOP decree unfroze 75 percent of the balances which had been frozen in old demand deposit accounts on the condition that the checks be made payable to the "National Treasury."

Two days later, the Libyans promised to provide 20 million U.S. dollars to Noriega under an unpublicized loan agreement which was signed the previous week. The money, however, did not materialize.

On the 24th of April, Solis Palma replaced most of the government cabinet, including all of his economic ministers. The new ministers were considered to be more to the left of the Panamanian political spectrum than their predecessors.

From April 25th to May 9th, banking dominated the crisis. First, the Banking Association sent a letter to the new Finance Minister saying that the minimum conditions had not been met for banks to reopen. The Banking Commission then authorized 11 operations such as loans, foreign exchange, etc. On the 27th, the National Bank of Panama failed in an attempt to secure a settlement account for the nation's banks. Finally, on the 9th of May, all general license banks were allowed to open to the public with severe withdrawal restrictions.

In a press conference on the 11th of May, the Finance Minister estimated that the GNP of Panama would fall 10 - 20 percent in 1988 due to the U.S. economic sanctions.

On May 10th, U.S. Ambassador to Panama Arthur Davis was forced to land at Howard AFB due to harassment of his ground crew by PDF elements at Paitilla Airport.

On the 12th, U.S. officials for the first time made a public statement in which it was confirmed that there were serious negotiations ongoing with Noriega regarding his terms for leaving office. The press widely reported that the U.S. government had offered to drop the indictments against Noriega in return for his leaving, but when the terms of the deal were made public, this was shown not to be the case. A settlement seemed to be imminent with Noriega's negotiators actually agreeing on an equitable deal. However, on the 25th of May at the last moment, Noriega refused to honor the arrangements which had already been negotiated. In a live statement later that day, Secretary of State George Shultz said that "No further negotiations are contemplated. All proposals addressed during these negotiations have been withdrawn. No offers remain on the table."

On the 15th of June, President Reagan barred all senior Panamanian government officials and their families "who formulate and/or implement policies of Noriega and/or his handpicked president" from entering the United States.

On Tuesday, 26 July, the Washington Post newspaper quoted unnamed sources as saying that President Reagan had signed a finding authorizing covert action against Noriega in a renewed bid to oust him from power. Although an administration official confirmed that story the next day, the White House refused to discuss any details. The Post's sources, however, stated that the covert action stopped short of any paramilitary operation.

On Wednesday, 3 August, Homero Londoño, a stringer for Voice of America was released after 12 days imprisonment for "crimes against the security of the state" and the filing of "false and tendentious" stories. His release came over 24 hours after bail was posted for him according to his attorney. The VOA issued a statement saying, in part, "The treatment of Mr. Londoño is a blatant attempt to intimidate independent journalists in Panama and choke off the truth."

On 9 August, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega met with Noriega in Panama for a three day official visit. In a statement to the press, Ortega called the United States "the king of terrorism" in response to U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz's earlier public remark that Noriega was the "king of drugs". Ortega expressed complete support to Noriega, although he publicly offered no direct aid.

The next day, Arnulfo Arias, the three-time former president of Panama and one of the country's most revered and controversial politicians, died of a heart attack in Miami, Fla., at the age of 86. Arias, who was founder and head of the Authentic Panamenist Party for more than 40 years, had been elected to the presidency

three times, but never completed a term, having been ousted by the military each time. Due to his opposition of the current government, Arias had feared retribution from the Noriega regime and had lived in self-imposed exile for the past 15 years. He originated the movement to gain control of the Panama Canal from the United States.

On on the 12th, Noriega held a military/civic rally at Albrook Field celebrating his fifth anniversary as Commander-in-Chief of the Panama Defense Forces and the fourth anniversary of the PDF "Battalion 2000", who according to plan, are to take over defense of the Canal in the year 2000. Although it had been widely rumored that Noriega would use the rally as an opportunity to step down from his military post, he did not.

On Monday, 15 August, a funeral procession for former Panamanian President Arnulfo Arias filled a four lane avenue for nearly a mile. Without the usual fear of repression by military and police, protesters quickly turned the ceremony into a peaceful protest against Noriega. His funeral march became a rallying point for opposition parties and attracted an estimated 60,000 to 80,000 people. The ceremony was attended by U.S. Ambassador Davis and his daughter, Susan, but the Arias family refused permission for the Panamanian military to attend.

The next day a group of workers from the government-owned electricity company, IRHE, were arrested after cutting power to Panamanian television and newspapers also owned by the government, for lack of payment of more than $500,000. After cutting the power at the Editora Renovaciòn S.A. (ERSA) newspaper chain and Channel 2 television, several vans of riot police arrived at the television station and arrested the workers. Following the arrests, the office of the president released a statement reminding "Panamanians and public workers in particular" that in March the government had declared all state utilities vital to national security and under the "protection" of the Panama Defense Forces.

On August 21st, U.S. officials released a statement confirming reports that at least 240 incidents of harassment of American personnel by Panamanian authorities had been recorded in [illegible] The incidents ranged from extortion to robbery, beatings and rape by police officers.

On the 24th of August, about 50 dockworkers protested to demand payment from the Panamanian government and the release of Isaac Rodriguez, the leader of the state electrical workers union who had been arrested the week before. The workers blocked traffic in front of the port of Balboa during a peaceful lunchtime protest.

On 29 August, more rioting broke out at the University of Panama and adjacent Industrial Arts School. The students were protesting shortages of school supplies. Witnesses stated that at least four protesters were injured when the police dispersed the crowd but no arrests were reported. Although both the University and Industrial Arts School were closed the next day, some 300 students again protested, calling for Noriega's resignation. More than 50 riot

police tried to clear the barricaded streets as they fought the students with water cannons, birdshot and tear gas. In spite of this, the students continued to build new barricades throughout the day and responded to PDF charges with rocks. A local television news program reported that at least six protestors were arrested and several wounded.

The next protest took place on 12 September as state dockworkers went on strike and students clashed with police in separate incidents. Several hundred students from the National Institute, a state high school, blocked morning traffic for about an hour by overturning a car along the Fourth of July Avenue and shouted anti-Noriega slogans. The approximately 20 riot police who responded were met by a hail of rocks, and subsequently returned fire with teargas and birdshot. Afterwards, the Education Ministry announced that the school would be closed indefinitely because of the protests. The students were also protesting the plight of the striking dockworkers at the port of Balboa who were demanding the payment of their yearly "13th month" bonus withheld by the government.

The next day, the U.S. Defense Department ordered a cut in the required tour length for all military personnel stationed in Panama as part of an effort to reduce the number of dependents in country.

On 16 September, U.S. Ambassador Davis recommended the elimination of about half of the 160 diplomatic posts at the American Embassy due to concern for their personal safety.

On September 19th, the port of Balboa was seized by the military as the dockworker's strike continued. The strikers were joined by about 20 to 30 percent of the 75,000 government employees who also demanded their annual bonus.

On Monday, 26 September, Panamanian authorities announced the arrest of 26 Panamanians allegedly involved in "subversive movement" financed by the United States. The U.S. Embassy denied the charges.

On 27 September, Solis Palma accused the United States of aggression against Panama in a speech at the United Nations, boycotted by the U.S. The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Vernon Walters, called the charges "ones which we have come to expect from Panama's military-dominated regime. They are in a word, false."

On September 29th, Panamanian authorities initially refused American access to, and then illegally seized, U.S. government equipment in at the Atlantic port of Las Minas from a secure and bonded storage area. The equipment included a 120mm main gun from an M-1 Abrams tank which had been destined for use in the U.S. Army Tropic Test Center (an installation utilized in the testing of the effects of tropical climate on military equipment and personnel). Trucks and trailers, miscellaneous containerized materials, a field kitchen and soft drinks intended for the Commissary were also seized. Panamanian authorities immediately called a press conference at the Port, accusing the United States of illegally transporting

weapons to be used against the city and people of Panama. The gun was described in the regime-controlled press as a 155mm howitzer, capable of delivering nuclear warheads a distance of 32 miles, allegations which were completely false. The gun as shipped was inoperable and did not include the necessary equipment to move or sight it for firing.

U.S. officials issued an exceptionally strong protest and demanded the return of all materials seized. U.S. troops were moved to the Atlantic area and certain military units were placed on heightened alert status. On Sunday, 2 October, all material was returned by the Panamanian government.

On 1 October, Panamanian authorities began seizing the assets of deposed Panamanian President Eric Arturo Delvalle for acts "harmful to the people of Panama". The Treasury Secretary ordered every bank in Panama to freeze Delvalle accounts and turn over his records by 7 October. Also seized were 18 racehorses and the Santa Rosa sugar refinery which was one of Delvalle's main businesses. Seizure orders were additionally announced for the assets of three other prominent opposition figures.

On 11 October, a report released by the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) stated that press freedom no longer existed in Panama.

On 24 October, five PDF T-35 aircraft flew over Quarry Heights at a dangerously low altitude (estimated 400 ft and lower) and over the nearby Balboa elementary school at roof-top level. In response to U.S. protests over the incident, the PDF-controlled media called the accusations "ridiculous" and said it was part of a psychological campaign by the White House to influence the votes in the U.S. presidential elections.

On the 30th of October, in a broadcast interview with the Cable News Network (CNN), Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Elliot Abrams, said that Reagan Administration efforts to displace Noriega had failed, and that it would be up to the next administration to deal with the Panamanian problem.

On 2 November, the regime-controlled media accused the U.S. of additional treaty violations in a story which alleged that a U.S. Army "armored" Cobra attack helicopter along with Blackhawk transport aircraft had flown near the resort island of Taboga without prior coordination from the proper authorities.

On 9 November, the Minister in charge of the presidency, Manuel Solis Palma, addressed the nation in a televised session of the legislative assembly. In his speech, he called for support for the May 1989 elections and appealed to the lower classes. Solis Palma referred to the peasants, the poor, and those who are members of pro-regime political parties as "authentic Panamanians," and severely criticized the opposition parties for putting their own interests ahead of the interests of the motherland. The editorial columns of the GOP morning newspapers also carried press attacks on the U.S.

Presidential elections, stating that Americans will not be able to vote for the better candidate, it will have to choose the lesser of the two evils. The Reagan administration was condemned for its foreign policy in Central America and for having waged an "unjust political and economic war against Panama."

On 11 November, speculation on U.S. foreign policy towards Panama under the Bush administration was expressed in GOP media by regime and opposition leaders. Solis Palma, called upon the new administration to review its Panama policy, stating that it was not what it should be. Head of the regime's Democratic Revolutionary Party, (PRD) Carlos Duque, said that he hoped George Bush would be "more open-minded" and have a more moderate policy toward Panama. Opposition party leader, Ricardo Arias Calderon, called for a continuation of current policy and a complete withdrawal of all support for General Noriega.

On 8 December 88, USSOUTHCOM formally announced the Treaty Implementation Plan (TIP) which outlined the plans for the relocation of SOUTHCOM from Panama. The initial release was made on the SCN Evening Report with a follow-up story in the 9 December Tropic Times. Additionally, copies of the statement were provided to all U.S. wire services and radio/TV networks as well as all Panamanian media.

On 12 December, prominent headlines on the front page of "LA Estrella de Panama" announced that the foreign ministry had no knowledge of the plans to remove SOUTHCOM from Panamanian soil.

On 21 December page one of The Tropic Times condemned the PDF refusal to coordinate with the U.S. regarding the annual Christmas Sponsorship Program. This program allows units, staff and others to sponsor various Panamanian organizations with toys, money, food and labor. In 1987, this program had successfully aided more than 7,600 Panamanians.

On 23 December, the Noriega regime announced the release of all of the alleged "subversives" who had been detained since the 23rd of September.

On 30 December, Mediodia, a newcomer local paper which had become increasingly pro-regime despite initial claims that it would be impartial, ran a story on alleged official Panamanian concern about interference of the SOUTHCOM command newspaper, The Tropic Times, in Panama's internal affairs. This was followed by an official Panamanian protest through the binational joint committee in which it was charged that The Tropic Times was clandestine, interventionist, underhanded and reckless. The document further demanded immediate cessation of publication. U.S. officials refused.

On 30 December, Aristides De Icazaea, general manager of Exitosa Radio Network and vice president of the government-controlled Televisora Nacional (Channel 2), was deported to Miami after being detained at Omar Torrijos International Airport in Panama as he returned from a trip there. Possible connection with a clandestine

television station and opposition radio station were cited as the reasons for his expulsion.

It was reported that on or about 30 December, an underground radio station, Loz de Libertad, (Voice of Liberty) had begun broadcasting. The PDF initiated efforts to search for the broadcast site.

SUMMARY.

As of 31 December, 1988, the situation in Panama appeared to be essentially static. No new initiatives had been announced since the public statement by Elliot Abrams and there was every indication that his prediction of little or no new changes to policy would occur until the new administration was sworn in.

Since the advent of a large number of stories by the international press dealing with the harassment of U.S. citizens in Panama, the number and severity of such harassments decreased. Although a great many businesses in Panama had failed due to the deteriorating economic structure, there was no apparent sign that Noriega's hold on power had weakened or that his forces were losing confidence in his ability to maintain control.

One by-product of the crisis was a strengthening of the ties between Panama and Libya, Cuba, and Nicaragua. There has been evidence that one or more of these countries has provided financial support to Noriega, contributing to his longevity in spite of the extremely poor economic situation within the country. Noriega has repeatedly publicly implied that this is true. Additionally, there is strong evidence that large shipments of small arms came into Panama from Cuba during 1988.

With the approach of Panamanian elections scheduled for May 1989, it appeared probable that Noriega would remain in power at least until that time. Meanwhile, with a weakened economy and a tarnished self image, Panama continued to remain simply - in crisis.

HISTORICAL REPORT
1988

(U) DISTINGUISHED VISITORS: An alphabetical listing of visitors, LTG/Civilian Equivalent and above, for calendar year 1988 follows:

DISTINGUISHED VISITORS	PERIOD OF VISIT
Abramowitz, Morton I., Hon. Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Intelligence Accompanied by (b)(6)	APR 12-13
Ackerman (D-NY), Gary L., Hon. United States House of Representatives Accompanied Rep Peter H. Kostmayer	MAR 24
Aveledo, Jesus Ramon, Maj Gen Commanding General, Venezuelan Air Force Accompanied by (b)(6) and a party of 1	FEB 01-06
(b)(6) Political Advisor to Army Chief of Staff Accompanied Gen Carl E. Vuono	JUL 16-17
(b)(6) Professional Staff Member to the Senate Committee on Armed Services	JAN 24-26
Beckett, Edwin H.A., MG Defense Attache and Head of British Defense Staff, Washington D.C. Accompanied by (b)(6) and Squadron Leader B. (b)(6)	JUN 08-10
Behrend, Pearl, Mrs. National President American Legion Auxiliary Accompanied by (b)(6)	MAY 28-31
Blaz (R-Guam), Ben, Hon. United States House of Representatives Accompanied Rep Stephen J. Solarz	JUL 07-09
Brown, Frederic J., LTG Commanding General, Fourth U.S. Army Accompanied by a party of 3	SEP 20-23
Brown, Richard C., Mr. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Inter-American Affairs Accompanied by a party of 1	SEP 08-11
Buck, Kathleen, Hon. General Counsel, Department of Defense Accompanied by a party of 2	APR 23-28

Burke, Terrence, Mr. Deputy Assistant for Operations Drug Enforcement Administration Accompanied LTG Olmstead	JAN 11-12
Burton (R-IND), Dan, Hon. United States Senate Accompanied by a party of 3	FEB 27
Carrera, Jaime, RADM Joint Chief of Peruvian Staff, D-2 Accompanied by (b)(6)	JUN 20-23
Cassidy, Duane H., Gen Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command Accompanied by (b)(6), Brig Gen Gary H. Mears, and a party of 2	MAY 06-10
Chesney, Murphy A., Lt Gen Surgeon General, United States Air Force Accompanied Gen Welch	JAN 09-10
Cook, Ernest T., LtGen Commanding General Fleet Marine Force Atlantic	
Accompanied by a party of 5	APR 24-26
Accompanied by a party of 6	DEC 29-30
Cruz Johnson, Rigoberto, VADM Director, Chilean National Defense Accompanied by (b)(6) and a party of 2	NOV 22-25
Crowe, Jr., William J. Crowe, ADM Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Accompanied by (b)(6) and a party of 13	DEC 10-12
Cushman, John H., LTG (Ret) Consultant for Packard Commission Report Accompanied by a party of 1	JUN 12-14
Delgado, Manuel Marcelo, LTG Director of Intelligence Ecuadoran Intelligence Accompanied by a party of 4	JUL 20-22
Duncan, Stephen, Hon. Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs Accompanied by a party of 4	FEB 16-19
Dwyer (D-NJ), Bernard, Hon. United States House of Representatives Accompanied Rep John P. Murtha	AUG 07-08

Dyer, James W., Hon. Deputy Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs (House) Accompanied Rep John P. Murtha	AUG 07-08
(b)(6) Visiting Scholar, University of Colorado	JUL 10-13
Fretes Davalos, Alejandro, LTG Chief of Staff of Paraguayan Armed Forces Accompanied by a party of 1	MAR 19-23
Fox, J. Edward, Hon. Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Department of State Accompanied Rep John P. Murtha	AUG 07-08
Gianelli, William R., Hon. Chairman, Board of Directors Panama Canal Commission	APR 12-15
Gildred II, Theodore E., Hon. American Ambassador to Argentina Accompanied by (b)(6)	JUN 30-JUL 02
Glickman (D-KS), Dan, Hon. United States House of Representatives Accompanied by Rep Bud Shuster	DEC 13-14
Goodin, Joan, Ms. Executive Director, CAPACITAS International	OCT 19-22
Gray, Jr., Anthony W., Dr. Deputy Director, Inter-American Region International Security Affairs	AUG 28-30
(b)(6) Foreign Policy Issues Coordinator For Presidential Campaign of Senator Robert Dole	FEB 02
Haynes, William, (GS-17), Mr. House Appropriations Committee, Surveys and Investigation Accompanied (b)(6)	JUL 11-15
Heiberg III, Elvin R., LTG Chief of Engineers Accompanied by a party of 6	MAR 08-13
Herres, Robert T., Gen Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff	
Accompanied by (b)(6) and a party of 9	MAR 19-20/27
Accompanied by (b)(6) and a party of 7	NOV 2-3/10

Hoffman, Dean, (GS-16), Mr. AUG 22-25
National Intelligence Officer for Economics

Holwill, Richard N., Hon. NOV 17-19
American Ambassador to Ecuador
Accompanied by (b)(6)
and a party of 2

Honor, Edward, LTG FEB 15-17
Director for Logistics,
Organization of Joint Chiefs of Staff
Accompanied by a party of 1

Hoobler, James F., Mr. JAN 11-12
Deputy Assistant Secretary,
International Narcotics Matters (INM)
Accompanied by LTG Olmstead

Kelly, Thomas W., LTG AUG 08-12
Director for Operations, Joint Staff,
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Accompanied by a party of 2

Kempf, Peter T., Lt Gen
Commander, United States Air Force South
Accompanied by a party of 4 AUG 10
Accompanied by a party of 4 AUG 17-19
Accompanied by (b)(6) and a party of 4 AUG 24-25
Accompanied by a party of 3 OCT 02-03
Accompanied by (b)(6) and a party of 3 OCT 24-25

Kozak, Michael, Mr. APR 16-20
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau for Inter-American Affairs
Accompanied (b)(6)

Kostmayer (D-PA), Peter H., Hon. MAR 24
United States House of Representatives
Accompanied by Rep Gary L. Ackerman and a party of 3
Lambe, Richard M., Brigadier NOV 15-19
Commander, British Forces, Belize
Accompanied by (b)(6)
and a party of 2

Lary, Buford D., Lt Gen APR 13-15
Inspector General of the U.S. Air Force,
Director for Anti-terrorism
Office of the Secretary of the Air Force
Accompanied by (b)(6) and a party of 3

Lenzo, Antonio, MG FEB 10
Italian Defense Attache to Washington D.C.,
Panama, Mexico, Haiti, and Dominican Republic
Accompanied Ambassador Enzo Montano

Lincoln, Jennie, Dr. OCT 11
Deputy Director Center for Latin American
Studies

Livingston (R-LA), Bob, Hon. United States House of Representatives Accompanied Rep Bud Shuster	DEC 13-14
McCarthy, James P., Lt Gen HQ USAF Deputy Chief of Staff Programs and Resources (USAF/PR) Accompanied by a party of 3	AUG 05-06
McDonald, Charles C., Lt Gen Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics and Engineering, Headquarters, USAF Accompanied by a party of 2	MAR 06-08
McEwen (R-OH), Bob, Hon. United States House of Representatives Accompanied Rep Bud Shuster	DEC 13-14
McLean, Norman G., Maj Gen Chief of Staff of the Guyana Defence Force Accompanied by a party of 3	OCT 12-13
McNamara, Thomas E., Hon. American Ambassador Designate to Colombia	AUG 11-12
McPeak, Merrill A., Lt Gen Commander, 12th Air Force Attended Component Commander's Conference	JAN 07-08 JUN 23-24
Maravilla, Augusto C., COL Chief of C-5 Civil Affairs and Propaganda, El Salvador Air Force Accompanied by COL Jose Galileo Torres Castro	SEP 20-23
Marsh, Jr., John O., Hon. Secretary of the Army Accompanied by a party of 6	AUG 25-26
Mollohan (D-WV), Allen B. Hon. United States House of Representatives Accompanied Rep John R. Murtha Accompanied Rep John R. Murtha	 MAR 05 AUG 07-08
Monascal, Leonardo Enrique, BG Chief of Operations Venezuelan Air Defense Forces	NOV 07-09
Montano, Enzo, Hon. Italian Ambassador to Panama Accompanied by MG Antonio Lenzo	FEB 10
Murtha (D-PA), John R., Hon. United States House of Representatives Accompanied by Rep Allan B. Mollohan and a party of 3 Accompanied by Rep Allan B. Mollohan (D-WVA), REP Bernard Dwyer (D-NJ), Hon. James Dyer, HON J. Edward Fox and a party of 2	 MAR 05 AUG 07-08

Mundy, Carl E., LT Gen Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Policies and Operations Department Accompanied by a party of 3	NOV 01-03
Myers, John T., LTG Director, Defense Communications Agency Accompanied by party of 3	MAR 10-14
Accompanied by BG Phillip Bracher	JUL 28-30
Olmstead, Stephen D., LTG Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense For Drug Policy and Enforcement Accompanied by (b)(6) (b)(6) and a party of 3	JAN 11-12
Olson, William, Dr. Director of Low Intensity Conflict, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC Accompanied by a party of 1	MAY 08-11
Ono, Allen K., LTG Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel Headquarters, United States Army Accompanied by a party of 2	FEB 15-17
Pastorino, Robert, Mr. Department of Defense/ISA Deputy Assistant Secretary Accompanied by a party of 9	APR 16-17
Penfold, John, Mr. Deputy Chief of Mission United States Embassy, Honduras Accompanied by a party of 5	FEB 19-20
Purcell, Susan Kaufman, Dr. Director of the Latin American Program for the Council of Foreign Relations	NOV 06-09
Reid (D-NV), Harry, Hon. United States Senate Accompanied by a party of 5	OCT 24
Rich, Robert, Hon. American Ambassador to Belize Accompanied by (b)(6)	MAR 03-06
(b)(6) Department of Political Science University of Wyoming	MAR 05-12
Ross, Jimmy D., LTG Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics United States Army Accompanied by a party of 3	MAY 16-19

Rubio, Arturo, VADM Commander, Guatemalan Navy Base Pacific Accompanied by a party of 3	NOV 28-DEC 02
Salazar, Luis, Brigadier General J3 Peruvian Armed Forces	OCT 14-19
Schwartz, Louis, Mr. United States Consul General to Brazil	FEB 08
Shuler, Jr., Ellie G., Lt Gen Commander, 8th Air Force Accompanied by a party of 5	AUG 23-25
Shuster (R-PA), Bud, Hon. United States House of Representatives Accompanied by Rep Bob Livingston, Rep Dan Glickman, Rep Bob McEwen and a party of 3	DEC 13-14
Skelton (D-MO), Ike, Hon. United States House of Representatives Accompanied by MG Charles E. Dominy and a party of 2	AUG 25-29
Solarz (D-NY), Stephen J., Hon. United States House of Representatives Accompanied by Rep George Wortley (R-NY), Rep Ben Blaz (R-Guam), (b)(6) and a party of 3	JUL 07-09
Thorsen, Eric, Hon. Air Force Assistant Secretary Accompanied by a party of 8	OCT 19-20
Thurman, Maxwell R., GEN Commanding General United States Army Training and Doctrine Command Accompanied by a party of 7	DEC 04-05
Torpy, Charles R., Mr. (SES-4) Assistant for National Programs Office of the Secretary of the Air Force Accompanied by LTG B. D. Lary	APR 13-15
Torres Castro, Jose Galileo, COL Chief of COPREFA (Comite de Prensa de las Fuerzas Armadas), El Salvador Air Force Accompanied by Col Augusto C. Maravilla	SEP 20-23
Van Note, Graham, (GS-18), Mr. Director, House Appropriations Committee, Surveys and Investigation Accompanied by Mr. William Haynes (GS-17) and a party of 3	JUL 11-15

Vuono, Carl E., GEN — JUL 16-17
United States Army Chief of Staff
Accompanied by [redacted]
LTG Sidney T. Weinstein, [redacted]
[redacted] and a party of 13

Wagner, Jr., Louis C., GEN — APR 25-30
Commanding General
Army Materiel Command (AMC)
Accompanied By [redacted]
and a party of 3

Weinstein, Sidney T., LTG — MAR 06-11
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Accompanied by Gen Carl E. Vuono — JUL 16-17
Accompanied by [redacted]
and a party of 2 — OCT 15-16

Welch, Larry D., Gen — JAN 09-10
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Accompanied by [redacted]
Lt Gen Murphy A. Chesney and a party of 5

Wiant, Jon A., Mr. APR 12-13
Director of Intelligence Coordination, INR

Whitehouse, Charles S., Hon. — AUG 28-30
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict
Accompanied by [redacted]
and a party of 1

Wolthuis, Robert K., Dr. (SES-4) — DEC 07-08
Department of Defense for Humanitarian and
Civic Assistance

Wohlers, Eduardo E., BG — JUL 28-AUG 02
Commander, Guatemalan Air Force
Accompanied by [redacted]
and a party of 3

Wortley (R-NY), George, Hon. — JUL 07-09
United States House of Representatives
Accompanied Rep Stephen J. Solarz

DISTINGUISHED GROUPS:

Advanced Operational Studies Fellow — OCT 17-19
Group of 9

Arkansas Civic/Media Tour to CENTAM — JUL 27
Group of 20 including MG James A. Ryan (TAG),
BG, 1 state senator, 2 state representatives, 10
civic leaders and 5 media

CAPSTONE General/Flag Officer Course
Group of 11 officers lead by
ADM(R) Harry D. Train, III — JUN 06-08
Group of 13 officers lead by GEN(R) Robert W. Bazley — OCT 03-05

Component Commander's Conference — JUN 23-24

[redacted] (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. § 424 — JAN 19-25 — DIA

D.C. Civic/Media Tour to CENTAM — MAR 09
Group of 23 including MG Calvin Franklin,
16 civic leaders and 7 media

Florida Civic/Media Tour to CENTAM — AUG 02
Group of 24 including MG Robert F. Ensslin, Jr. (TAG),
2 state senators, 3 state representatives
5 military, 13 civic leaders and 5 media

Fuerzas Conjuntas I — MAR 07-11
Participation by 46

Louisiana Civic/Media Tour to CENTAM — JAN 11-15
Group of 9 including MG A. M. Stroud, (TAG),
and Hon. Hunt Downer (State Representative)

Navas, Jr., William, BG
Deputy Director of the Army National Guard
Group of 26 including Amb Richard F. Staar, MG James
B. Stodart and 5 media — JUL 11
Group of 27 including 15 academia and 5 media — NOV 14

Oklahoma Civic/Media Tour to CENTAM — MAY 16-19
Group of 17 including MG Donald Ferrell (TAG)
Chief of Staff for Governor, 3 civic leaders, 8 media
and 4 military escorts

Security Assistance Conference — SEP 26-30
Group of 55

DISTINGUISHED GROUPS (CONT):

South Dakota Civic/Media Tour to CENTAM Group of 19 including Hon. George S. Mickelson (Governor), Hon. Homer Harding (State Senator), TAG 2 military escorts, 9 civic leaders and 5 media	MAY 02-05
Temple, Jr., Herbert R., LTG Chief, National Guard Bureau Accompanied by group of 30 including Hon. Dave McCurdy (D-OK), 2 State representatives, 12 civic leaders and 9 media	JUN 05-08
USSOUTHCOM Counterpart Contingency Training (SCCT) Group of 16 officers including MG Richard E. Stearney and BG William W. Wells	MAY 19-22

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ABDR...........Aircraft Battle Damage Repair
ABN............Airborne
ADUANA.........Government Customs Office, Republic of Panama
AFB............Air Force Base
AFFOR..........Air Force Forces
AFRTS..........Armed Forces Radio and Television Service
AFS............Air Force Station
AGR............Active Guard/Reserve
AIDS...........Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AOR............Area Of Responsibility
AR.............Argentina
ARFOR..........Army Forces
ARNG...........Army National Guard
ASD............Automated Systems Division
ASP............Ammunition Supply Point
ASPO...........Army Space Program Office
ATF............Arraijan Tank Farm
ATF............Arraijan Tank Farm
BG.............Brigadier General
BH.............Belize
BL.............Bolivia
BN.............battalion
BR.............Brazil
C-E............Communications and Electronics
CA.............California
CAS............Close Air Support
CASA 21-200....Government of Spain Aircraft Company STOL
CASC...........Canal Alternatives Study Commission
CAT............Crisis Action Team
CB.............Combined Board
CBRN...........Caribbean Basin Radar Network
CCT............Combat Control Team
CCT............Crawley Caribbean Transport
CCTV...........Closed Circuit Television
CDTS...........Computer Directed training System
CENTCOM........Central Command
CEOI...........Critical Elements of Information
CFA............Community Family Activities
CH.............Chapter
CHODC..........Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation
CI.............Chile
CI.............Clandestine Intelligence
CI.............Command Information
CIA............Central Intelligence Agency
CIF............CINC In-extremis Force
CINC...........Commander in Chief
CINCFOR........COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FORSCOM
CINCSO.........Commander-In-Chief, Southern Command
CIOP...........Clandestine Intelligence Operations Proposal (C)
CME............Crisis Management Exercise
CMS............Central Material Section

C^3...........Command, Control and Communications
C-141..........United States Air Force cargo aircraft
C-27...........STOL Aircraft
C-5A...........United States Air Force cargo aircraft
C2IP...........Command and Control Initiatives Program
C3.............Command, Control and Communications
CNN............Cable News Network
CO.............Colombia
COL/Col........Colonel
COLD...........Conference of Logistics Directors
COMINT.........Communications Intelligence
COMSOCSOUTH....Commander, Special Operations Command South
CONPLAN........Contingency Plan
CONUP..........Automatic Restart of Teleconferences
CONUS..........Continental United States
COPREFA........Comite de Prensa de las Fuerzas Armadas
CPX............Command Post Exercise
CS.............Costa Rica
CTA............Center for Treaty Affairs
CY.............Calendar Year
DAC............Direccion Aeronautica Civil(Civil Aviation Directorate)
DC.............District of Columbia
DCINC..........Deputy Commander-In-Chief
DCSLOG.........Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics
DEA............Drug Enforcement Agency
DEPMEDS........Deployable Medical Systems
DFT............Deployment for Training
DG.............defense guidance
DIA............Defense Intelligence Agency
DMA............Defense Mapping Agency
DMO............directed military overstrength
DNTT...........Direccion Nacional de Transporte Terrestre (Highway Patrol)
DOD............Department of Defense
DOS............Department Of State
DRB............Defense Resource Board
EC.............Equador
EDRE...........Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise
EEI............Essential Elements of Information
ELINT..........Electronics Intelligence
EML............Environmental Morale Leave
EOC............Emergency Operations Center
ES.............El Salvador
ESAF...........EL Salvador Armed Forces
ESPN...........Call sign for cable television sports network
ESTADO MAYOR...Latam equivalent of U.S. Pentagon
ETC............Extended Terminal Capability
EUCOM..........European Command
EW.............Electronic Warfare
ea.............Each
FAO............Foreign Area Officer
FAST...........Fleet Anti-Terrorist Support Team
FASTROPE.......rapid exit from helicopter in flight via rope
FAX............Facsimile
FID............Foreign Internal Defense

FLIR...........Forward Looking Image Radar
FMS............Foreign Military Sales
FMTS...........Field Medical Training Site
FTS............File Transfer System
FTX............Field Training Exercise
FY.............Fiscal Year
G4.............Division Level Logistics Staff Element
GAO............General Accounting Office
GC.............Guardia Civil
GDF............Guyanese Defense Force
GIPSEY.........Graphics Information Processing System
GOP............Government of Panama
GOXX...........Government of XX (2-letter country code)
GPS............Ground Processing System
GT.............Guatemala
GY.............Guyana
HAFB...........Howard Air Force Base
HCA............Humanitarian Civic Action
HCA............Humanitarian/Civic Assistance
HF.............High Frequency
HO.............Honduras
HQ USSOUTHCOM..Headquarters U.S. Southern Command
HQ.............Headquarters
HUMINT.........Human Intelligence Data
IAAFA..........Inter-American Air Force Academy
IAC............Indications and Analysis Center
IANTN..........Inter-American Naval Telecommunications Network
ICAO...........International Civilian Aviation Organization
IDL............Infantry Division Light
IEEPA..........International Economic Emergency Powers Act
IES............Imagery Exploitation System
IG.............Inspector General
IGSAV..........Inspector General Staff Assistance Visit
IMET...........International Military Education And Training
IMINT..........Imagery Intelligence
INM............International Narcotics Matters
IOC............Initial Operating Capability
IR.............Infrared
ISO............Information System Officer
ITBM...........Impuestos de Transferencia de Bienes Muebles (Sales Tax)
JACP/CC........Joint Airborne Command Post/Command and Control
JAG............Judge Advocate General
JAVDET.........Joint Audio-Visual Detachment
JC.............Joint Committee
JCE............Joint Committee on the Environment
JCS............Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSE...........Joint Communication Support Element
JDS............Joint Deployment System
JGI............Joint General Inspection
JIC-SOUTH......Joint Intelligence Center South
JINTF..........Joint Intelligence Task Force
JMA............Joint Mobilization Augmentation
JMD............Joint Manning Document

J4.............Logistic Directorate, Joint Staff
JMP............Joint Manpower Program
JOC............Joint Operations Center
JOPS III.......Joint Operation and Planning System
JOPS...........Joint Operation Planning System
JOTC...........Joint Operations Training Center
JPAO...........Joint Public Affairs Office
JPEG...........Joint Planning and Execution Graphics
JPESC..........Joint Planning and Execution Systems Conference
JPO............Joint Petroleum Officer
JPOC...........Joint Planning Orientation Course
JSCP...........Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSIIDS.........Joint Security Internal Intrusion Detection System
JSOTF..........Joint Special Operations Task Force
JSPD...........Joint Strategic Planning Document
JTD............Joint Table of Distribution
JTF-B..........Joint Task Force Bravo
JTF-BME........Joint Task Force-Bravo Medical Element
JTF-PM.........Joint Task Force-Panama
JTF............Joint Task Force
JTFSO..........Joint Task Force South
JULLS..........Joint Universal Lessons Learned System
KL-43..........Encryption Device
LANTCOM........Atlantic Command
LANTFLT........Atlantic Fleet
LATAM..........Latin America
LDA............Office of Leadership and Analysis (CIA)
LI.............Low Intensity
LIC............Low Intensity Conflict
LOG............Logistics
LTC/LtCol......Lieutenant Colonel
LTG............Lieutenant General
LTT............Logistics Team Training
MAP............Military Assistance Program
MAPP...........Modern Aids To Planning Program
MARFOR.........Marine Forces
MC.............Medical Corps
MCG............Military Coordination Group
MCSF...........Marine Corps Security Force
MEDFAA.........Medicine in Air Forces of the Americas (Medicina en las Fuerzas de Aerias de las Americas)
MEDRETE........Medical Readiness Training Exercise
MEI............Management Effectiveness Inspection
MH-60..........BLACKHAWK helicopter modified for SOF
MILGP..........Military Group
MKT............Military Kitchen Trailer
MMDS...........Multichannel Multipoint Distribution System
MMTT...........Medical Mobile Training Team
MP.............Military Police
MS/MSC.........Medical Service Corps
MSG............Message
MSI............Multi-Spectral Imagery
MSR............Main Supply Route
MTT............Mobile Training Team
mm.............millimeter

MTMC...........Military Traffic Management Command
MTR............Missions, Tasks and Responsibilities
MTT............Mobile Training Team
NAU............Narcotics Assistance Unit
NAVFOR.........Navy Forces
NAVSCIATTS.....Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School
NC.............North Carolina
NCO............NonCommissioned Officer
NDB............Nondirectional Beacon
NDU............National Defense University
NEO............Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
NMCC...........National Military Command Center
NMCS...........National Military Command Systems
NMIST..........National Military Intelligence Support Team
NRT............Near Real Time
NSA............National Security Agency
NSWU...........Naval Special Warfare Unit
NVG............Night Vision Goggle
O&I............Operations and Intelligence
OAS............Organization of American States
ODA............Operational A Detachment
ODB............Special Forces Operational Company
ODC............Office of Defense Cooperation
ODT............Overseas Deployment for Training
OFDA...........Office of Disaster Assistance
OPCON..........Operational Control
OPLAN..........Operation Plan
OPREP..........Operation Report
OPS............Operations
OR.............Operating Room
OSD-PA.........Office of the Secretary of Defense - Public Affairs
OTAR...........Over The Air Rekeying
OVOP...........Overt Operations Proposal
PAC............Panama Analysis Cell
PACOM..........Pacific Command
PAD............Public Affairs Detachment
PANAM..........Pan American
PAO............Public Affairs Office
PCC............Panama Canal Commission
PCT............Panama Canal Treaty
PDF............Panamanian Defense Forces
PE.............Peru
PESMS..........Portable Electronic Support Measures System
PIC............Personal ID Codes
PM.............Panama
PMH............Patrol Missile Hydrofoils
PML............Personnel Movement Limitation
PO's...........Petty Officer's
POL-MIL........Political Military
POM............Program Objective Memorandum
PPBS...........Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
PRC............Panama Review Committee
PRSA...........Public Relations Society of America
PSYOP..........Psychological Operations

PUB............Publication
PY.............Paraguay
R&S............Reconnaissance and Surveillance
RAD............Research and Development
RC.............Reserve Component
REG............Regulation
ROC............Required Operational Capability
ROP............Republic of Panama
RST............Regional Survey Team
SAAM...........Special Assigned Airlift Mission
SAO............Security Assistance Organization
SAR............Search and Rescue
SASS...........Small Aerostat Surveillance System
SAV............Staff Assistance Visit
SBU............Special Boat Unit
SC.............Office Symbol for Southern Command
SCEN...........Southern Command Engineers
SCIF...........Secure Compartmented Intelligence Facility
SCJ2-OI........J2'S Operations Division
SCJ2-PP........J2'S Plans Division
SCJ2-PR........J2'S Programs Division
SCJ2-PS........J2'S Security Division
SCJ3...........U.S. Southern Command Directorate of Operations
SCJ4-L.........U.S. Southern Command Directorate of Logistics, Logistics Resource Readiness Division
SCJ4...........U.S. Southern Command Directorate of Logistics
SCJ5...........U.S. Southern Command Directorate of Strategy, Programs and Policy
SCJ6...........U.S. Southern Command Directorate of Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems
SCN............Southern Command Network
SCPA...........Southern Command Public Affairs
SCSG...........Southern Command Surgeon's Office
SCTA...........U.S. Southern Command Treaty Affairs
SEAL...........Sea, Air, And Land (U.S. Navy SOF)
SECDEF.........Secretary of Defense
SFG(A).........Special Forces Group, Airborne
SFODA..........Special Forces Operations "A" Detachment
SICOFAA........System of Cooperation among Air Forces of the Americas (Sistema de Cooperacion de las Fuerzas Aerias de las Americas)
SIGINT.........Signals Intelligence
SIMS...........Southcom Intelligence Management System
SITREP.........Situational Report
SMEE...........Subject Matter Expert Exchanges
SOAD...........Special Operations Aviation Detachment
SOCSOUTH.......Special Operations Command South
SOF............Special Operations Forces
SOFA...........Status of Forces Agreement
SOLCA ....Special Operations Liaison Communications Assemblages
SOP............Standard Operating Procedures
SPECAT.........Special Category
SROC...........South-Regional Operations Center
SSMIS..........Standard SAO Management Information System

STOL...........Short Take-Off/Landing
STU III........Secure Voice Telephonic Communication Device
SWORD..........Small Wars Operational Requirements Division
TDY............Temporary Duty
TF GRAY........fielded SOF for enhanced security operations for Panama
TIAP...........Theater Intelligence Architecture Program
TIP............Treaty Implementation Planning
TLCF...........WWMCCS Teleconferencing
TOSC4..........Tape Library System
TPFDD..........Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data
TSE............Theater Support Element
UCP............Unified Command Plan
UHV............Upper Huallaga Valley
UMOPAR.........rural paramilitary counternarcotics police
UN.............United Nations
USA............United States Army
USAF...........United States Air Force
USAFSO.........United States Air Force-South
USAID..........U.S. Agency for International Development
USAMMA.........US Army Medical Materiel Agency
USAR...........U.S. Army Reserve
USARSA.........U.S. Army School of the Americas
USARSO DCSINT..USARSO Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence
USARSO.........US Army, South
USARSO.........United States Army South
USASAALA.......US Army Security Assistance Agency, Latin America
USCINCSO.......United States Commander In Chief South (General Woerner)
USDAO..........United States Defense Attache' Office
USF............US Forces
USG............US Government
USMAAG.........United States Military Assistance Advisory Group
USMC...........United States Marine Corps
USMLO..........United States Military Liaison Office
USNAVSO........US Navy, South
USODC..........United States Office of Defense Cooperation
USSOCOM........U.S. Special Operations Command
USSOUTHAF......Southern Air Force
USSOUTHCOM.....United States Southern Command
USSOUTHCOM.....Southern Command
USSOUTHCOM.....US Southern Command
USTRANSCOM.....United States Transportation Command
UY.............Uruguay
UY.............Uruguay
VE.............Venezuela
VHF............Very High Frequency
VISAT..........Vision Satellite de Panama
VOR............VHF Omnidirectional Radio Range
WASSO..........WWMCCS ADP System Security Officer
WATASO.........WWMCCS Terminal Area System Security Officer
WIN............WWMCCS Intercomputer Network
WRAIR..........Walter Reed Army Institute of Research
WRNP...........WWMCCS Remote Network Processor
WWMCCS.........World-Wide Military Command and Control System
Z(032138Z).....Zulu Date, Time, Group

1STFSSG........1st Force Service Support Group
7IDL...........7th Infantry Division Light
24th COMPWG....24TH Composite Wing
82d ABN........82d Airborne Division

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